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The topic of war and peace has come into the focus of scholarly discussions 
again in recent years.1 This volume presents the contributions to a symposium 
held on May 9th, 2009 at the Humanities Center at Harvard and was generously 
funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.2 The symposium focused on the ques-
tion of how peace was established and kept as well as the ways and means the 
ancient Greeks developed to prevent war and maintain interstate stability. In 
this context, different perspectives and approaches, ranging from pragmatic 
political goals and the definition and interpretation of key terms such as eirene to 
the underlying norms and their relevance for the realpolitik, were discussed. 
 
“No one is so foolish as to choose war over peace. In peace sons bury their 
fathers, in war fathers bury their sons.”3 
 
This basic truth is ascribed by Herodotus to Croesus who – after his devastat-
ing defeat against the Persians – finally realizes the foolishness and unjustness 
of his previous actions. War in general is depicted here as a perversion of the 
right order – and one might conclude that avoidance, even abomination of war 
is not only advisable, but inherent in human qualities in general.4 That peace 
was highly valued in ancient Greece is evident already in the earliest texts avail-
able to us. Although the Iliad abundantly glorifies the belligerent ideal, the hor-
rors of war are not concealed either, as it is most prominently demonstrated by 
Zeus, who insults Ares:  
 
                                                
1  Cf. i.a. Ostwald 1996. Momigliano 1998. Raaflaub – Rosenstein (eds.) 1999. 
Amouretti et al. (eds.) 2000. Sordi (ed.) 2001. van Wees 2001. Chaniotis 2005. 
Meißner – Schmitt – Sommer (eds.) 2005. Raaflaub (ed.) 2007. Rocchi (ed.) 2007. 
Raaflaub 2009. Raaflaub 2010. See also Keil 1916. Caldwell 1919. Nestle 1938. 
Bickerman 1944. Zampaglione 1973. Arnould 1981. Melko – Weigel 1981. Schmitt 
1983. Grassl 1984. Kienast 1985. Sordi (ed.) 1985. Erxleben (ed.) 1987. Binder – 
Effe (eds.) 1989. Spiegel 1990. Whitby 1991. Graeber 1992. 
2  The paper by Kurt Raaflaub was published elsewhere, cf. Raaflaub 2009. Raaflaub 
2010.  
3  Hdt. 1.87.4. οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω ἀνόητος ἐστὶ ὅστις πόλεμον πρὸ εἰρήνης αἱρέεται: ἐν μὲν 
γὰρ τῇ οἱ παῖδες τοὺς πατέρας θάπτουσι, ἐν δὲ τῷ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας. Translation 
A.D. Goodley. Cf. also Hermocrates in Polyb. 12.26.8 (apud Timaios). 
4  For similar sayings cf. Hdt. 8.3.1; Thuc. 1.80-85, 2.61.1, 4.59.2, 62.2. Cf. Cobet 1986, 
7.  
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“Most hateful to me art thou of all gods that hold Olympus, for ever is 
strife dear to thee and wars and fightings.”5  
 
In contrast, eulogies of peace are widespread in the literature of the archaic 
period. In the Odyssey, for instance, Achilles confesses to Odysseus that he 
would gladly trade the glory of a dead hero for a bare life among the lowest 
social ranks, thus underlining the value of life per se. Shortly afterwards, how-
ever, the hero cannot resist to ask the visiting Odysseus if his son Neoptolemus 
succeeds in meeting the high expectations on the son of the warrior Achilles.6 
Peace is praised even more explicitly by Hesiod. In the Theogony, Eirene is 
presented as one of the Horai together with Dike and Eunomia and is therefore 
shown as a requirement as well as a guarantee of a good life.7 This conjunction 
between peace and justice can also be seen in the Works and Days, where Zeus 
and Dike reward the just city with peace and prosperity.8 Pindar accordingly 
describes Eirene as “guardian of wealth for men”.9 These few examples already 
demonstrate that the ancient Greeks draw a clear difference between war and 
peace and considered this difference as crucial for the well being of the individ-
ual as well as for the success of a community. Equally evident, however, is the 
ambivalence of the very term eirene that was used to describe peace inside a 
community as well as peaceful relations and co-existence with other poleis and 
could imply both the simple absence of war and violence as well as a more 
idyllic state comprising and entailing prosperity and justice.  
The Greeks, of course, were fully aware of the power of war to shape inter-
state relations and the significant impact it could have on communities, as is 
famously demonstrated by Heraclitus’ dictum that war is the father of all 
things.10 However, the appreciation of peace and the reality of wars also 
nudged the Greeks to develop a whole set of instruments to prevent, to limit 
and to end violent conflicts. In fact, already both the Iliad and the Odyssey depict 
                                                
5  Il. 5.890. ἔχθιστος δέ μοί ἐσσι θεῶν οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν: αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη 
πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε. Translation A.T. Murray. For Ares see also Il. 5.757-763, 830-
835, 9.63-64. Cf. also the description of the horrors of war by Hector and 
Andromache in Il. 6.407-460 and the comparison between the city in peace and the 
city in war on the shield of Achilles (Il. 18.490-540). 
6  Od. 11. 488-494. For more critical traditions regarding the Trojan War cf. Scodel 
2008.  
7  Hes. Theog. 901-903.  
8  Hes. Op. 224-228. Raaflaub 2010, 598.  
9  Pindar, Ol. 13,7-8. ταμί ἀνδράσι πλούτου. Cf. also Od. 24,486. Anth. Lyr.2 Carm. Pop. 
frg. 1 (Diehl). Bacchyl. frg. 4, 61-72 (Snell).  
10  Heraclitus frg. 53 (Diels/Kranz). Cf. also Cleinias in Plato’s Nomoi (626a) on 
permanent, but undeclared war between all poleis.  
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a variety of solutions to settle a conflict, even though on different levels and 
under different circumstances.11 From earliest Greek history on, duels, negotia-
tions and truces were used to limit the sorrows of war, and treaties and alliances 
were concluded in order to restore peace and to prevent future conflicts either 
by stipulations or by deterrence.12 Other states tried to maintain security by 
pursuing a policy of neutrality.13 While these instruments neither could nor 
were intended to ban war altogether from the Greek world, they nevertheless 
constituted a basic framework of rules and instruments explicitly or implicitly 
designed to prevent or to end the most violent and harmful conflicts.  
However, new developments in the fifth century changed the rule of poli-
tics to an extent previously unknown. The Persian campaign under Xerxes 
posed a new kind of threat to many Greek communities and thus caused an 
equally uncommon response. When some of the Greek poleis decided to join 
forces in order to counter the Persian aggression under Xerxes and founded the 
Hellenic League, the cities concluded individual treaties with Sparta as the lead-
ing power, but they also agreed to abandon or at least defer all conflicts with 
other members of the League, as Herodotus attests for the case of Aegina and 
Athens.14 Peace among the Greek cities thus became and was understood as a 
prerequisite to prevailing against a common and superior enemy. While this 
united movement was proudly celebrated in the aftermath of Xerxes’ defeat, 
the emergence of Athens and Sparta as new superpowers in the wake of the 
Persian Wars changed the Greek world even more profoundly. The rise of the 
Delian League brought forth an alliance that constituted a novelty both in its 
form as a hegemonic symmachia as well as in regard to Athens’ domination over 
its allies. The increasing conflict with Sparta that culminated in the Peloponne-
sian War caused even more significant changes.  
For the Greek thinking about war and peace, the Peloponnesian War 
proved to be a pivotal experience. Due to their widespread alliances, most parts 
of Greece were drawn into the war between Athens and Sparta that hence went 
far beyond the geographic scope of former conflicts. The rapidly developing 
military technique and the long duration of the conflict caused major conse-
quences for the general population, and the increasing ruthlessness and the 
                                                
11  Cf. the private settlement between Priam and Achilles in the Iliad and the re-
establishment of peaceful order in Ithaca based on Odysseus’ reconciliation with the 
relatives of the killed suitors in the Odyssey. Cf. Alonso 2007, 207. 
12  Cf., inter alia, Kiechle 1958. Piccirilli 1973. Adcock – Mosley 1975. Olshausen (ed.) 
1979. Tausend 1992. Baltrusch 1994. Raaflaub 1997. Piccirilli 2002. Raaflaub 2009, 
esp. 239. Elmer and Bershadsky in this volume. 
13  Alonso 2007, 208. For concepts of neutrality in later periods see Alonso 1987 and 
2001. 
14  Hdt. 7.145.1. 
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abundantly reported cruelties surpassed all previous experiences.15 In reaction 
to these experiences, yearning for peace spread, as it is most impressively evi-
dent in the Attic drama of these times. Thus, Euripides praises the eagerly 
awaited peace in his Cresphontes:  
 
“Peace, with your depth of wealth, fairest of the blessed gods, I pine for 
you, so long you are in coming; I fear old age may overwhelm me with 
hardships before I can look upon your graceful beauty, your songs adorned 
with dancing, your garland-loving revels. Come, mistress, to my city! Ban 
from our homes the hateful Discord, and raging Strife that delights in whet-
ted iron”.16 
 
The same theme is explained in more detail by the Theban herald in his 
Hiketides: 
 
“For whenever the city has to vote on the question of war, no man ever 
takes his own death into account, but shifts this misfortune on to another; 
but if death were before their eyes when they were giving their votes, Hellas 
would never rush to her doom in mad desire for battle. And yet each man 
among us knows which of the two to prefer, the good or ill, and how much 
better peace is for mankind than war, peace, the Muses’ dearest friend, the 
foe of Sorrow, whose joy is in glad throngs of children, and its delight in 
prosperity. These are the blessings we cast away and wickedly embark on 
war, man enslaving his weaker brother, and cities following suit.”17 
                                                
15  Cf. Thuc. 1.231-232.  
16  Eur. frg. 453 (Cresphontes). Εἰρήνα βαθύπλουτε καὶ καλλίστα μακάρων θεῶν, ζῆλός 
μοι σέθεν ὡς χρονίζεις. δέδοικα δὲ μὴ πρὶν πόνοις ὑπερβάλῃ με γῆρας, πρὶν σὰν 
χαρίεσσαν προσιδεῖν ὥραν καὶ καλλιχόρους ἀοιδὰς φιλοστεφάνους τε κώμους. ἴθι 
μοι, πότνα, πόλιν. τὰν δ’ ἐχθρὰν στάσιν εἶργ’ ἀπ' οἴκων τὰν μαινομέναν τ’ ἔριν θηκτῷ 
τερπομέναν σιδάρῳ. Translation Chr. Collard – M. Cropp. Although this passage 
refers especially to internal strife and civil war, the general praise of peace was clearly 
understood as a comment on the current situation during the Archidamian War as 
well, cf. Harder 1985, 3f. 102f.  
17  Eur. Suppl. 481-492. ὅταν γὰρ ἔλθῃ πόλεμος ἐς ψῆφον λεώ, οὐδεὶς ἔθ᾽ αὑτοῦ θάνατον 
ἐκλογίζεται, τὸ δυστυχὲς δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐς ἄλλον ἐκτρέπει· εἰ δ᾽ ἦν παρ᾽ ὄμμα θάνατος ἐν 
ψήφου φορᾷ, οὐκ ἄν ποθ᾽ Ἑλλὰς δοριμανὴς ἀπώλλυτο. καίτοι δυοῖν γε πάντες 
ἄνθρωποι λόγοιν τὸν κρείσσον᾽ ἴσμεν, καὶ τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ κακά, ὅσῳ τε πολέμου 
κρεῖσσον εἰρήνη βροτοῖς· ἣ πρῶτα μὲν Μούσαισι προσφιλεστάτη, Ποιναῖσι δ᾽ ἐχθρά, 
τέρπεται δ᾽ εὐπαιδίᾳ, χαίρει δὲ πλούτῳ. ταῦτ᾽ ἀφέντες οἱ κακοὶ πολέμους 
ἀναιρούμεσθα καὶ τὸν ἥσσονα δουλούμεθ᾽, ἄνδρες ἄνδρα καὶ πόλις πόλιν. 
Translation E.P. Coleridge. Cf. also Eur. Tro. 95-97. Hel. 1151-1160. For war and 
peace in drama in general see Zampaglione 1973, 71-82. Erxleben (ed.) 1987. Spiegel 
1990, 93-111. Raaflaub 2001, 334-339. 
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This laudation of peace clearly takes up and expands the earlier traditions of 
praising eirene cited above; but Euripides also explicitly mentions the entice-
ments that continuously mislead the citizens to ignore potential dangers and to 
strive for war. The same problems are addressed in an even more pointed 
manner in the comedies of Aristophanes. Dicaiopolis, the comic hero of the 
Acharnians (performed 425 BC), concludes a separate peace treaty with Sparta, 
while in Aristophanes’ Peace even the gods leave Olympus to Polemos who 
holds the goddess Eirene captive.18 This widespread and intensive discussion 
about the issue of peace in Attic drama thus proves that the topic arose the 
interest of the public and was subject to heated debates among the citizens. 
And despite the fact that our evidence is rather limited, there is no compelling 
reason to assume that these thoughts and debates were confined to Athens.19  
But even though peace had thus been established as a desirable value, the 
Greeks were reluctant to transform it into a political concept and implement it 
as a major goal of interstate politics. Even the devastating experiences of the 
Peloponnesian War had no immediate impact, neither in political actions nor in 
regard to the development of more effective instruments to avoid war in the 
future. Less than ten years after the capitulation of Athens in 404 BC, Sparta 
was again at war not only against the Persian Empire in Asia Minor, but also 
against a coalition led by Athens, Thebes and Corinth. And it is not until 392 
BC that we hear of any serious attempts to end the war and to establish a more 
stable order of interstate relations. Eventually, in 386 BC the King’s Peace was 
concluded as the first koine eirene20 and peace was finally recognized as a legal 
status in interstate relations.21 The invention of the koine eirene was a watershed 
moment in the development of Greek thinking on peace and the combination 
of key terms such as eirene, eleutheria and autonomia continued to dominate the 
inter-political discourse and propaganda for the following decades. The in-
creased significance of peace was also reflected in the establishment of a formal 
cult in Athens, presumably after peace agreement of 375 BC.22 The famous 
                                                
18  See also the debates about peace in Aristoph. Equ. 634-673. 792-819. Vesp. 472-476. 
666-685. 698-712, the joint lamentations of Athenians and Spartans in frg. 415, 420 
(Holkades) and, of course, the Lysistrata of 411 BC; cf. Zampaglione 1973, 82-90. 
Erxleben (ed.) 1987. Spiegel 1990, 112-125. Raaflaub 2001, 329-334. 
19  Raaflaub 2010, 596f.  
20  For the koine eirene see esp. Ryder 1965. Jehne 1994. Wilker in this volume. 
21  Cf. Polly Low in this volume. 
22  Philochorus FGrH 328 F 151; Isocr. 15.109-110; Nep. Timotheos 2.2. Cf. also SEG 
16.55 (29.88) and its discussion by Robert 1979 and Jehne 1994, 63 Anm. 93. The 
account of Plutarch (Cimon 13,6) that a cult for Eirene had already been established 
in the mid of the fifth century in order to celebrate the Peace of Callias has to be 
rejected; cf. Jacoby FGrH IIIb Suppl. I. 522-526. Suppl. II. 420-422.  
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statue of Cephisodotus in the Agora shows the goddess Eirene bearing the 
infant Ploutos, taking up the earlier traditions of the interdependence of peace 
and prosperity.23  
However, from its very beginning of existence the koine eirene as well as re-
lated prominent catchwords such as peace and autonomy were employed and 
misused by the hegemonic and ambitious poleis in order to establish or 
strengthen their dominant position in power politics.24 Despite the recognition 
of peace not only as a legal, but also as the preferable relationship between 
states,25 war continued to be understood as an inevitable element of interstate 
relations, 26 as it was already stated by Herodotus’ Croesus who ends his lamen-
tation cited at the very beginning with the verdict: 
 
“But I suppose it was dear to the divinity that this be so.”27 
 
It is therefore by no surprise that these ambivalences in ideology, meaning and 
pragmatic power politics are reflected in contemporary political theory. While 
Plato and Aristotle are mostly concerned with peace and justice inside the polis, 
a comprehensive approach to peace in inter-political affairs is virtually absent 
from their writings. Both philosophers regarded a world without war as entirely 
utopian and only offer some thoughts on how armed conflicts could be tempo-
rarily avoided or limited in scope.28 Nevertheless, our sources do offer some 
traces of new perspectives on peace that went beyond the scope of the tradi-
                                                
23  Paus. 1.8.2, 9.16.2. La Rocca 1974. Jung 1976. Simon 1986, 702 no. 8. Simon 1988, 
12-16. 
24  For the ambivalence of the term eirene esp. in fourth century BC see Polly Low in 
this volume.  
25  For war as a deviation from the just and good order see already Solon frg. 4 (West). 
Anonymus Iamblichi frg. 89.6.4 (Diels/Kranz), cf. Raaflaub 2010, 598-600.  
26  Heraclitus frg. 67 (Diels/Kranz). 
27  Hdt. 1.87.4. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα δαίμοσί κου φίλον ἦν οὕτω γενέσθαι. Translation A.D. 
Godley. 
28  See, for instance, Plat. Leg. 628d-e: “With regard to the well-being of a state or an 
individual, that man will never make a genuine statesman who pays attention primar-
ily solely to the needs of foreign warfare, nor will he make a finished lawgiver unless 
he designs his legislation for peace rather than his peace legislation for war.” (πρὸς 
πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώτου διανοούμενος οὕτω τις οὔτ᾽ ἄν ποτε πολιτικὸς 
γένοιτο ὀρθῶς, πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων μόνον καὶ πρῶτον, οὔτ᾽ ἂν 
νομοθέτης ἀκριβής, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν 
πολεμικῶν ἕνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης. Translation R.G. Bury. Cf. also the states not af-
fected by war in Plato Rep. 2,372d1-3 (“city of pigs”) und Aristot. Pol. 7.2.1324b41-
1325a5. For Plato and Aristotle on war and peace see Nestle 1938, 28-31. Zampa-
glione 1973, 54-64. Cambiano 1985. Spiegel 1990, 190-210. Ostwald 1996. 
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tional praises of eirene. While peace in general, as we have seen, was positively 
connoted throughout Greek history, the definition and meaning of the term did 
change over the course of the centuries and was subject to the political and/or 
economic objectives implicitly or explicitly tied to it.29 And although the bene-
fits of peace in general were never disputed,30 the relevance attributed to main-
taining or creating peace differed compared to other ambitions.31 On the other 
hand, the explanations why peace, in fact, has to be regarded as a state worth 
striving for, multiplied and became increasingly elaborate. The benefits of peace 
for the individual as well as for the community were given more and more 
priority and a utilitarian approach towards peace was promoted, like the one 
Xenophon presented in his Poroi:  
 
“For I presume that those states are reckoned the happiest that enjoy the 
longest period of unbroken peace; and of all states Athens is by nature most 
suited to flourish in peace. For if the state is tranquil, what class of men will 
not need her? Ship-owners and merchants will head the list. Then there will 
be those rich in corn and wine and oil and cattle; men possessed of brains 
and money to invest; craftsmen and professors and philosophers; poets and 
the people who make use of their works; those to whom anything sacred or 
secular appeals that is worth seeing or hearing. Besides, where will those 
who want to buy or sell many things quickly meet with better success in 
their efforts than at Athens? (...) If, on the other hand, any one supposes 
that financially war is more profitable to the state than peace, I really do not 
know how the truth of this can be tested better than by considering once 
more what has been the experience of our state in the past. He will find that 
in old days a very great amount of money was paid into the treasury in time 
of peace, and that the whole of it was spent in time of war.”32 
                                                
29  Cf. Polly Low and Maria Brosius in this volume.  
30  Cf. the differentiation between a real peace (εἰρήνη) and a truce (σπονδαί) by Ando-
cides; see Julia Wilker in this volume.  
31  So (explicitly) Polybios 4.31.3-4: “I admit, indeed, that war is a terrible thing; but it is 
less terrible than to submit to anything whatever in order to avoid it. For what is the 
meaning of our fine talk about equality of rights, freedom of speech, and liberty, if 
the one important thing is peace?” (ἐγὼ γὰρ φοβερὸν μὲν εἶναί φημι τὸν πόλεμον, οὐ 
μὴν οὕτω γε φοβερὸν ὥστε πᾶν ὑπομένειν χάριν τοῦ μὴ προσδέξασθαι πόλεμον. ἐπεὶ τί 
καὶ θρασύνομεν τὴν ἰσηγορίαν καὶ παρρησίαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ὄνομα πάντες, εἰ 
μηδὲν ἔσται προυργιαίτερον τῆς εἰρήνης; Translation E.S. Shuckburgh). Similar 
thoughts can be found in Eur. Troad. 400-403, cf. Kienast 1985, 14f.  
32  Xen. Poroi 5.2-4, 11-12. εὐδαιμονέσταται μὲν γὰρ δήπου πόλεις λέγονται, αἳ ἂν 
πλεῖστον χρόνον ἐν εἰρήνῃ διατελῶσι: πασῶν δὲ πόλεων Ἀθῆναι μάλιστα πεφύκασιν 
ἐν εἰρήνῃ αὔξεσθαι. τίνες γὰρ ἡσυχίαν ἀγούσης τῆς πόλεως οὐ προσδέοιντ᾽ ἂν αὐτῆς 
ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ ναυκλήρων καὶ ἐμπόρων; οὐχ οἱ πολύσιτοι, οὐχ οἱ πολύοινοι [οὐχ οἱ 
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In the following, Xenophon argues that a more active policy of peace could 
help Athens to regain its leading role in Greece as well as the goodwill of the 
other poleis – and even spare the massive expenses an expansion based upon 
force would cost.33 Peace therefore gained further legitimacy and was not re-
garded as a hindrance to the success in foreign policy anymore.34 Alternative 
approaches to ban war at least from mainland Greece were also brought for-
ward by the growing panhellenic movement.35 However, appeals to common 
values and norms, references to written and/or unwritten laws and treaties36 as 
well as common or individual benefits37 were not mutually exclusive, but rather 
complemented each other in the public discourse.  
As it has been demonstrated, peace was recognized as a significantly posi-
tive value from the early Greek history on. While the Greeks considered war as 
a constituent of politics, modern scholarship has in recent decades almost 
unanimously and rightly rejected the thesis that war was the normal, even the 
natural state of interstate relations in ancient history.38 Even in antiquity war 
was only one option among many.39 Therefore, “peace” has to be regarded as 
an equally important factor – as a political catchword, a value open to a whole 
variety of definitions, and a goal, that was hard to achieve, but worth a try. The 
ambivalence and wide range of possible meanings and employments of the 
term eirene, the precariousness of peace and the very fact that based on our 
sources, war sometimes seems to have been a ubiquitous factor in ancient poli-
tics make it even more difficult to assess “peace” as a topic in modern scholar-
ship. The present volume therefore aims to focus on the ways and means the 
                                                                                                    
ἡδύοινοι]; τί δὲ οἱ πολυέλαιοι, τί δὲ οἱ πολυπρόβατοι, οἱ δὲ γνώμῃ καὶ ἀργυρίῳ 
δυνάμενοι χρηματίζεσθαι; καὶ μὴν χειροτέχναι τε καὶ σοφισταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι, οἱ δὲ 
ποιηταί, οἱ δὲ τὰ τούτων μεταχειριζόμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἀξιοθεάτων ἢ ἀξιακούστων ἱερῶν ἢ 
ὁσίων ἐπιθυμοῦντες; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ δεόμενοι πολλὰ ταχὺ ἀποδίδοσθαι ἢ πρίασθαι 
ποῦ τούτων μᾶλλον ἂν τύχοιεν ἢ Ἀθήνησιν; (...) εἰ δέ τις αὖ εἰς χρήματα 
κερδαλεώτερον νομίζει εἶναι τῇ πόλει πόλεμον ἢ εἰρήνην, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα πῶς ἂν 
ἄμεινον ταῦτα κριθείη ἢ εἴ τις τὰ προγεγενημένα ἐπανασκοποίη τῇ πόλει πῶς 
ἀποβέβηκεν. εὑρήσει γὰρ τό τε παλαιὸν ἐν εἰρήνῃ μὲν πάνυ πολλὰ χρήματα εἰς τὴν 
πόλιν ἀνενεχθέντα, ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα καταδαπανηθέντα. Translation E.C. 
Marchant. 
33  Xen. Poroi 5.5-10. A similar argument is brought forward by Isocrates in his On the 
Peace (esp. Isocr. 8.19-26). 
34  Cf. Polly Low in this volume.  
35  Flower 2000.  
36  Cf. Peter Hunt in this volume. 
37  See above; Xen. Vect. 5.5-10; Isocr. 8.19-26. 
38  See Keil 1916, esp. S. 7-9; cf. also Vernant 1987, 31f. 45. Momigliano 1998, 243f. 
Bernand 1999, 214f.  
39  Cf. especially Santi Amantini 1979-1980. Schmitt 1983, 33. Meier 1990, 561f. 588. 
Baltrusch 2008, 7. 22-23. 103. 
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Greeks developed and employed in order to prevent wars, to stabilize interstate 
relations and to keep peace during the archaic and classical periods. In this 
context, emphasis is given to the premises, contents and relevance of such 
policies as well as the political discourse related to the issues at stake. In order 
to understand the forms and modes of Greek peace policies, the various strate-
gies and ways of implementation have to be analyzed – ranging from a restric-
tion of military actions40 and diplomatic efforts41 to legally binding agreements 
and more comprehensive concepts of peacekeeping and inter-political stabiliza-
tion.42 In this context, shared values and commonly accepted terms are of spe-
cial importance as they are essential for a settlement between conflicting par-
ties.43 
 
As it is only appropriate for a volume dealing with questions of war and peace 
in the Greek world, the first contribution by David Elmer deals with the Iliad 
and analyzes the famous duel of Menelaos and Alexander in the third and 
fourth book that was aimed to end the conflict and to prevent further blood-
shed. In this context, the poet vividly describes the soldiers’ hopes for an end 
of the war regardless of their origin, thus merging the two parties into one 
community of shared interest. This new community is symbolized in particular 
by the ritual oath made by Priam and Agamemnon, where the obligatory sanc-
tionary clause is attributed not to Agamemnon, but anonymously to “someone” 
(tis) from the ranks of the Trojans and the Achaeans. In the framework of the 
Homeric narrative, such a tis-speech signifies a collective bipartisan statement, 
thus underlining the unity created by the shared hope for peace. However, the 
community across the battle lines was only temporary and the peaceful consen-
sus broke up immediately as Alexander was secretly carried away by Aphrodite 
leaving the parties in disagreement about the outcome of the duel.  
While the Iliad undoubtedly ranks among the most influential epos regard-
ing heroic war traditions even beyond the scope of classical antiquity, the fol-
lowing article also deals with the development and revitalization of traditions. 
Natasha Bershadsky examines the relations between Sparta and Argos. She 
argues that in the archaic period, these relations were constructed around a 
myth of an Argive-Spartan conflict over the Thyreatis. The accompanying 
practice of recurrent ritual battles is reflected in Herodotus' description of a 
battle between the two poleis (Hdt. 1.82). This ritual fell into oblivion after the 
Spartan annexation of Cynuria in the sixth century, but the Argives asked for its 
                                                
40  See David Elmer and Natasha Bershadsky in this volume.  
41  See Sarah Bolmarcich in this volume. 
42  See Peter Hunt, Julia Wilker and Maria Brosius in this volume.   
43  See David Elmer, Polly Low and Peter Hunt in this volume. 
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reinstatement during the peace negotiations of 420 BC. The reactivation of this 
ritual suited the interest of the oligarchic party in Argos that hoped to gain 
further legitimacy in the internal conflicts and to counter the anti-Spartan 
propaganda of the democratic faction.  
The role of diplomacy in the Peloponnesian War is in the focus of Sarah 
Bolmarcich’s contribution. She shows that, according to Thucydides’ account, 
the negotiations between Sparta and Athens right before the outbreak of the 
war oscillated between unrealistic and more pragmatic claims of both parties. 
Due to the process of the argument, however, both sides must in fact have 
been sure that their demands would not be met and thus inevitably headed for 
war. The Melian Dialogue, on the other hand, demonstrates how diplomatic 
negotiations were run under the overwhelming military dominance of Athens. 
Here, the self-confidence and arrogance of the Athenians declared real negotia-
tions doomed to failure from the very beginning. In this context, diplomacy is 
therefore not a way to prevent war, but only suitable to delay its outbreak.  
My own article deals with the emergence of the koine eirene-idea and the first 
attempt to establish an interstate agreement based on the principles of a Com-
mon Peace in the negotiations of 392/391 BC. Although the Athenian assem-
bly rejected the peace proposal at that time, the idea of a Common Peace, 
based on the right of autonomy for all poleis and intended to last forever, revo-
lutionized Greek interstate relations. However, the emergence of this idea was 
not only a result of an increasing war-weariness on all sides. The Athenian arche, 
the Peloponnesian War and Sparta’s hegemonic policy in its aftermath had 
made clear that a comprehensive order was necessary to maintain interstate 
stability. As a multi-party peace treaty of unlimited term the proposal of 
392/391 BC constituted an innovative approach, but also has to be regarded as 
a consequence of previous experiences.  
Polly Low focuses on the question what eirene in fact meant for the Greeks 
in the late classical period. In an inscription probably dated to 362/361 BC (RO 
42), the Greeks justify their negative answer to a request for help by the rebel-
lious Persian satraps with a praise of peace. This praise emphasizes the benefits 
of peace including happiness and prosperity for their own cities as well as po-
litical strength and the ability to help one’s friends, thus demonstrating the 
ambiguity of the term peace and the significant differences between an ideal-
ized value and a legal status. Therefore, a peace treaty could well be regarded 
and favored as the basis of a new war against an outside party. Therefore, in 
Athens the newly established cult of Eirene was not seen as a contradiction to 
the revitalized military ambitions. On the other hand, several sources show that 
such a strictly functionalist interpretation of peace was not left unchallenged, 
thus proving an ongoing and vivid public debate about the meaning of peace 
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and its relevance as well as the relationship between policies of peace and 
power politics.  
Peter Hunt discusses the role of legalism in interstate relations in the late 
classical period. Based upon the evidence of especially the symbouleutic 
speeches, he shows that legal regulations and clauses of treaties in particular 
bore more significance in the political discourse than it has been usually as-
sumed in modern scholarship. The citation of clauses and treaties were of spe-
cial importance in public debates; war could only be waged if a former treaty 
was nullified. At the same time, the Greeks were well aware that interstate 
conflicts could be resolved peacefully based upon legal considerations and in 
fact considered these solutions as superior to war. This approach offers new 
perspectives on the character of Greek interstate relations in general and shows 
that war was by far not as ubiquitous and dominant as it is often assumed.  
Finally, Maria Brosius focuses on the Greco-Persian relationship. In this 
context, an analysis of the relations inside the Achaemenid Empire between the 
Great King and the satraps helps to understand the Persian policy towards the 
Greek poleis especially in Ionia. While internal rebellions and other threats to the 
central power and the stability of the empire in general were subdued immedi-
ately, revolts in more remote provinces were mostly brought to an end by dip-
lomatic means and mediators. A similar pattern applies to the Greco-Persian 
relations in general: while severe threats to the Pax Persica were countered by 
immediate military actions, a certain degree of autonomy and independence was 
granted to provinces at the fringes of the empire as long as they accepted the 
superiority of the Great King. The example of the city of Erythrae shows that 
under these circumstances, for the Greek poleis in Ionia it was worth consider-
ing Persian authority instead of Athenian hegemonic rule.  
The contributions to this volume thus deal with a great variety of problems, 
political situations and interests from Homeric times to the very end of the 
classical period. Nevertheless, they do present a coherent picture of the general 
strive for peace and interstate stability, although these aims could well be inter-
preted in different terms and had to be brought in line with the political interest 
and ideologies of their times.  
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Building Community Across the Battle-Lines 
The Truce in I l iad  3 and 4 
 
David F. Elmer 
 
Recent work on interstate relations in early Greece has produced two major 
revisions of established positions. The first is a welcome reassessment of Bruno 
Keil’s often-cited characterization of peace as “a contractual interruption of a 
(natural) state of war.”1 As Victor Alonso has stressed, war was only one possi-
ble mode of interaction for early Greek communities, and no more the default 
than either friendship or the lack of a relationship altogether.2 The second 
major development is represented by Polly Low’s reconsideration of the wide-
spread assumption that “a strict line can be drawn between domestic and inter-
national life”: her work reveals the many ways in which Greek political life 
blurred the boundaries between intra- and inter-polis relationships.3 From a 
certain point of view, these two reconfigurations can be seen to be mutually 
reinforcing. The notion of a default state of war presupposes a clear line of 
demarcation between the community and its enemies. Thus, if the Athena of 
Aeschylus’ Eumenides can promote the idea of an Athens more or less perpetu-
ally at war (“let there be foreign war, without stint”)4, it is in the context of the 
play’s construction of a civic body that is both internally cohesive and distinct 
from all others. The vision of the polis as a self-contained entity makes it possi-
ble to imagine a permanent, natural state of war. If, however, the boundaries of 
early Greek communities are not as clearly articulated as Aeschylus’ vision 
implies, then the prospect of a default relationship between communities be-
comes correspondingly more elusive. 
In fact, the Iliad speaks both to the vigor with which early Greek thought 
explored the possibility of alternatives to war, and to the fluid conception of 
community that supported such thinking. The poem expresses a discernible 
longing for peace, particularly in Books 3 and 4, when the Achaeans and Tro-
jans struggle to establish and maintain philotês (“friendship”) amongst them-
selves. This episode provides one of the principal examples exploited by 
Alonso in his critique of Keil. Alonso nevertheless holds to a conception of 
philotês as a “bond with a bilateral character,” that is, as a reciprocal relationship 
                                                
1  Keil 1916, 8. 
2  Alonso 2007. See also Baltrusch 1994, 94, with references. 
3  See Low 2007, esp. ch. 3; my quotation is from pp. 129-130.  
4  Aesch. Eum. 864. θυραῖος ἔστω πόλεμος, οὐ μόλις παρών. “Without stint” is the 
translation of Smyth 1999 (1926). 
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between distinct groups.5 In so doing, he loses sight of the most distinctive 
feature of the Argive-Trojan entente: what is at stake is not so much the recon-
figuration of a relationship between communities as the establishment of a new, 
higher-order community, one which incorporates both sides. Although this 
community ultimately proves unsustainable, for a short period of time it pro-
vides a framework for the peaceful interaction of its members. The present 
contribution seeks to delineate the terms in which the emergence of this 
broader community is expressed, and to provide some reflection on the mean-
ing of its ultimate non-viability. 
 
 
Speaking with a common voice 
 
When the Trojans and Achaeans are finally on the verge of joining battle, at the 
beginning of Book 3, Hector rebukes Alexander for shrinking from the fight. 
Shamed, Alexander offers to engage Menelaos in single combat, with the victor 
taking uncontested possession of Helen and the wealth she brought to Troy. As 
far as the wider conflict is concerned, Alexander envisions a negotiated settle-
ment: once the duel is resolved, the disputants’ respective communities will 
establish philotês through oaths, and the Argives will return peacefully to their 
homeland (3.73-75). Hector steps forward to present Alexander’s offer, and 
Menelaos, accepting, calls for sacrificial victims so that the leaders of the armies 
may swear an oath to abide by the terms of the treaty. These ritual preparations 
represent the first concrete step toward a reconfiguration of the relationship 
between the warring parties. The assembled soldiers of both sides respond with 
collective sentiments of joy and hope: 
 
“So he spoke, and both the Achaeans and the Trojans rejoiced, 
hoping for an end to toilsome war.”6 
 
The fact that Trojans and Achaeans respond as a group, as the collective sub-
ject of the verb “rejoiced” (ἐχάρησαν), marks an important moment of social 
adjustment, an incremental step toward the fusion of discrete entities. 
The full significance of this response emerges more clearly when viewed 
against the background of the set of formulas the Iliad employs to describe the 
responses of audiences in deliberative contexts. A superficial reading of the 
collective reaction of Achaeans and Trojans might register it simply as the 
                                                
5  Alonso 2007, 212. 
6  Il. 3.111-112. ὣς ἔφαθ’, οἳ δ’ ἐχάρησαν Ἀχαιοί τε Τρῶές τε | ἐλπόμενοι παύσασθαι 
ὀϊζυροῦ πολέμοιο. 
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mechanical consequence of a unique situation, namely, the formulation of a 
proposal addressed jointly to both sides. Such a reading, however, goes against 
the grain of a textual strategy aimed at constructing broad distinctions between 
Greek and Trojan collective behaviors.7 Nowhere is this strategy more evident 
than in the system of formulas for audience response in scenes of collective 
decision-making, what might be called the poem’s “grammar of reception.”8 
The Iliad employs a fairly restricted set of such formulas. Generally speaking, 
Iliadic audiences display one of five reactions to deliberative proposals, ex-
pressed in the following five ways (with variations)9:  
 
1. ὣς ἔφαθ᾿, οἳ δ᾿ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ 
He spoke thus, and they were all silent 
 (3.95, 7.398, 8.28, 9.29, etc.) 
2. ἔνθ᾿ ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοί 
Thereupon all the other Achaeans expressed approval  
 (1.22, 1.376) 
3. ὣς ἔφαθ᾿, οἳ δ᾿ ἄρα πάντες ἐπίαχον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν 
He spoke thus, and all the sons of the Achaeans shouted in response  
(7.403, 9.50; variants at 2.333, 2.394) 
4. ὣς Ἕκτωρ ἀγόρευ᾿, ἐπὶ δὲ Τρῶες κελάδησαν 
Hector spoke thus, and the Trojans roared in response  
 (8.542, 18.310) 
5. ὣς ἔφαθ᾿, οἳ δ᾿ ἄρα πάντες ἐπῄνησαν βασιλῆες 
He spoke thus, and all the kings approved 
 (7.344, 9.710; variants at 3.461, 23.539; cf. 
2.335, 4.29, 4.380, 16.443, 18.312, 22.181) 
 
The essential thing to note about this formulaic system is the rigor with which 
it distinguishes between the behaviors of different communities. The first and 
                                                
7  On the ways in which the Iliad distinguishes between the Greek and Trojan com-
munities, particularly with regard to speech, see Mackie 1996. 
8  I explore this grammar in detail in a forthcoming book (Elmer 2013). See esp. chap-
ter 1. 
9  This list omits another formula frequently used to indicate that a proposal has been 
accepted: ὣς ἔφαθ᾿, οἱ δ᾿ ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἠδ᾿ ἐπίθοντο (7.379, 9.79, 14.133, 
etc.). This formula is not, strictly speaking, part of the “grammar of response,” since 
it refers not to the reaction of the audience but merely to the efficacy of the pro-
posal. Il. 2.142 and 9.173 both represent complex exceptions to the system, which 
can be explained in terms of an emphasis, at moments of crisis, on social atomiza-
tion, as opposed to the solidarity ideally operative in collective decision-making 
(Elmer 2013). 
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last of these responses occur among both Greek and Trojan audiences, but the 
other three are strictly limited to one or the other group. Moreover, the single 
instance in which a Trojan audience responds with a version of the fifth reac-
tion (18.312) acquires its significance from the fact that this response is other-
wise restricted to the Achaeans (and the Olympians): at a climactic moment in 
the narrative, the Trojans suddenly adopt a mode of collective decision-making 
more typical of their enemies, and opt for a course of action (camping on the 
battlefield to press their advantage in the morning) that leads ultimately to their 
demise. 
Against this background, the peculiarity of the collective reaction of Achae-
ans and Trojans comes more clearly into view. The response formulas reviewed 
above focus on the presence or absence of a discernible sign of approval. In 
this case, however, the narrator refers simply to the affective disposition of the 
audience (joy mixed with hope), without specifying whether that disposition 
was expressed. The unambiguous disclosure of group sentiment is obviously 
essential to true collective deliberation. The narrator’s lack of specificity on this 
occasion contributes to a certain ambiguity as to the nature of the proceedings. 
In spite of the obvious importance of a possible agreement to all those in-
volved, we are entitled to wonder whether Alexander’s proposal is a matter of 
group action or a purely private arrangement between himself and Menelaos. It 
has characteristics of both, but this is not, evidently, a scene of true collective 
decision-making; at least, the audience does not behave as though it were. The 
more important peculiarity for our purposes, however, concerns the simple fact 
that the same response is predicated simultaneously of two groups whose be-
haviors the Iliad is elsewhere at pains to distinguish. By violating the overall 
tendency of the poem’s formulaic system, these lines offer a striking indication 
that the boundary separating the two sides is beginning to break down. 
The text specifies not only that Greeks and Trojans responded in the same 
way, but that they did so for the same reason: both groups were “hoping for an 
end to toilsome war.” The prospect of a negotiated agreement therefore corre-
sponds to the emergence of a unified sentiment among the warring parties. The 
poem seems to suggest that the very possibility of a treaty requires a coinci-
dence of interests and attitudes. This in itself may not seem very significant: 
without a doubt, some common interest in seeking a resolution is always neces-
sary to bring the parties to a conflict to the negotiating table. Be that as it may, 
the narrator goes to considerable lengths to stress this new community of spirit, 
tying it explicitly to the formal conclusion of the treaty. When Priam arrives 
from the city with the horkia, the sacrificial victims for the oath, Agamemnon 
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pronounces the terms of the agreement.10 The horkia are then slaughtered and 
spondai poured. The sacrifice and libations formally inaugurate a new relation-
ship between Greeks and Trojans, a relationship that is marked not only ritu-
ally, but also, once again, by a notable response on the part of the audience. If 
Menelaos’ proposal of an oath was followed by the first suggestion of an 
emerging concord, the actual execution of the oath sacrifice results in a striking 
indication that Trojans and Greeks are now unified not only in sentiment but 
also in speech: 
 
“[Agamemnon] spoke, and he cut the necks of the lambs with the pitiless 
bronze. 
And he laid them on the ground gasping 
and wanting for life, for the bronze had taken their strength. 
And drawing wine from the mixing-bowl with cups, 
they poured it out, and prayed to the eternal gods. 
And someone of the Achaeans and Trojans was speaking thus: 
‘Most powerful and greatest Zeus, and you other immortal gods, 
whoever should first violate the oath-sacrifices, 
may their brains flow on the ground just like this wine, 
their own and their children’s, and may their wives be taken by others.’”11 
 
The prayer expressed in this collective manner – a prayer that, in itself, does not 
indicate anything more substantive than a common commitment to observing 
the terms of the treaty – is less striking than the fact that Trojans and Greeks 
here speak with a single voice, represented as the words of an anonymous 
“someone” (tis). The significance of this gesture must once again be elucidated 
with reference to the broader conventions of Homeric narrative. 
There is, of course, nothing unusual in the introduction of such an anony-
mous statement into the narrative. Such passages, often called “tis-speeches” 
                                                
10  When Agamemnon reformulates the agreement, he makes an important addition to 
the terms: in the event of Alexander’s defeat, the Trojans are to surrender not just 
Helen and her property, but also a “fitting” penalty “that will be remembered even 
among future generations” (Il. 3.286-287). Although there is no indication of any 
objection to Agamemnon’s addendum, it undoubtedly makes it more difficult for 
the Trojans to accept his eventual judgment on the outcome of the duel (see below). 
11  Il. 3.292-301. ἦ, καὶ ἀπὸ στομάχους ἀρνῶν τάμε νηλέϊ χαλκῷ· | καὶ τοὺς μὲν 
κατέθηκεν ἐπὶ χθονὸς ἀσπαίροντας | θυμοῦ δευομένους· ἀπὸ γὰρ μένος εἵλετο χαλκός. 
| οἶνον δ’ ἐκ κρητῆρος ἀφυσσόμενοι δεπάεσσιν | ἔκχεον, ἠδ’ εὔχοντο θεοῖς 
αἰειγενέτῃσιν. | ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε· | Ζεῦ κύδιστε μέγιστε καὶ 
ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι | ὁππότεροι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὅρκια πημήνειαν | ὧδέ σφ’ ἐγκέφαλος 
χαμάδις ῥέοι ὡς ὅδε οἶνος | αὐτῶν καὶ τεκέων, ἄλοχοι δ’ ἄλλοισι δαμεῖεν. 
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after the characteristic indefinite pronoun, or Chorreden in reference to their 
collective aspect, are widespread.12 There are 17 such speeches in the Iliad, nine 
of them transcribing, as here, what was actually said on a particular occasion, 
and 8 more describing the potential words of imagined speakers. The device is 
not, however, simply a way of indicating what isolated or scattered individuals 
said or might have said, as though the Homeric narrator were a reporter stop-
ping passers-by for a “man-on-the-street” perspective. On the contrary, 
speeches attributed to an anonymous tis are the way the Homeric narrator 
introduces a collective sentiment, a view that characterizes a distinct social group. 
In the Odyssey, for example, the attitudes and intentions of the suitors are sev-
eral times registered by means of such speeches; the discreditable sentiments 
expressed on these occasions are clearly meant to reflect on the suitors as a 
group.13 Moreover, the formulation of a collective attitude in a tis-speech high-
lights the cohesion of the group to which it is ascribed. It thereby comes to 
function as a narrative index of social solidarity. The clearest example of this 
technique is in the Achaean assembly of Book 2. After the near-disintegration 
of the army, Odysseus manages to restore order. A crucial step in his reconsti-
tution of the army as a cohesive group is the forceful silencing of Thersites; this 
scene is capped by the words of the plêthus, the mass of soldiers, as expressed in 
an anonymous tis-speech: 
 
“And [the Achaeans], though distressed, laughed at him with pleasure. 
And thus someone was saying, looking at another near by: 
‘Well! Truly Odysseus has done countless good things 
as author of good counsels and leader in war; 
but now this is the best thing he has done among the Argives, 
in that he has stopped that wordy slanderer from speaking in public. 
His over-proud heart will surely not stir him again 
to antagonize kings with words of blame.’”14 
 
                                                
12  For recent scholarship on Homeric tis-speeches, see Wilson 1979, de Jong 1987, and 
Létoublon 1995. For the term Chorreden, see Hentze 1905. De Jong 1987, 71 empha-
sizes that, in the passage quoted above, Greeks and Trojans are “presented as a collec-
tive” (emphasis original).  
13  See, for example, Od. 2.324-336, 4.769-771. 
14  Il. 2.270-277. οἳ δὲ καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἡδὺ γέλασσαν· | ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν 
ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον· | ὢ πόποι ἦ δὴ μυρί’ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργε | βουλάς τ’ 
ἐξάρχων ἀγαθὰς πόλεμόν τε κορύσσων· | νῦν δὲ τόδε μέγ’ ἄριστον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν 
ἔρεξεν, | ὃς τὸν λωβητῆρα ἐπεσβόλον ἔσχ’ ἀγοράων. | οὔ θήν μιν πάλιν αὖτις ἀνήσει 
θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ | νεικείειν βασιλῆας ὀνειδείοις ἐπέεσσιν. 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
© 2012, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz 
ISBN Print: 9783938032510 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317845
 Building Community Across the Battle-Lines     31 
 
Speeches such as this one are evidently meant to express some kind of perva-
sive social force, a collective feeling that defines or even constructs a group.15 
The attitude of the Achaean plêthus towards Thersites is one of the chief indica-
tors in this scene that a social bond has been restored. 
The anonymous speech that caps the oath-sacrifice in Book 3 serves the 
same function. The words spoken in common by Trojans and Achaeans make 
manifest the social bond the treaty has created (or perhaps the bond that such a 
treaty requires). Not coincidentally, this manifestation of solidarity occurs at the 
very moment of sacrifice, the moment when the wine is poured out on the 
ground.16 The conjunction here of sacrifice and collective utterance recalls the 
importance of sacrifice generally in Homer as a socially meaningful act. Sacrifi-
cial meals frequently mark the establishment or reaffirmation of connections 
between members of a group.17 But this is not a sacrificial meal: as in the case 
of the Iliad’s other oath-sacrifice (19.266-268), the victims are evidently dis-
posed of without being consumed. The social significance of this sacrifice de-
rives strictly from its relation to the treaty, from the fact that it is the ritual 
complement to the oath pronounced by Agamemnon. 
The words of the anonymous representative of the “Achaeans and Trojans” 
likewise stand in a complementary relationship to the oath. In addition to its 
typological function as an expression of the solidarity of a newly-constituted 
group, the tis-speech is also the event that collectivizes the obligations imposed 
by the treaty. It is essential to recognize the public force of this utterance, 
which is not simply, as Irene de Jong has it, “a private prayer of Greek and Tro-
jan soldiers” that “forms an interesting contrast to Agamemnon’s official pray-
er.”18 The contrast, if there is one, is simply a matter of the discrete role played 
by this speech in the overall logic of the treaty ritual. Agamemnon’s oath for-
mulates the terms of the treaty, but it is the anonymous prayer of Achaeans and 
Trojans that stipulates the sanction for violating it, and thus creates a collective 
                                                
15  Cf. Létoublon 1995, 2.  
16  Cf. de Jong 1987, 70. 
17  Cf. Seaford 1994, 42-53. Notable examples are the sacrifice that concludes Iliad 
Book 1, the meal Agamemnon serves to the gerontes at Il. 9.90, the meal shared by 
Achilles and Priam in Book 24, and the meal on Laertes’ farm in Od. 24. Conversely, 
irregular meals or sacrifices indicate some disruption of the community. For exam-
ple, when Achilles is visited by the Embassy, he serves the meat of animals that have 
already been slaughtered (Patroklos burns thuêlai, but the sacrificial killing is omitted: 
Il. 9.206-221). The many scenes depicting the feasting of the Suitors are also part of 
the portrayal of their group as a dysfunctional community. 
18  De Jong 1987, 70 (emphasis original). Hentze 1905, 257 and Bergold 1977, 102 both 
emphasize the connection between the anonymous prayer and the oath ceremony. 
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lective obligation to uphold it.19 There is no break or discontinuity between the 
oath ceremony and the anonymous speech of those who witness it; on the 
contrary, the latter is a vital part of the former. 
Comparison with the inscriptional records of historical treaties helps to clar-
ify this point. The organization of the Iliadic passage in fact bears a striking 
resemblance to what we find in many treaty-inscriptions, in which the terms of 
the treaty are regularly followed by the text of the oaths to be sworn by repre-
sentatives of the communities in question. Notably, the oaths are often com-
posed in the first-person singular, as in the case of a 4th-century summakhia 
treaty, from which I excerpt below: 
 
“Alliance of the Corcyreans and Athenians for all time: if anyone should at-
tack the land or the people of the Corcyreans, the Athenians are to come to 
their aid in full strength, according to the request of the Corcyreans, as they 
are able. And if anyone should attack the people or the land of the Atheni-
ans either by land or by sea, the Corcyreans are to come to their aid in full 
strength, as they are able, according to the request of the Athenians. (...) 
The oath: ‘I will aid the people of the Corcyreans in full strength, as I am 
able, if anyone should attack the land of the Corcyreans either by land or by 
sea, according to the request of the Corcyreans. (...) These things are true by 
Zeus and Apollo and Demeter; if I keep my oath, may I enjoy many good 
things, and if not, the opposite.’ ‘I will aid the people of the Athenians in 
full strength as I am able, if anyone attacks the land of the Athenians either 
by land or by sea, according to the request of the Athenians. (...)  
These things are true by Zeus and Apollo and Demeter; if I keep my oath, 
may I enjoy many good things, and if not, the opposite.’”20 
                                                
19  Cf. Il. 19.264-265 (with Bergold 1977, 102): when swearing, by means of a similar 
oath sacrifice, that he has not touched Briseis, Agamemnon concludes by stipulating 
the sanction for perjury. The statement of the terms of the oath and the stipulation 
of the sanction here occur in the same prayer; in Book 3, these two components are 
distributed between Agamemnon and his audience. 
20  IG ii2 97 (375 BC): συμμαχία Κορκυραίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον. ἐάν τις 
ἴηι ἐ[πὶ] πολέμωι ε[ἰ]ς τ[ὴ]γ χώραν τὴγ Κορκυραίων ἢ ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸγ Κορκυραίων, 
βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίος παντὶ σθένει καθότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν Κορκυραῖοι κατὰ τὸ 
δυνατόν· καὶ ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἢ ἐπὶ τὴγ χώραν τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ 
πολέμωι ἴηι ἢ κατὰ γὴν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν, βοηθεῖν Κορκυραίος παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ 
δυνατόν, καθότι ἂν [ἐ]παγγέλλωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι. (…) ὅρκος· vacat βοηθήσω Κορκυραίων 
τῶι δήμωι παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ἐάν τις ἴηι ἐπὶ πολέμωι ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ 
θάλατταν ἐπὶ τὴγ χώραν τὴγ Κορκυραίων καθ’ [ὅ]τι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσι Κορκυραῖοι (…) 
ἀληθῆ ταῦτα νὴ τὸ[ν] Δία καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὴν Δήμητρα· [ε]ὐο[ρ]κο͂ντι μέμ μοι εἴη 
πολ[λ]ὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, εἰ δὲ [μή], τἀναντία. vacat [βοηθήσω Ἀθ]ηναίων τῶι [δ]ήμωι παντὶ 
σθέν[ει κατὰ τὸ δυν]ατόν, αἴ κά τις ἐ[πίηι ἐπὶ πο][λέμωι ἢ κατὰ γ]ῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν 
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The oaths recorded in this inscription represent the words of individuals who are 
binding themselves to abide by an agreement made between groups. As in the 
Iliad, the sanction for violation of the treaty (εἰ δὲ μὴ, τἀναντία) is included not 
among the formal terms of the agreement, but as a prayer pronounced by rep-
resentatives of the communities in question. The resolution of the collective 
obligations of the group into the individual obligations of its members is one of 
the more curious and persistent features of Greek diplomacy.21 It is evidently 
the reflex of tendencies rooted deeply enough in Greek culture to find expres-
sion also in the Iliad, where the collective force of the sanction is formulated in 
the speech of a singular tis. There is a continuity of mindset underlying these 
two representations of collective commitments. The practices reflected in the 
treaty oaths provide a valuable context for understanding not only the logic of 
the treaty scene in Iliad 3, but also the more general Homeric tendency to de-
lineate the attitudes and investments of a community as a whole in terms of the 
superficially singular pronouncement of an anonymous tis. 
There is, however, an important discrepancy between the oaths transcribed 
in treaty inscriptions and the collective prayer of Greeks and Trojans. The 
inscriptions record different oaths for the citizens of each state; the differences 
might be substantial, with different clauses and provisions prescribed for each 
side, but at the very least the name of one state must be substituted for the 
other, depending on the party in question.22 In the case of the treaty quoted 
above, the text even transcribes dialectal differences, faithfully reproducing 
certain Doricisms typical of the local speech of Corcyra, a Corinthian colony.23 
In the Iliad, on the other hand, Achaeans and Trojans utter the same prayer. The 
                                                                                                    
ἐ[πὶ τὴγ] [χώραν τὴν Ἀθην]αίων, καθ’ ὅτι κ’ ἐπαγ[γέ]λλω[ντι Ἀθηναῖ]οι (…) ἀληθῆ δὲ 
ταῦ]τα να[ὶ τ]ὸν Δία [κα]ὶ [τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ τὰν Δά]ματ[ρα]· εὐορκ[έο]ν[τι μέμ μοι εἴη 
πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθ]ά, εἰ δὲ μή, [τἀ][ναντία]. 
21  Cf. Bolmarcich 2007, 26 and Plescia 1970, 60. The individuals swearing the oaths 
might sometimes be the officials responsible for the execution of the treaty, and 
sometimes significantly larger groups.  
22  For an example of substantial differences, see IG i3 76, a treaty between Athens and 
the Bottiaioi dated to 422. The differences in this case are doubtless due to an 
asymmetrical power relationship. Thucydides 5.47 gives a single oath for both par-
ties in the case of a treaty between Athens and the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, 
but includes also the stipulation that “they shall each swear the oath that is most 
binding in their own country.” 
23  Cf. with their Attic counterparts in the oath of the Athenians αἴ κά τις (Attic ἐάν 
τις), ναί (Attic νή), Δάματρα (Attic Δήμητρα), εὐορκέοντι (Attic εὐορκοῦντι). Given 
that the typical Doric ᾱ for Attic η is only inconsistently observed, it is tempting to 
think that the composer of the inscription has been particularly scrupulous in ren-
dering the names of the gods called to witness the oath (Δάματρα vs. Δήμητρα), i.e. 
the ritually most significant part of the oath. 
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disparity is telling: while the treaties literally inscribe the distinction between 
communities by distinguishing the words spoken by their respective representa-
tives, the narrative of the Iliad works to elide this distinction by constructing a 
single community of speech. The negotiation of an agreement to end the Tro-
jan conflict is represented not, as in the inscriptions, as a matter of the relation-
ship between groups whose independent identities are rigorously maintained, 
but as the merging of groups into a new super-community, centered around 
common interests that can be expressed in words available to one and all. 
Shortly after the oath sacrifice and the accompanying collective prayer, a 
second tis-speech reinforces the connection between the negotiation of a truce 
and the creation of a temporary community, united in sentiment and speech. As 
Hector and Odysseus cast lots to determine whether Alexander or Menelaos 
will have the first spear-cast, the narrator reports another prayer uttered by 
both sides in common: 
 
“And someone of the Achaeans and Trojans was speaking thus: 
‘Father Zeus, ruling from Ida, most powerful and greatest, 
whoever it was that brought these trials to both peoples, 
let him perish and enter the house of Hades, 
but let us have friendship and steadfast oaths.’”24 
 
The openness with which the question of responsibility is posed emphasizes 
the re-centering of Greek and Trojan relations around a kind of common de-
nominator of shared interest. In spite of the general acknowledgement of Alex-
ander’s guilt elsewhere in the poem, even among his own countrymen, this 
prayer remains open to the possibility that Menelaos might bear responsibility, 
a point of view that seems patently calculated for universal acceptability.25 
The duel ends inconclusively when Aphrodite spirits Alexander away from 
the battlefield and saves him from imminent death. The ambiguous outcome, 
unforeseen by the terms of the agreement, initiates a period of uncertainty, but 
the treaty still holds, for a time. And so long as the treaty holds – so long, that 
is, as the Trojans and Achaeans enjoy a relationship that is not simply one of 
hostility – so too does their ability to speak with a single voice. Book 4 opens 
with a brief discussion among the gods about whether or not to permit a nego-
tiated conclusion to the war (I will have more to say about this scene in a mo-
ment). They resolve to initiate a new phase of fighting, but when Athena de-
                                                
24  Il. 3.319-323. ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε· | Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἴδηθεν μεδέων 
κύδιστε μέγιστε | ὁππότερος τάδε ἔργα μετ’ ἀμφοτέροισιν ἔθηκε, | τὸν δὸς ἀποφθίμενον 
δῦναι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω, | ἡμῖν δ’ αὖ φιλότητα καὶ ὅρκια πιστὰ γενέσθαι. 
25  Cf. the comments of Kirk 1985 on l. 321. 
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scends from Olympus to implement their decision, a third and final corporate 
utterance uniting Greeks and Trojans signals that, as yet, the truce holding 
together the fragile Greco-Trojan community still stands: 
 
“Just like a star that the son of wily Kronos sends, 
as a sign for sailors or for a broad host of fighting men, 
shining, and trailing many sparks – 
just so did Pallas Athena dash to the earth, 
and she lept into the middle; and wonder held those looking on, 
horse-taming Trojans and well-greaved Achaeans. 
And thus someone was saying, looking at another close by: 
‘Surely we will again have evil war and terrible slaughter – 
or Zeus is establishing friendship among both peoples, 
Zeus who is the steward of war for men.’ 
Thus someone of the Achaeans and Trojans was saying.”26 
 
Even as they contemplate the possible dissolution of the treaty that binds them, 
the two groups still manage to speak as one; the imminent shift that will rede-
fine their relationship has not yet been realized. 
These are, however, the last words pronounced in a collective voice. They 
provide a final statement of the common perspective embodied in the Greek 
and Trojan super-community, and they are situated in such a way as to provide 
a striking point of contrast for the moment at which the community is in fact 
dissolved. After her meteoric arrival at Troy, Athena instigates Pandaros to 
shoot an arrow at Menelaos. Menelaos is struck, but the wound proves to be 
fatal only to the delicate peace agreement, which is effectively ended by this 
breach of the truce. Agamemnon marks its demise rhetorically in his response 
to the calamity. In voicing his distress at Trojan perfidy and the near loss of his 
brother, he uses a potential tis-speech to construct a Trojan voice that is unam-
biguously hostile: 
 
“And one of the haughty Trojans will speak thus, 
leaping on the tomb of glorious Menelaos: 
                                                
26  Il. 4.75-85. οἷον δ’ ἀστέρα ἧκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω | ἢ ναύτῃσι τέρας ἠὲ στρατῷ 
εὐρέϊ λαῶν | λαμπρόν· τοῦ δέ τε πολλοὶ ἀπὸ σπινθῆρες ἵενται· | τῷ ἐϊκυῖ’ ἤϊξεν ἐπὶ 
χθόνα Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη, | κὰδ δ’ ἔθορ’ ἐς μέσσον· θάμβος δ’ ἔχεν εἰσορόωντας | Τρῶάς 
θ’ ἱπποδάμους καὶ ἐϋκνήμιδας Ἀχαιούς· | ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον· | 
ἦ ῥ’ αὖτις πόλεμός τε κακὸς καὶ φύλοπις αἰνὴ | ἔσσεται, ἢ φιλότητα μετ’ ἀμφοτέροισι 
τίθησι | Ζεύς, ὅς τ’ ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο τέτυκται. | ὧς ἄρα τις εἴπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν 
τε Τρώων τε. 
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‘May Agamemnon vent his anger on all this way, 
as even now he brought here a host of Achaeans in vain, 
and he went home again to his fatherland 
with empty ships, having left behind good Menelaos.’ 
Thus will someone speak; then let the wide earth open for me.”27 
 
This anonymous voice, projected onto an exclusively Trojan landscape devoid 
of a living Achaean presence, could not be more different from the voices that 
have populated the scene up to this point. Agamemnon seems almost deliber-
ately to be marking the end of the community of speech by re-imagining Trojan 
sentiment as irreconcilably inimical to the Greeks. His imagined utterance rein-
states the divide that separates the two communities. 
We do not encounter the anonymous speech device again until the conclu-
sion of the duel between Hector and Ajax in Book 7, a passage that, inciden-
tally, also offers the poem’s only other instance of a speech attributed jointly to 
both Greeks and Trojans. Hector imagines a remark that will be spoken by 
warriors on both sides when they observe that he and Ajax have exchanged 
gifts.28 This remark consists of an explicit acknowledgment of the philotês of 
which the gifts themselves are a material token. Although we cannot speak here 
of a proper community – this philotês binds only Hector and Ajax, and evidently 
only to a limited extent, since they will later take up arms against each other 
again – nevertheless we again observe a correlation between the possibility of a 
common utterance and the existence of a social bond that traverses the gap 
between Trojans and Achaeans. 
There is clearly a connection between Hector’s hypothetical speech of 
Achaeans and Trojans, marking the relatively amicable conclusion of his duel, 
and the imagined speech with which Agamemnon punctuates the disastrous 
results of the previous one.29 Nevertheless, the Trojan boast constructed by 
Agamemnon stands in a much closer relationship to the other anonymous 
speeches in Books 3 and 4. It brings to a close a remarkably dense sequence of 
such speeches that, as we have seen, coincides precisely with the period of the 
                                                
27  Il. 4.176-182. καί κέ τις ὧδ’ ἐρέει Τρώων ὑπερηνορεόντων | τύμβῳ ἐπιθρῴσκων 
Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο· | αἴθ’ οὕτως ἐπὶ πᾶσι χόλον τελέσει’ Ἀγαμέμνων, | ὡς καὶ νῦν 
ἅλιον στρατὸν ἤγαγεν ἐνθάδ’ Ἀχαιῶν, | καὶ δὴ ἔβη οἶκον δὲ φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν | 
σὺν κεινῇσιν νηυσὶ λιπὼν ἀγαθὸν Μενέλαον. | ὥς ποτέ τις ἐρέει· τότε μοι χάνοι εὐρεῖα 
χθών. 
28  Il. 7.299-302. 
29  There are a number of connections between the duels in Books 3 and 7, on which 
see Kirk 1978. The relationship between these scenes cannot, however, be ade-
quately appreciated in terms of Kirk’s scheme of primary use and secondary rework-
ing or imitation. 
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truce. Four of the Iliad’s 17 tis-speeches, or nearly one quarter, cluster around 
Book 3 and the beginning of Book 4. The concentrated exploitation of this 
technique bears all the hallmarks of a deliberate strategy designed to set off the 
period of the truce as a time when the differences between the Greek and Tro-
jan communities are temporarily bridged.30 To the extent that the anonymous 
tis-speech implies a cohesive group partaking of a common sentiment, this 
strategy insists on the correlation of the existence of an agreement with the 
existence of a single community to which the parties to the agreement belong. 
That is, in terms of the Iliad’s conceptual apparatus, an agreement is thought of 
not as something between groups but as something that unites the members of 
a single group. The Iliad’s word for the treaty is philotês; and philotês is philotês, 




Finding common ground 
 
The use of anonymous speeches to suggest the construction of a Greek and 
Trojan super-community is complemented by a parallel strategy focusing not 
on the behavior of the constituents but on their spatial organization. Corre-
sponding to the emergence of a verbal discourse shared by Trojans and Achae-
ans is the establishment of a common space, a center or mes(s)on around which 
the two groups can arrange themselves. The formal act of fixing this central 
space – which also serves as the field of battle for Menelaos and Alexander (cf. 
3.341) – is performed by Hector and Odysseus as they measure off the dueling 
ground.31 The meson appears, however, to be already identifiable from the mo-
ment that Hector steps forward to propose a negotiated settlement (ἐς μέσσον 
ἰὼν, 3.77). In a sense, this central space is necessary if Hector is to address the 
Greeks and Trojans as a whole, and if his words are to have their intended 
effect of binding the two sides in agreement. Marcel Detienne has demon-
strated the importance archaic Greek thought ascribes to the meson as a point of 
orientation for the community, as the locus for the definition of common 
property and the common good, and, finally, as the foundation for politically 
                                                
30  With this technique, contrast the juxtaposition of two opposed tis-speeches, one 
attributed to “someone of the Achaeans,” the other to “someone of the Trojans,” at 
17.414-422. These juxtaposed speeches express the hardening of the battle lines in 
the conflict over Patroklos’ corpse. 
31  Odysseus’ involvement in this procedure is not without significance: his own ship is 
at the center of the Achaean camp (8.223), which is an index of his role as a propo-
nent of solidarity among the Achaeans.  
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efficacious speech.32 Speech oriented toward the establishment or maintenance 
of the community must proceed from the meson. A middle point appears to be 
necessary in Greek thinking for the conceptualization of a community at any 
level: the oikos has its hearth, the polis its agora, and even supra-polis associations 
such as the confederated cities of Lesbos organize themselves around a cen-
ter.33 Accordingly, the ability of Greeks and Trojans to constitute themselves as 
a single group with common interests expressed in common words goes hand 
in hand with the existence of a central space in which those words can be spo-
ken, a space belonging equally to both sides. 
From this perspective, it is no surprise to find a consistent link between the 
communal utterances of Books 3 and 4 and the spatial center around which the 
events of the episode are organized. Each of the tis-speeches I have examined is 
connected to some event happening at the meson. In the case of the collective 
prayer that initiates the series, that event is the oath-sacrifice, which is situated 
specifically at the center (3.266). The second prayer follows immediately on the 
delimitation of the central dueling ground and the drawing of lots that takes 
place there. And the third and final joint speech responds directly to Athena’s 
divine manifestation as she leaps “into the middle” of the Trojans and Achae-
ans (4.79). In each case, events at the center provide the referent for an utter-
ance that indexes the social bond uniting Greeks and Trojans. This center is, 
therefore, an indispensible component of the conceptual and narrative appara-
tus that serves to delineate the transitory Greco-Trojan community: without it 
there would be no collective utterance, and no space within which such an 
utterance could emerge. Moreover, when that community ultimately dissolves, 
its disintegration must be marked spatially as well as in speech. Just as Aga-
memnon asserts the demise of the community of speech by substituting a hos-
tile Trojan utterance for a collective voice, so the narrator seems compelled to 
re-inflect the meson not as a space of convergence around common interests but 
as one of difference and conflict. After Menelaos has been wounded but before 
the general mêlée begins, Eris, personified strife, sets neikos homoiion, conflict 
common to all, “in the middle”: 
 
“Ares stirred the one side, and grey-eyed Athena the other, 
and Fear and Flight and Strife, full of insatiable longing, 
the sister and companion of man-slaying Ares, 
who is small when she first takes up arms, but thereafter 
                                                
32  Detienne 1965 and 1996 (1967), 90-102, building on Vernant 1982 (1962) and Lé-
vêque and Vidal-Naquet 1996 (1964). 
33  See Detienne 1996, 101 on Messon, the centrally-located, federal sanctuary on 
Lesbos. 
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walks the earth with her head fixed in the heavens; 
and at that time she set in their midst conflict shared by all, 
and she went through the throng increasing the groans of men. 
But when they came together, gathering in one place, 
they threw against each other their shields, their spears, and men’s fury”34 
 
As the two armies advance into the space that divides them, all they have in 
common is their hostility.35 
 
 
The limits of community 
 
The discussion thus far has focused on the two interlocking techniques by 
means of which the Iliad represents the treaty of Books 3 and 4 as a conver-
gence of two hostile groups and their reconstitution as a single super-
community united in space, speech, and sentiment. The Iliadic tradition seems 
unwilling or unable to conceive of an agreement as a bond between distinct 
groups: the very notion of a bond appears, in this mentality, to imply the exis-
tence of a single group. The question remains, how viable is that bond and the 
community it implies in the case of the Greeks and Trojans? The treaty is ulti-
mately voided as a result of divine intervention. Does that mean that it might 
have remained in force in the absence of interference? There are indications in 
the text of a profound skepticism about such a possibility. In particular, the end 
of Book 3 and the transition to Book 4 are structured in such a way as to sug-
gest that, in spite of their new-found ability to organize themselves as a cohe-
sive group, the Trojans and Achaeans still face severe limitations on their ability 
to maintain the integrity of their association in circumstances that are less than 
fully straightforward. 
At the end of Book 3, the duel has come to an ambiguous conclusion with 
the disappearance of Alexander. Menelaos has succeeded in despoiling his 
opponent of at least part of his armor (his helmet), and the narrator makes him 
the clear moral victor, stating that “he would have won untold kudos” if Aphro-
dite had not taken action (3.373). On the basis, presumably, of Menalaos’ supe-
                                                
34  Il. 4.439-447. ὄρσε δὲ τοὺς μὲν Ἄρης, τοὺς δὲ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη | Δεῖμός τ’ ἠδὲ Φόβος 
καὶ Ἔρις ἄμοτον μεμαυῖα, | Ἄρεος ἀνδροφόνοιο κασιγνήτη ἑτάρη τε, | ἥ τ’ ὀλίγη μὲν 
πρῶτα κορύσσεται, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα | οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξε κάρη καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ βαίνει· | ἥ 
σφιν καὶ τότε νεῖκος ὁμοίϊον ἔμβαλε μέσσῳ | ἐρχομένη καθ’ ὅμιλον ὀφέλλουσα στόνον 
ἀνδρῶν. | οἳ δ’ ὅτε δή ῥ’ ἐς χῶρον ἕνα ξυνιόντες ἵκοντο, | σύν ῥ’ ἔβαλον ῥινούς, σὺν δ’ 
ἔγχεα καὶ μένε’ ἀνδρῶν. 
35  Nenci 1981, 153 emphasizes the potential ambiguity of the meson, which can be a 
space either of cooperation or of conflict. 
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rior performance and the fact that Alexander is no longer anywhere to be seen, 
Agamemnon declares that Menealos’ victory is “evident” (νίκη μὲν δὴ 
φαίνετ᾿),36 and enjoins the Trojans to hand over Helen and the penalty he had 
stipulated in the case of Alexander’s defeat. Agamemnon’s interpretation lays 
claim to being an objective assessment of the available evidence – the “eviden-
tial” particle dê signals that his statement is based on direct perceptions that he 
assumes to be available to his audience as well37 – but it is, nevertheless, tenden-
tious. The treaty had defined victory with respect to the killing of one party by 
the other (καταπέφνῃ, 3.281; κτείνῃ, 3.284); in the absence of a corpse, there-
fore, there are no grounds for determining the victor. As it stands, the duel has 
resulted in a situation unforeseen by the original agreement, and undecidable on 
its terms. Agamemnon’s judgment represents an extension of the treaty’s provi-
sions to cover a situation that lies beyond their scope, an extension that is per-
haps not unjustified, but certainly motivated by self-interest. 
It is not surprising, then, that only a portion of Agamemnon’s audience ap-
proves his verdict – the portion that stands most to gain by such a result. Book 
3 ends with the notice that Agamemnon’s pronouncement receives approval, 
but it is an approval that is strictly limited to the Achaeans (ὣς ἔφατ᾿ Ἀτρεΐδης, 
ἐπὶ δ᾿ ᾔνεον ἄλλοι Ἀχαιοί, 3.461). Nothing is said about any response on the 
part of the Trojans. The significance of the Achaean reaction must again be 
elucidated with reference to the “grammar of reception” outlined above. The 
approval of the Achaeans is expressed with a variant of the fifth of the Iliad’s 
response formulas, which is characterized by the verb epainein. This formula 
represents the most decisive form of approval that an Iliadic audience can 
bestow on a deliberative proposal. Elsewhere, I argue that this key-verb can be 
correlated with the concept of “consensus”.38 It signals not just support for a 
speaker’s remarks, but the effective ratification of them. Louis Gernet detected 
in the verb epainein the idea of a “quasi-juridical efficaciousness,” and, as a rule, 
any proposal that meets with epainos is immediately put into effect.39 Here, 
however, this general rule runs up against an interesting complication. The 
                                                
36  Il. 3.457. 
37  On dê as a “marker of evidentiality,” see Bakker 1997, 75: “the dê clause, being 
directed to an addressee, signals that the speaker assumes that the hearer is capable 
of witnessing the same evidence.” For certain historical audiences of the Iliad, Alex-
ander’s helmet was still available as evidence for Menelaos’ mastery in the duel: the 
Lindos chronicle records that the helmet was on display in Athena’s great Rhodian 
temple (see Higbie 2003, 87-88 and 223-226).  
38  Elmer 2013. 
39  Gernet 1948, 186. Note that the noun epainos does not occur in the Homeric poems; 
I use it here as convenient shorthand for the uniquely decisive response signaled by 
epainein. 
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notionally efficacious response of a single constituency is embedded in a con-
text that stresses an expanded notion of community involving commitment 
from both sides. In such a context, what value can be ascribed to the support, 
no matter how decisive, of only one of the concerned groups? The text has 
arrived at a kind of aporia, an impasse in which a rule of the poem’s formulaic 
grammar is pitted against a more localized trend. The Achaeans may be able to 
express a unified will, but they are only one part of a larger group. That larger 
group, in the meantime, seems unable to formulate a collective response to the 
situation. The duel and its aftermath thus expose the limits of Greco-Trojan 
solidarity and suggest a skepticism about the possibility of establishing a func-
tioning super-community. 
It might be thought that the problem lies not with the project of creating an 
expanded community, but with the ambiguous conclusion of the duel, a situa-
tion problematic enough to create difficulties for any community, no matter 
how cohesive. Such an understanding, however, disregards the fact that the 
cohesiveness of a community cannot be judged in the absence of some test of 
its solidarity. The strength of a social bond remains only a potentiality until it is 
subjected to stress. The Iliad repeatedly uses complex or ambiguous situations – 
Agamemnon’s insincere proposal to decamp in Book 2, for instance, or the 
challenge of maintaining solidarity in spite of the absence of Achilles – to exam-
ine the sturdiness of Achaean society. The present occasion is no different: the 
point of the episode is that the Greco-Trojan community has been tested, and 
found wanting. 
The failure of Greeks and Trojans to constitute themselves as a fully cohe-
sive group is highlighted by juxtaposition with the divine community, which 
successfully negotiates a response to the same uncertain situation. With the 
articulation of an approval limited to the Achaeans, the narrative reaches a dead 
end; the discussion on the plain of Troy is abandoned with the last line of Book 
3, and the scene switches suddenly to Olympus at the start of Book 4. There, 
the gods take up the issue of how to resolve the ambiguities of the duel, even as 
the force of a limited and partial epainos is left an open question. It is as if, hav-
ing raised the specter of an irreconcilable conflict at the heart of the Greco-
Trojan accord, the narrator must have recourse to a whole and uncompromised 
social group in order to move the action forward. To be sure, the divine com-
munity is not a unified one. It includes entrenched partisans of both sides rep-
resented at Troy, whose differences seem at times no less insurmountable than 
those of their human protégés; in Book 20, the gods even take up arms against 
each other. Nevertheless, in spite of their differences in Book 4, they are able to 
arrive at a course of coordinated action. Moreover, they do so by appealing to 
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epainos, the very mechanism that indexes the limits of social coordination at 
Troy. 
Zeus opens deliberations among the Olympians by seconding Agamem-
non’s judgment that victory lies with Menelaos.40 He invites the gods to con-
sider whether they will, accordingly, allow a negotiated settlement to the war, or 
whether they will instead prompt a renewal of hostilities. He himself proposes 
that the war be settled according to the terms of the treaty.41 The narrator char-
acterizes this suggestion as an insincere attempt to provoke Hera rather than a 
straightforward proposal,42 but the question of Zeus’ sincerity is irrelevant to 
the subsequent debate, which exposes genuine differences between Zeus and 
his consort.43 Unable to contain her anger, Hera expresses her firm opposition 
to any negotiated outcome in terms of the withholding of epainos: 
 
“Most terrible son of Kronos, what a speech you have spoken! 
How can you wish to render my labor vain and unfulfilled, 
and the sweat my toil has brought me; my horses have grown weary 
while I gathered the host, an evil thing for Priam and his children. 
Do what you like: but we other gods do not all approve.”44 
 
This formulation of the restricted support Zeus’ proposal would receive estab-
lishes an interesting parallel between the situation at Troy and the unfolding 
debate among the gods. Sincerely or not, Zeus has put forward the same 
proposition that Agamemnon presented to the assembled Achaeans and Tro-
jans. In Agamemnon’s case, that proposal met with only limited approval. Hera 
predicts precisely the same result on Olympus: epainos for Zeus’ proposed 
course of action will be only partial, attenuated, and therefore of questionable 
efficacy. She implies, menacingly, that the same impasse that now confounds 
                                                
40  Il. 4.13. 
41  Il. 4.17-19. 
42 Il. 4.5-6. 
43  As Kirk 1985, 331-332 notes, the narrator must do something to explain Zeus’ 
proposal, since the prospect of peace would appear to run counter to the promise 
he has made to Thetis. Wilamowitz connected Zeus’ “attempt” (ἐπειρᾶτο, 4.5) to 
nettle Hera with the diapeira of Agamemnon in Book 2 (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 
1920, 298; cf. πειρήσομαι, 2.73). As in the case of Agamemnon’s testing of the 
troops, Zeus’ provocation leads ultimately to the confirmation of the traditional 
course of events on the part of the larger community. 
44  Il. 4.25-29. αἰνότατε Κρονίδη ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες· | πῶς ἐθέλεις ἅλιον θεῖναι 
πόνον ἠδ’ ἀτέλεστον, | ἱδρῶ θ’ ὃν ἵδρωσα μόγῳ, καμέτην δέ μοι ἵπποι | λαὸν 
ἀγειρούσῃ, Πριάμῳ κακὰ τοῖό τε παισίν. | ἕρδ’· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ 
ἄλλοι. 
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the Trojans and Greeks might afflict the gods as well, with herself and Athena 
playing the role of dissenters. Her threat to withhold her consent places her in 
curious alignment with the Trojan position, an alignment that can only be con-
sidered ironic in light of her hunger for Troy’s destruction. 
In the event, however, the gods manage to avoid deadlock in a manner that 
points up simultaneously the strengths of the divine community and the corre-
sponding weaknesses of the temporary coalition at Troy. Zeus expresses frus-
tration at Hera’s bitter intractability, but he nevertheless declares his intention 
to forego a quarrel (νεῖκος, 4.37) over Troy, now or in the future. He therefore 
relents, and agrees to Troy’s destruction – but only on condition that Hera will 
reciprocally yield if and when Zeus wishes to destroy a city dear to her. For 
Hera, this balancing of present and future claims not only resolves the quarrel 
with her spouse, it also provides the foundation for widespread agreement 
among the gods as a group:  
 
“Let us yield to each other, I to you and you to me, and the other immortal 
gods will follow in course” (ἐπὶ δ᾿ ἕψονται θεοὶ ἄλλοι | ἀθάνατοι).45  
 
The last part of her remark, which echoes her earlier warning (οὔ τοι πάντες 
ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι), figures the gods’ response to the compromise as the 
reversal of the threatened withholding of epainos for Zeus’ initial proposal. 
Moreover, as Egon Flaig has argued, this vision of the equalization of distinct 
preferences, predicated as it is on a continuing context for interaction, corre-
sponds to one of the basic requirements for consensus-based decision-making: 
the principle of “delayed return.”46 This principle ensures that anyone who 
momentarily sacrifices his own interests in consenting to a decision will receive 
suitable compensation, or will have his interests protected, in future decisions. 
It requires that consenting individuals understand their losses and gains, first, as 
fundamentally comparable, and, second, as part of a continuum with both a 
past and a future – not as isolated, sui generis interests. That is to say, it requires 
that individuals understand themselves as members of a persistent community. 
These are the conditions that Zeus sets on his acquiescing to the destruction of 
Troy: his agreement is to be registered as part of an ongoing negotiation of 
preferences among the gods. While there is no positive statement of epainos to 
punctuate the transaction with Hera, the discussion nevertheless pivots on this 
crucial concept, and Zeus explicitly frames the negotiations in terms of the 
mechanisms of consensus. 
                                                
45  Il. 4.62-64. 
46  See Flaig 1993, 141 and 1994, 16 and 25 for “das Prinzip der vertagten Gegen-
leistung”; cf. Graham 1984, 105 on delayed return as the “mystique” of democracy. 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
© 2012, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz 
ISBN Print: 9783938032510 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317845
44 David F. Elmer  
 
The gods therefore succeed where the Greeks and Trojans fail: they manage to 
overcome significant differences and arrive at an executable course of action by 
exploiting the framework of epainos. The key to their success, and the crucial 
distinction that sets them apart from the Greco-Trojan community, is the exis-
tence of a persistent context of interaction extending beyond the present mo-
ment in time. Such a context is unavailable to the human actors attempting to 
settle the outcome of the duel. No matter how the war ends, once it is over the 
Achaeans’ departure will put an end to the possibility of recuperating present 
loss with future gain. When Agamemnon uses the boast of an anonymous 
Trojan to encapsulate his vision of an Achaean defeat, he imagines a landscape 
totally devoid of any Achaean presence apart from the bones of his brother 
Menelaos.47 The immobility of those bones in a funeral mound that will serve 
eternally as the locus for the Trojans’ boastful exultation expresses the petrifica-
tion of the Trojan-Greek relationship in a state of permanent disadvantage to 
the Achaean side. By the same token, the negotiated settlement proposed by 
Agamemnon will likewise perpetuate a permanently asymmetrical relationship, 
formulated in terms of a “timê that will be remembered even among future 
generations.”48 The decision to bring about such a relationship simply cannot 
be made communally, that is, through a consensus involving both sides, since 
the result would effectively foreclose the contextual field on which consensus 
rests. 
The Achaeans and Trojans therefore revert to a relationship of hostility, 
even as their respective partisans on Olympus manage (for a time) to reassert 
their collective identity. What is remarkable about this picture is that the alter-
native to hostility is not friendship, conceived as a relationship between two 
distinct, autonomous groups, but the construction of a larger community of 
interests that subsumes distinct groups. Such a community persists only so long 
as the framework that sustains its internal relationships remains functional. 
No doubt, to assert that a community survives only so long as its facilitating 
framework amounts to a tautology. It is a useful tautology, however, insofar as 
it grounds the idea of community in a pragmatic context of interaction – rather 
than, say, in the more abstract concept of “identity.” The Greco-Trojan com-
munity comes into being, in spite of obvious differences at the level of identity, 
because of the availability of such a context. By the same token, even a shared 
identity may not be sufficient to guarantee the viability of a community in the 
absence of opportunities for the ongoing negotiation of interests. That is to say, 
the breakdown of the Greco-Trojan community is not necessarily an idiosyn-
                                                
47  Il. 4.172-175. 
48  Il. 3.287 = 3.460. 
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cratic development, tied to the peculiar nature of this association of natural 
adversaries, but may well be indicative of the inherent weaknesses of any collec-
tive entity. The flipside of the fluidity that allows even enemies to reconstitute 
themselves as a single group is an instability even in apparently secure associa-
tions.  
This instability is a major theme of the Iliad, which, for all its interest in the 
conflict between the Greeks and the Trojans, is equally or even more interested 
in the conflicts that divide the Achaeans themselves. Their internal disputes 
(also over a woman, in the first instance) are not qualitatively different from 
those that drive the war. And as the Achaeans seek to restore some measure of 
solidarity in the later books of the poem, they do so under the shadow of the 
failed truce of Books 3 and 4. In fact, the formal reconciliation between Achil-
les and Agamemnon unfolds almost as a replay of the earlier scene. When 
Achilles declares his readiness to put an end to his anger, the assembled Achae-
ans experience the same kharis they felt, along with the Trojans, in Book 3: 
 
“So he spoke, and the well-greaved Achaeans rejoiced 
as the great-hearted son of Peleus renounced his anger.”49 
 
As in Book 3, the use of a formula that does not belong to the normal “gram-
mar of reception” signals the ambiguous nature of a rapprochement that is fun-
damentally private, but fraught with consequences for the community. The 
echo of the truce is reinforced a short while later, when Agamemnon summons 
horkia and conducts an oath-sacrifice, the only other example of an oath-
sacrifice in the Iliad.50 
What are we to make of the convergences between these two scenes? Cer-
tainly they emphasize the extent to which Achilles has been alienated from his 
confederates: his reconciliation with Agamemnon is conducted as though it 
were a treaty between battlefield foes. The specter of the failed truce, however, 
also suggests that the restoration of Achaean solidarity remains precarious, and 
invites us to wonder just how long the Achaeans will be able to maintain their 
cohesiveness as a community. Achilles, it should be noted, does not partake of 
the meal that follows the sacrifice: he continues to be isolated, in important 
                                                
49  Il. 19.74-75. ὣς ἔφαθ’, οἳ δ’ ἐχάρησαν ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ | μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος 
μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος. 
50  Il. 19.250-268. At 19.191, Agamemnon refers to this sacrifice as ὅρκια πιστά, a 
formula that elsewhere refers only to a real or hypothetical agreement between Tro-
jans and Achaeans. For a detailed examination of the parallels between these two 
scenes of sacrifice, see Kitts 2005, 115-156. 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
© 2012, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz 
ISBN Print: 9783938032510 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317845
46 David F. Elmer  
 
respects, from the community.51 And if the situation of the Achaean commu-
nity at Troy is so precarious, what then will become of it after the end of the 
war, when Agamemnon’s coalition breaks up and the various contingents re-
turn to their respective homes in Hellas? What will happen, that is, when the 
returning heroes enter history as the ancestors of the various local communities 
to which the poem’s audiences belong? The failure of the Greco-Trojan ex-
periment in community-building raises an anxiety about the prospect for collec-
tive solidarity in the absence of a persistent context of interaction. This anxiety 
points beyond the Iliad to the problems faced by the poem’s real-life audiences, 
who inhabit a world in which such contexts must constantly be renegotiated. 
                                                
51  Seaford 1994, 159-160. 
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The Border of War and Peace 




“I was especially inclined to laugh at the people who quarreled about 
boundary-lines (…). And when I looked toward the Peloponnese and 
caught sight of Cynuria, I noted what a tiny region, no bigger in any way 
than an Egyptian bean, had caused so many Argives and Spartans to fall in a 
single day.”1 
 
Thus speaks Menippus, Lucian’s character who soared to the Moon on an 
eagle’s wings and looked back at the Earth. The fact that in the second century 
AD an ancient conflict between the Argives and the Spartans over a strip of 
borderland is picked out by the satirical writer as a memorable demonstration 
of human absurdity may give us an initial hint of the evocative power of the 
subject. This paper explores the evolving ideology of the conflict over Cynuria 
and the shifting networks of ritual, mythological and political associations this 
conflict was embedded in throughout its history. This inquiry will cause us to 
probe the boundaries of the ancient Greek conceptions of war and peace, ritual 
confrontations and real hostilities. 
 
 
The Argive proposal 
 
The starting point of this paper is a consideration of seemingly eccentric terms 
of a peace treaty, regulating the issue of Cynuria, put forward by the Argives to 
the Spartans. It is the year four hundred twenty BC. An unstable peace between 
Sparta and Athens is teetering. In addition, a thirty-year truce between Sparta 
and Argos has expired, and the Spartans are anxious to renew it in order to 
avoid fighting with both Argos and Athens. The Argives, on the other hand, 
worriedly imagine that they are about to confront a coalition between the Spar-
tans, Athenians, Boeotians and Tegeans.2 They curb their aspirations to head an 
                                                
1  Lucian. Icaromenippus 18.1-2, 11-16. Μάλιστα δὲ ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις ἐπῄει μοι γελᾶν τοῖς περὶ 
γῆς ὅρων ἐρίζουσι (…). ἀποβλέψας δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον, εἶτα τὴν 
Κυνουρίαν γῆν ἰδὼν ἀνεμνήσθην περὶ ὅσου χωρίου, κατ’ οὐδὲν Αἰγυπτίου φακοῦ 
πλατυτέρου, τοσοῦτοι ἔπεσον Ἀργείων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων μιᾶς ἡμέρας. Translation 
A.M. Harmon.  
2  Thuc. 5.36.1, 5.40.3. 
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alliance of city-states independent of Sparta, and send envoys to Sparta with the 
goal of obtaining peace on the best possible terms. Thucydides describes the 
negotiations: 
 
“What the Argives first demanded was that they might be allowed to refer 
to the arbitration of some state or private person the question of the Cynu-
rian land, a borderland about which they have always been disputing, which 
contains the cities of Thyrea and Anthene, and which is occupied by the 
Spartans. The Spartans at first said that they could not allow this point to be 
discussed, but were ready to conclude upon the old terms. Eventually, how-
ever, the Argive ambassadors succeeded in obtaining from them this con-
cession: For the present there was to be a truce for fifty years, but it should 
be competent for either party, there being neither plague nor war in Sparta 
or Argos, to give a formal challenge and decide the question of this territory 
by battle, as on a former occasion, when both sides claimed the victory; 
pursuit not being allowed beyond the frontier of Argos or Sparta. The Spar-
tans at first thought this mere folly; but at last, anxious at any cost to have 
the friendship of Argos, they agreed to the terms demanded, and commit-
ted them to writing. However, before any of this should become binding, 
the ambassadors were to return to Argos and communicate with their peo-
ple, and in the event of their approval, to come at the feast of the Hyacin-
thia and take the oaths.”3 
 
At this point the relations between Sparta and Athens become even more 
strained, owing to Alcibiades’ intrigues. Alcibiades then orchestrates a treaty 
                                                
3  Thuc. 5.41.2-3. καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀφικόμενοι αὐτῶν λόγους ἐποιοῦντο πρὸς τοὺς 
Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ’ ᾧ ἂν σφίσιν αἱ σπονδαὶ γίγνοιντο. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἱ Ἀργεῖοι 
ἠξίουν δίκης ἐπιτροπὴν σφίσι γενέσθαι ἢ ἐς πόλιν τινὰ ἢ ἰδιώτην περὶ τῆς Κυνουρίας 
γῆς, ἧς αἰεὶ πέρι διαφέρονται μεθορίας οὔσης (ἔχει δὲ ἐν αὑτῇ Θυρέαν καὶ Ἀνθήνην 
πόλιν, νέμονται δ’ αὐτὴν Λακεδαιμόνιοι)· ἔπειτα δ’ οὐκ ἐώντων Λακεδαιμονίων 
μεμνῆσθαι περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’, εἰ βούλονται σπένδεσθαι ὥσπερ πρότερον, ἑτοῖμοι εἶναι, 
οἱ Ἀργεῖοι πρέσβεις τάδε ὅμως ἐπηγάγοντο τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ξυγχωρῆσαι, ἐν μὲν 
τῷ παρόντι σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι ἔτη πεντήκοντα, ἐξεῖναι δ’ ὁποτεροισοῦν 
προκαλεσαμένοις, μήτε νόσου οὔσης μήτε πολέμου Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Ἄργει, 
διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῆς γῆς ταύτης, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερόν ποτε ὅτε αὐτοὶ ἑκάτεροι 
ἠξίωσαν νικᾶν, διώκειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι περαιτέρω τῶν πρὸς Ἄργος καὶ Λακεδαίμονα 
ὅρων. τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα, ἔπειτα 
(ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως φίλιον ἔχειν) ξυνεχώρησαν ἐφ’ οἷς ἠξίουν καὶ 
ξυνεγράψαντο. ἐκέλευον δ’ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρὶν τέλος τι αὐτῶν ἔχειν, ἐς τὸ Ἄργος 
πρῶτον ἐπαναχωρήσαντας αὐτοὺς δεῖξαι τῷ πλήθει, καὶ ἢν ἀρέσκοντα ᾖ, ἥκειν ἐς τὰ 
Ὑακίνθια τοὺς ὅρκους ποιησομένους. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνεχώρησαν· Translation R. Crawley, 
modified. 
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between Athens and Argos, persuading the Argives to abandon their agreement 
with the Spartans. In the following summer (419 BC) Argos enters into a war 
with the Spartan ally Epidaurus; in another year, the Spartans defeat the Argives 
in the battle of Mantinea.4 The Peloponnesian War rolls on, and we are left to 
ponder the significance of the fleeting and idiosyncratic vision of peace that 
featured a battle for the disputed territory. What advantage did the Argives seek 
by proposing to replay the battle for Cynuria? In the modern scholarship, the 
Argive suggestion is interpreted as an indulgence in nostalgic archaizing at the 
cost of realistic engagement with the political situation.5 However, dismissing 
the Argive move as an outmoded oddity runs a serious risk of overlooking any 
pragmatic objectives that the Argives might have had. This paper endeavors to 
find such objectives. I also believe that a careful analysis of the ways in which 
the issue of Cynuria was handled would produce a new information about the 
mechanisms through which the relations of peace were established between 
city-states. 
An attempt to understand the motivation that drove the Argives to propose 
the rerun of the battle has to start from the question about the nature of the 
conflict for Cynuria. Why was Cynuria so central in the negotiations between 
Sparta and Argos? It is unlikely that the importance of Cynuria derived from its 
economic or strategic worth.6 Cynuria is an isolated mountainous area.7 The 
mountain range of Parnon and the ridges of Mt Partheneion separate it, respec-
tively, from both Sparta and Argos. Cynuria’s economic value must have been 
insignificant:8 it is not rich in natural resources, and poorly suited for agriculture 
– there are only two plains in it (one of them near the city of Thyrea, on the 
coast of the Argolic Gulf). Furthermore, the conflict between the Spartans and 
the Argives, referred to by Thucydides and Lucian, is regularly described in 
other sources as a conflict over Thyreatis, the plain near Thyrea:9 thus, the 
confrontation apparently focused on only a small piece of Lucian’s “Egyptian 
bean.”  
A striking feature of Thucydides’ concise presentation of the confrontation 
over Cynuria/Thyreatis is that the description of the course of the conflict 
                                                
4  Thuc. 5.43-47, 5.53, 5.66-74. 
5  Hanson 2005, 344, n.37; Hornblower (2002 (1983), 84) describes the Argive pro-
posal as a “comic moment.” 
6  See below the discussion of Cynuria’s value as a “buffer zone” (Kelly 1970b, 980) 
between Argos and Sparta. 
7  On the isolation of Cynuria, see Kelly 1970b, 979-980. 
8  Brelich 1961, 22; Kelly 1970b, 980; cf. Robertson 1992, 191. 
9  The ancient authors use the appellations Thyrea, Thyreae and Thyreatis to describe 
the area. I employ “Thyreatis” throughout this paper, to distinguish the region from 
the city of Thyrea.  
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supersedes the account of its causes. We learn a great deal about the conflict’s 
temporal complexity. In the present moment of Thucydides’ narrative, Cynuria 
is inhabited by the Spartans. However, Thucydides also portrays the Argives 
and the Spartans as always disputing over Cynuria, which is called a “border-
land”10 despite having been under Sparta’s control from the middle of the sixth 
century BC.11 A further temporal reference is introduced: a certain past occa-
sion on which both Sparta and Argos considered themselves victors. This past 
occasion is put forward as a blueprint for a future battle for Cynuria.  
The mentions of the earlier battle and of the conflict’s perpetual nature in-
dicate that the traditional history of the conflict played an important role in the 
conflict’s present. Interestingly, the Argive proposal seeks to remove the issue 
of Cynuria from history into the safe space of a ritual. The condition that in the 
battle for Cynuria the pursuit cannot proceed beyond the frontiers of Argos 
and Sparta disconnects the question of Cynuria’s possession from the possibil-
ity of a wider territorial conquest. Moreover, the fight for this territory becomes 
the manifestation of concord between Argos and Sparta. It follows from the 
prominence of the history and ritual in the Argive proposal that the key to 
understanding of the importance of Cynuria/Thyreatis in the Argive-Spartan 
relationship should be sought not in the economic and strategic factors but in 
the ideology of the conflict over this territory. By the “ideology of the conflict” 
I mean a conceptual framework, including the past course of the conflict as 
conceived by each side, that informed the perception of the conflict’s meaning. 
In the course of my argument, I will attempt to elucidate the particular visions 
of the past that the Argives and the Spartans might have operated with at the 
moment of the treaty. After reconstructing the ideology of the conflict, we will 
be in a better position to identify the ways in which this ideology was utilized 
and manipulated by the Argive proposal to ritualize the confrontation over 
Cynuria. This, in turn, should help us to answer the question concerning the 





Our most important source concerning the conflict over Cynuria/Thyreatis is 
Herodotus’ description of the so-called Battle of Champions (1.82). This battle 
is commonly identified with the “former occasion, when both sides claimed the 
                                                
10  γῆς…μεθορίας. Thuc. 5.41.2; also 2.27.2. Figueira (1993, 528-529) points out the 
peculiarity of Thucydides’ definition of Cynuria/Thyreatis as a borderland. 
11  On the dating of the Spartan annexation of Cynuria, see below.  
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victory,” mentioned by Thucydides.12 Herodotus dates the battle by the time of 
Croesus’ appeal to the Spartans for help against the Persians (in 546 BC, by our 
reckoning). The Spartans, Herodotus tells us, had just seized the territory of 
Thyreatis from the Argives, who were ready to fight for the return of their land. 
The warring sides agreed that in lieu of a full-scale battle, only three hundred 
men from each side should fight. The rest of the two armies departed to avoid 
involvement in the battle. In the course of fighting, only three men were left 
alive, two Argives and a Spartan. The Argives returned to Argos, believing that 
they had won, but the Spartan stripped the enemy corpses of armor and re-
turned to his post in the Spartan camp. The next day, when both armies came 
back to learn the outcome, a disagreement broke out over who should be con-
sidered the victor; the argument turned into a fight, and after both side had 
suffered many casualties, the Spartans defeated the Argives. This confrontation, 
Herodotus says, led to changes in both the Spartan and the Argive customs 
concerning their hairstyles: the Argives resolved to cut their hair short till they 
had won Thyreatis back, while the Spartans began to grow their hair long.  
The Battle of Champions is not the only attested military clash focused on 
Cynuria/Thyreatis. Thucydides’ assertion that the Argives and the Spartans 
“always dispute” for Cynuria is matched by Pausanias’ account, portraying 
Cynuria as a primordial conflict zone. Pausanias dates the first Spartan military 
involvement in Cynuria by the reign of Echestratus, the son of eponymous 
Agis, and even prior to the reign of Prytanis, the son of eponymous Eurypon.13 
He also refers to a struggle for Thyreatis between the Spartans and Argives in 
the reign of Theopompus.14 Furthermore, Plutarch mentions a speech of Poly-
dorus (the Agiad king contemporary with Theopompus, according to the inher-
ited tradition), made on the occasion of the Spartan victory over the Argives, 
“after the battle of the three hundred.”15 Plutarch’s wording is interesting: he 
says that in the battle of the three hundred the Argives were “again” (πάλιν) 
defeated by the Spartans, suggesting a previous Spartan victory over the Ar-
gives in a battle of three hundred.16 The sources portray the dispute over Cynu-
ria as remaining unresolved for a long time after the episode during the Pe-
loponnesian War described by Thucydides: Pausanias mentions an arbitration 
                                                
12  Thuc. 5.41.2. Hornblower 2008, 97 with further references. 
13  Paus. 3.2.2, 3.7.2. 
14  Paus. 3.7.5. In addition, Pausanias transmits a tradition of the Spartan defeat by the 
Argives at Hysiai (Paus. 2.24.7), which is often connected to the conflict over Cynu-
ria in the modern literature (Wade-Gery 1949, 80; Brelich 1961, 23, n.29 gives other 
references); however, see Kelly 1970a. 
15  Plut. Apophthegmata Laconica 231e. 
16  Brelich 1961, 25. 
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of the disputed territory between Sparta and Argos by Philip and then again, by 
the Roman senator Gallus.17  
 
 
Conflicting interpretations of the dispute over Thyreatis 
 
A major advance in the understanding of the ideological underpinnings of the 
conflict over Thyreatis was made by Angelo Brelich in his classic study Guerre, 
agoni e culti nella Grecia arcaica. Brelich called attention to the long duration of the 
conflict, the reports of its inception in the legendary antiquity, and the incom-
mensurability between the value of the disputed territory and the scale of the 
conflict.18 He also emphasized the repeated appearance of regulations, mitigat-
ing the magnitude of the fighting.19 Brelich observed that the dispute over 
Thyreatis shared these features with another ancient conflict over a border 
territory, the war for the Lelantine Plain between Eretria and Chalcis. He no-
ticed a resemblance between the aetiology of the Spartan and Argive hairstyles 
given by Herodotus, and a tradition associating a particular hairstyle with the 
Lelantine War,20 and suggested that the references to hair-cutting tied these 
border conflicts to ritual initiations of young men into adulthood.21  
Brelich also reconstructed some religious connotations of the conflict over 
Thyreatis. The conflict was linked with one of the most important Spartan 
festivals, the Gymnopaediae. The festival featured choruses of paides in honor 
of the Spartans who fell at Thyrea; the choral leaders wore wreaths called thy-
reatikoi, commemorating the victory at Thyrea.22 The ritual celebration of the 
battle for Thyreatis during the Gymnopaediae occurred in the framework of the 
cult of Apollo Pythaeus,23 a divine figure important in Laconia, and at the same 
time strongly associated with Argos.24 Brelich remarked that Apollo Pythaeus 
                                                
17  Paus. 7.11.1-2. 
18  Brelich 1961, 22, 29, 29-30, n.38.  
19  Ibid., 29. The examples include the restriction of the number of the participants to 
three hundred on each side (Hdt. 1.82.3); the Argive proposal that the pursuit in a 
future battle for Cynuria should not go beyond the borders of Argos and Sparta 
(Thuc. 5.41.2); Polydorus’ insistence in that the aim of the battle was solely the pos-
session of the disputed territory and not the conquest of the enemy’s city (Plut. Apo-
phthegmata Laconica 231e). 
20  Ibid., 30. 
21  Ibid., 80-81. 
22  Ibid., 30-31. Sosibius via Athenaeus 15.678b-c, Anecd. Bekk. 1, 32, Suda s.v. 
Γυμνοπαίδια.  
23  Paus. 3.11.9; Brelich 1961, 31.  
24  Brelich 1961, 32, 34. Ancient sources (Telesilla via Paus. 2.35.2) claim that the epi-
thet Pythaeus is originally Argive.  
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was connected to the confrontation between Argos and Sparta,25 and also ap-
parently once united the two city-states in some sort of federal cult.26 Brelich 
concluded that the dispute over Thyreatis (as well as the Lelantine War) origi-
nated as a ritual combat for the border territory, during which the participants 
transitioned from the status of ephebes to adulthood. Over time, these ritual 
combats were transformed into real wars, leaving only an “aura” of cultic and 
ritual associations.27 However, Brelich himself admitted that such an explana-
tion left some problems unresolved. The relation between the ritual limitation 
of violence and apparent cases of severe bloodshed is perplexing. For example, 
in Herodotus’ narrative, the regulation limiting the number of the combatants 
to three hundreds on each side is combined with the annihilation of all but 
three participants.28 A further and major problem is that Brelich’s “ritual aura” 
does not explain the nature of fighting over Thyreatis once the ritual combats, 
according to Brelich’s model, were transformed into real confrontations. Brel-
ich perceived the cultic and ritual details, cropping up in our sources in 
connection to the dispute over Thyreatis, as synchronically inconsequential, 
stripped of their “original” initiatory context in the distant past.29 However, the 
perpetuation of a ritual at a given moment in time tends to endow it with a 
range of current functions and significances.30 A proper reconstruction of a 
ritual therefore ought to consider its successive modifications in form, content 
and function over a span of time: the rituals connected to the confrontation 
over Thyreatis need to be embedded in their historical contexts. Finally, 
Brelich's analysis presents an additional methodological problem in that Brelich 
uses the sources in an undifferentiated fashion, without distinguishing between 
earlier and later ones. 
Indeed, Thomas Kelly, who carefully examined the ancient sources on the 
history of the strife between Sparta and Argos in a chronological manner, came 
to the following unsettling conclusion: “the later the writer the more he pro-
                                                
25  According to a tradition reported by Pausanias, the cult of Apollo Pythaeus in Asine 
figured in an ancient episode of the Spartan-Argive hostilities. Paus. 2.36.4. Brelich 
1961, 32. 
26  Thuc. 5.53.1, Diod. 12.78.1. Brelich 1961, 33-34. The evidence for the federal cult of 
Apollo Pythaeus that included both Argos and Sparta is complicated and can be on-
ly briefly considered in the current presentation. See below n.108.  
27  Brelich 1961, 83-84. 
28  Ibid., 79. 
29  Thus, for example, Brelich mentions the Argive proposal to the Spartans of replay-
ing the battle for Thyreatis (Brelich 1961, 17), but he does not offer any remarks on 
the import of this suggestion in 420 BC.  
30  Kowalzig 2007, 34. 
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fesses to know about the early warfare between the two states.”31 Kelly asserts 
that the centuries-long struggle between Argos and Sparta, stemming from the 
earliest times, was invented in the fourth century BC and then elaborated on by 
the later historians.32 The gist of Kelly’s argument is as follows. The earliest 
mention of the conflict between Argos and Sparta is Herodotus’ description of 
the Battle of Champions; the passage of Thucydides about the Argive sugges-
tion to replay the battle is the next oldest reference.33 Both sources portray the 
conflict as focused solely on the issue of the territory of Cynuria/Thyreatis.34 
On this subject Kelly observes that the accessible road from Sparta to Cynuria 
passed through the territory of Tegea; the alternative mountainous route was 
very difficult. Kelly infers that a precondition for Sparta’s being strategically 
interested in the occupation of Cynuria (as a buffer zone protecting the Spar-
tans from a potential Argive attack and making a Spartan attack on the Argive 
plain possible) was Spartan dominance over Tegea.35 Sparta gained control of 
Tegea sometime in the middle of the sixth century,36 which therefore must 
provide a terminus post quem for the Spartan military interest in Cynuria. This 
date fits well with the date of the Battle of Champions derived from Herodotus 
(546 BC); after that point there is an unambiguous record of continual hostili-
ties between Sparta and Argos.37 
Kelly argues that the ancient writers coming after Herodotus and Thucy-
dides were influenced by the post-mid-sixth-century hostile relations between 
Sparta and Argos and assumed that the two states were antagonistic throughout 
their history.38 The first mention of a specific conflict between Sparta and Ar-
gos predating the Battle of Champions is found in Ephorus, whom Kelly cred-
its with the introduction of the idea of the strife between Argos and Sparta as 
the defining theme of the early Peloponnesian history.39 For Pausanias the 
traditional enmity between the two states was a given. Pausanias makes numer-
                                                
31  Kelly 1970b, 1000. 
32  Ibid.  
33  Tyrtaios’ fragment P. Oxy. 3316 (not yet discovered at the time of Kelly’s article) is 
sometimes cited as an archaic evidence of the war between Sparta and Argos. Cart-
ledge 2002, 109. However, a rarely acknowledged feature of the poem is that it is 
written in the future tense, which opens the possibility that the poem does not por-
tray to a historical event. Indeed, the description of military events in the future 
tense finds parallels in Archilochus fr. 3 and Hymn. Hom. Dem. 265-267, both of 
which, as I plan to argue in a different paper, refer to rituals.  
34  Kelly 1970b, 974, 979-980. 
35  Ibid., 980-981. 
36  Ibid., 975, n.16 with further references.  
37  Ibid., 984.  
38  Ibid. 
39  Ibid., 985. 
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ous references to it, providing, for example, a list of six early Spartan kings who 
engaged in confrontations with the Argives. Kelly remarks that the kings on the 
list belong to such remote past that their historicity is highly unlikely; for him, 
the list is an example of a later baroque embellishment on the theme of pri-
mordial Argive-Spartan strife.40  
Kelly’s analysis seems to undercut several points of Brelich’s argument, 
such as the early inception of the conflict for Thyreatis and the long duration of 
the conflict. However, at this point a crucial distinction must be made between 
the historical reality of the centuries-long confrontation over Cynuria/Thyreatis 
and the historical reality of the tradition describing such confrontation. I con-
sider Kelly’s argument about the mid-sixth century inception of Sparta’s mili-
tary involvement in Cynuria to be persuasive; however, his claim that the tradi-
tion of the ancient conflict between Argos and Sparta was invented in the 
fourth century is less convincing. While it is plausible that the specific details 
concerning the early confrontation are a later elaboration, already Thucydides 
states that the two states were “always disputing” over Cynuria.41 Plato and 
Xenophon also share belief in a tradition of the primordial conflict between 
Sparta and Argos.42 Further, our earliest source, Herodotus’ account, contains 
elements such as the equal numbers of the battle participants on each side, or 
the aetiology of haircuts, highly evocative of ritual. Thus, Herodotus does not 
provide us with a dry military report of the Battle of Champions in 546 BC as 
an inception of Argive-Spartan conflict: rather, his description suggests that he 
is familiar with the tradition of the conflict, endowed with ritual overtones. Let 
us attempt to reconstruct the various stages of the development of this tradi-
tion. The starting point for this reconstruction should obviously be a closer 
examination of our earliest source, Herodotus. 
 
 
Myth, ritual, history: What Herodotus has joined together  
 
As we have seen, the date of the Battle of Champions (546 BC) matches Kelly’s 
reconstruction of the Spartans becoming interested in the annexation of Cynu-
ria after they have gained control of Tegea. While we lack a literary source, 
contemporary or earlier than Herodotus, that would corroborate Herodotus’ 
dating of the Spartan conquest, an archaeologically attested explosive appear-
                                                
40  Ibid., 994-995. 
41  αἰεὶ … διαφέρονται, Thuc. 5.41.2. Thucydides’ wording elicits Kelly’s objection, not 
backed up by any evidence, that αἰεί “cannot be taken in temporal sense.” Kelly 
1970b, 974, n.10.  
42  Plato Leg. 3.686b, Xen. Hell. 3.5.11. Kelly 1970b, 985, nn.53,54.  
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ance of the Spartan settlements in Cynuria in the middle of the sixth century 
fits the date provided by Herodotus.43 Thus, it is likely that Herodotus’ account 
of the Spartan annexation of Cynuria in the middle of the sixth century has 
some foundation in reality.  
However, one should observe that the connection between the Battle of 
Champions and Croesus’ appeal for help against the Persians, on which the 
precise dating of the battle is founded, is extremely flimsy. The story of the 
battle appears in a vignette that turns to have no causal relation with the Spar-
tan assistance for Croesus:44 the Spartans decide to help Croesus “despite their 
conflict with the Argives,”45 but then the news of Croesus’ capture arrive as 
they are ready to sail out, so they cancel the expedition. This lack of causal 
relation elicits a suspicion that Herodotus attached the description of the Battle 
of Champions to Croesus’ appeal on some other grounds than his rigorous 
knowledge of the historical link between the two events. The fragility of the 
battle’s dating compels us to examine the historicity of the rest of the passage, 
which is commonly interpreted as a straightforward chronological account of 
the past.46 However, a more careful look at the episode reveals disturbing 
anachronisms and aberrations. First, it was long ago observed that Herodotus’ 
description of the Argive supremacy in the Peloponnese at the time of the 
Spartan attack47 brings to mind the legendary past of Agamemnon’s rule over 
the islands rather than the realia of the sixth century.48 Further, 546 BC seems 
late for the Spartan adoption of the long hair: representations of long-haired 
Spartan youths are attested much earlier.49 Finally, the outcome of the Battle of 
Champions – the death of all but three participants – is extraordinary.50 A hop-
lite battle in which all of the participants are killed off is easier accommodated 
in the world of myth than in the world of military history.  
                                                
43  Kennell 2010, 52. Cartledge 2002, 123 also supports this date for the Spartan an-
nexation of Thyreatis.  
44  Dillery 1996, 221.  
45  Hdt. 1.83.  
46  As recently as Kennell 2010, 52. 
47  “At this time the land as far as Malis in the west belonged to the Argives, both the 
mainland and the islands, including Cythera and the rest.” Hdt. 1.82.2. All transla-
tions from Herodotus are by A.L. Purvis. 
48  Beloch 1912, 204, n.1; Kelly 1970b, 977-978; Tomlinson 1972, 88; tentatively, Ash-
eri et al. 2007, 139. Cf. Hdt. 1.1.2. 
49  Tomlinson 1972, 89; Lipka 2002, 194. For Plutarch, this custom possessed the 
antiquity of Lycurgus’ ordinance. Plut. Lys. 1.2-3. David 1992, 14. 
50  The rate of mortality in a hoplite battle has been assessed as three to ten percent for 
the winning side, and ten to twenty percent for the defeated one. Krentz 1985, 18; 
Hanson 1995, 306-307.  
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A reasonable explanation of these peculiarities is that Herodotus incorporated a 
legendary tradition of a lethal battle into his account of the fighting over 
Thyreatis. Suggestions along these lines have been made in the past by Richard 
Tomlinson and Noel Robertson.51 Yet both these scholars, in different ways, 
underestimate the potential significance of such a legend. Tomlinson’s focus of 
interest is the historical reality of the interactions between Argos and Sparta in 
the sixth century BC. Thus, while he notices the “romanticizing” in Herodotus’ 
account and posits a question concerning its causes, he leaves the question 
unanswered.52 Robertson’s assertion is that the story of the battle of Champi-
ons was “invented” as an aetiology of a certain festival.53 However, such a 
privileging of the ritual at the expense of the affiliated myth disregards the 
interactions between the ritual and the myth, which are arguably central in the 
generation of messages.54 My argument will attempt to examine the historical 
implications of the mythical tradition about the battle for Thyreatis considered 
jointly with its allied rituals. 
Ritual connotations, as we have already observed, are conspicuous in the 
description of the Battle of Champions. The aetiology of the Spartan and Ar-
give hairstyles suggests an association with rites of passage.55 For Sparta, in 
particular, we have Xenophon’s statement that the men were allowed to grow 
long hair after they left the age grade of hêbôntes.56 A subtler point, also indica-
tive of a ritual, is a paradoxical pattern of cooperation between Sparta and 
Argos, emerging from Herodotus’ phrasing. Herodotus reports that the Spartan 
custom of wearing long hair was established as an opposite of the Argive adop-
tion of the short hair.57 The Argives and the Spartans appear to define them-
selves through their antagonism; their hair-related customs are contrasting and 
complementary, operating in one system of signification.  
Thus, even a relatively rapid examination of the passage uncovers interlock-
ing elements of history, myth and ritual. The joining together of such elements, 
                                                
51  Tomlinson 1972, 89; Robertson 1992, 184; Kõiv 2003, 131. 
52  Tomlinson 1972, 89. 
53  Robertson 1992, 207.  
54  The definition of myth with which I operate is “a given society’s codification of its 
own traditional values in narrative and dramatic form.” Nagy 1990, 436. Similarly, 
Lincoln 1999, 147. On the relation between myth and ritual, see the discussion in 
Kowalzig 2007, 22-23.  
55  Brelich 1961, 80-81; Robertson 1992, 206. 
56  Xen. Lac. Pol. 11.3. Ducat 2006a, 109-111. Cf. Pettersson 1992, 85. Hêbôntes were the 
oldest age group that did not have full citizen status (despite their prominence in 
military service). Ducat 2006a, 104-112. 
57  Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων ἔθεντο νόμον. “The Spartans established a 
contrary regulation.” Hdt. 1.82.8. 
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often stemming from different sources, is at the heart of Herodotus’ historical 
method.58 Sometimes Herodotus identifies his sources; at other times different 
narrative strands are amalgamated. Moreover, in many cases it is possible to 
pinpoint the modifications that Herodotus made in the traditional accounts 
included in his History.59 The following discussion attempts to determine the 
outlines of the constituent traditions that Herodotus merged in his description 




Beautiful death in Thyreatis 
 
My working hypothesis so far is that Herodotus combined the mythical tale of 
a deadly battle for Thyreatis and some ritual elements (whose nature we will 
discuss later) with the historically veracious story of a large-scale confrontation 
between Sparta and Argos that resulted in the Spartan appropriation of Cynu-
ria. The idea that Herodotus combined the myth of a lethal battle and an ac-
count of a historical confrontation receives some support from the existence of 
a version in which the battle of six hundred champions is unaccompanied by 
further military conflict. Plutarch, citing the Peloponnesian History by Chrysermus, 
reports that when, after the deadly battle of the six hundred champions, both 
sides still claimed victory,60 “the Amphictyonic Assembly, after a personal in-
spection of the battlefield, decided in favor of the Spartans.”61 We will return to 
the peculiar detail of the Amphictyonic Assembly arbitrating between the Spar-
tans and the Argives. Now let us examine another difference between the ver-
sions of Herodotus and Plutarch/Chrysermus: the fate and function of the last 
Spartan to remain alive, Othryades.  
Herodotus ends the story of the battle by telling that Othryades “was 
ashamed to return to Sparta because his comrades had died; he killed himself 
there in Thyrea.”62 No shame figures in Plutarch’s rendering: Othryades, the 
Spartan general, is wounded mortally, summons the remaining strength to build 
a trophy, and writes upon it a victory dedication in his own blood.63 The same 
story reoccurs in several other sources, including an epigram attributed to Si-
                                                
58  Bakker 2002, 15, 18-19, 29; cf. Dewald 2002, 283, 286-287; Griffiths 2006, 140.  
59  Burkert 1965; Griffith 1989; Calame 2003 (1996), 86-108; Giangiulio 2001; Gian-
giulio 2005; Griffiths 2006, 140-141. 
60  Compare Thuc. 5.41.2: “when both sides claimed the victory.”  
61  Plut. Parallela Minora 306b. Translation F.C. Babbitt. 
62  Hdt. 1.82.8. 
63  Plut. Parallela Minora 306a-b.  
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monides.64 Herodotus’ account is our earliest attestation of the tale of Thyrea, 
since the attribution of Anth. Pal. 7.431 to Simonides is tentative.65 However, 
we cannot automatically assume the absolute chronological primacy of Herodo-
tus’ version. The question is, could the suicide of Othryades have featured in 
the mythical tradition about the lethal battle that ended with the Argive-Spartan 
dispute over the victory? 
We can answer this question in part, I believe: this episode is unlikely to be 
stemming from the Spartan version of the myth, since the suicide of the last 
Spartan survivor does nothing to bolster the Spartan claim of victory.66 Con-
versely, the heroic death of Othryades as presented by Plutarch and the epi-
grams perfectly fits the Spartan ideology of a beautiful death, i.e. the death in 
battle that brings salvation and glory to the city.67 Thus, this version, despite its 
later attestation, is possibly more similar than Herodotus’ version to the variant 
of the myth prevalent in Sparta.  
Interestingly, we also have traces of an Argive variant of the mythical battle 
for Thyreatis. Pausanias reports that the Argives considered themselves victors 
in the contest for Thyreatis with the Spartans.68 In another passage, he de-
scribes seeing in the theater in Argos “a representation of a man killing another, 
namely the Argive Perilaus, the son of Alcenor, killing the Spartan Othry-
ades.”69 Thus, it appears that the Argives at some point presented the death of 
Othryades as their own victory.70  
Why did Herodotus incorporate the suicide of Othryades, rather than the 
episode of Othyrades’ glorious death, into his narrative? Herodotus’ variant can 
be at least partially explained as the result of the joining of two tales, the mythi-
                                                
64  Anth. Pal. 7.431 (attributed to Simonides); 7.430; 7.741; Theseus via Stob. Flor. 
3.7.68 (= FGrH 453 F 2), on which see Corcella 1996, 263, with n.15 for further lit-
erature. Only one epigram (Anth. Pal. 7.526) speaks of Othryades’ suicide (following 
the erection of the trophy). 
65  See Bravi 2006, 89-90, with bibliography. 
66  It is noteworthy that Plutarch vehemently disagrees with the Herodotean version of 
Othryades’ death: “Notice how roughly he has handled Othryades, whom they [the 
Spartans] particularly admired and honored.” Plutarch, De Herodoti malignitate 858d. 
Translation L. Pearson. On the anomalous nature of Herodotus’ motivation of Oth-
ryades’ suicide see Dillery 1996, 227; Robertson 1992, 201; Tomlinson 1972, 89. 
67  Loraux 1977. On the heroization of the Spartans fallen at Thyrea, see Currie 2005, 
99, n.59 with further references.  
68  Paus. 10.9.12.  
69  Paus. 2.20.7. Translation W.H.S. Jones. In Herodotus, Alcenor is the name of one of 
the two Argive survivors; Plutarch gives the name of Agenor instead. 
70  Asheri et al. 2007, 140. 
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cal battle and the historical confrontation.71 In the process of joining, the figure 
of Othryades, pivotal in the traditional story, becomes marginalized.72  
While Herodotus’ story of Othryades’ suicide somewhat departs from the 
conventional ideology of the glorious death, the theme of the beautiful death 
emerges forcefully in a different episode, which turns to be implicitly connected 
with the battle for Thyrea. I refer to the famous scene when before the battle of 
Thermopylae a messenger reports to Xerxes that the Spartans are engaged in 
combing their long hair. Demaratus explains to the astonished Xerxes that it is 
a custom for the Spartans to arrange their hair when they are about to risk their 
lives.73 At this point we may remember Herodotus’ statement that the Spartans 
adopted long hair in commemoration of the victory at Thyrea. This custom 
turns out to be not only a joyful sign of triumph and a tribute to the heroic 
dead, but a preparation for becoming a beautiful corpse,74 if need be, in emula-
tion of the three hundred at Thyrea.75 
 
 
The ritual battle  
 
The Spartan annexation of Cynuria probably dates to the middle of the sixth 
century BC, as we have discussed. Can we date the mythical tale of the conflict 
over Thyreatis? While living, changing myths are notoriously difficult to date, 
the detail of the strangely cooperative attitude of the Argives and the Spartans, 
expressed in the equal number of the battle participants on each side, is unlikely 
to have been first conceived after the Spartan takeover of Cynuria: it probably 
                                                
71  The story of Othryades’ suicide out of shame to be the only survivor may also in 
part have been motivated by Herodotus’ sympathy toward Aristodemus, the sole 
survivor of Thermopylae, who was dishonored at Sparta as a “trembler”, and then 
fell at Plataea after proving himself one of the bravest fighters. On Herodotus’ sym-
pathy toward Aristodemus, see Ducat 2006b, 34-38. 
72  The placement of the suicide of Othryades at the very end of Herodotus’ account of 
the confrontation over Thyreatis intensifies the impression of the episode’s mar-
ginalization in Herodotus’ rendering. 
73  Hdt. 7.208.3, 7.209.3. 
74  On the Spartan hair arrangement in preparation to dying beautifully, see David 
1992, 16. 
75  On the similarities between Herodotus’ descriptions of the battles of Thyrea and 
Thermopylae see Dillery 1996. All the potential explanations of these similarities 
that Dillery considers involve Herodotus, consciously or unconsciously, patterning 
the accounts of Thyrea and Thermopylae after one another. Dillery 1996, 234. 
However, a qualitatively different scenario is also imaginable: the tradition of Thyrea 
could have molded the tradition of Thermopylae independently and prior to Hero-
dotus. 
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derives from the earlier period, when Sparta and Argos, as Kelly argues, were 
not yet enemies.76  
We arrive at a paradox: the myth of the confrontation between Argos and 
Sparta, focused on the issue of Thyreatis, appears to predate any real clash of 
interests between Argos and Sparta in that area. What was the significance of 
the myth of the confrontation before there was a real confrontation? And how 
do we account for the traces of cooperation and ritual, noticeable in Herodo-
tus’ description of the conflict over Thyreatis? As a solution, I propose to 
adopt a modified form of Brelich’s hypothesis that the Argives and the Spar-
tans engaged in ritual combats for the border territory of Thyreatis. In contrast 
to Brelich, I do not consign the ritual confrontations to the prehistoric past, but 
rather suggest that they took place in the archaic period until Sparta disrupted 
the tradition by the annexation of Cynuria.77 The outcome of each battle de-
termined to which city-state the border territory of the Thyreatis would belong 
till the next encounter.78 I submit that these ritual battles commemorated and 
reenacted (in an attenuated form) the mythical deadly battle of the six hundred 
champions. 
The idea of the ritual reenactments of the battle for Thyreatis helps to ex-
plain why Herodotus merged the myth of the battle with the story of the Spar-
tan conquest of Cynuria, which happened only about a hundred years before 
Herodotus’ time.79 While Herodotus probably was not aware of the past prac-
tice of the ritual battles, the reenactments that occurred till the middle of the 
sixth century could have “modernized” the myth, creating an impression that it 
was situated not in the legendary past, but in a relatively recent historical time. 
Herodotus’ mention of the Spartan adoption of the long hair in his account 
of the confrontation over Thyreatis indicates that the long hair may have been 
linked to the participation in the ritual battle. In Sparta in the classical period 
the right to wear long hair coincided with the attainment of full citizenship.80 If 
we assume that it was the same in the archaic period, we can infer that the 
                                                
76  Kelly 1970b, 1001.  
77  Brelich very cautiously considered a possibility that battles with limited number of 
participants, analogous to the Battle of Champions, were fought in Thyreatis “in 
tutte le epoche.” Brelich 29-30, n.38. See also Kõiv 2003, 132.  
78  The mechanism of such variable possession is obscure, but possibly it concerned the 
revenue from the territory. 
79  Tomlinson remarks that the “folk-tale versions of events,” reported by Herodotus, 
such as the story of Cypselus, typically “belong to remoter times that the mid-sixth 
century.” Tomlinson 1972, 89. 
80  See above n. 56.  
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(hypothetical) ritual battle functioned as a rite of coming of age for its partici-
pants, marking their transition into full citizen status.81 
 
 
Fighting at the Gymnopaed iae  
 
I hypothesized that in the archaic period the Argives and the Spartans fought in 
ritual battles for the territory of Thyreatis. What follows is an attempt to recon-
struct further details concerning the setting and organization of such battles. 
We have already mentioned Brelich’s observation of the connection between 
the tale of battle for Thyreatis and an important Spartan festival, the Gym-
nopaediae,82 which involved choruses in honor of the Spartans fallen at Thyrea, 
as well as wreaths, called thyreatikoi, worn by the choral leaders in the memory 
of the Spartan victory at Thyrea.83 The current communis opinio is that the com-
memoration of the battle for Thyreatis is a later addition to the festival. A de-
tail, reported by Athenaeus on the authority of Sosibius, of choruses at the 
Gymnopaediae performing songs of Alcman and Thaletas,84 creates an impres-
sion of the festival practices that predate 546 BC (the accepted date of the 
battle at Thyrea).85 However, as I have argued, the myth of the battle of the six 
hundred champions should be detached from the date of 546 BC; when it is 
                                                
81  The hypothesis that there was an archaic Spartan tradition of ritual battles, serving 
as rites of passage, finds a typological parallel in the later attestation of Spartan 
group combats, bearing initiatory overtones, such as the Platanistas (Paus. 3.14.8-10; 
Ducat 2006a, 208-209; Kennell 1995, 55-59) and the ball games. Kennell (1995, 40) 
shows that, at least in the Roman period, the Spartan ball game was “a type of 
graduation ceremony, marking the transition from ephebe to adult.” It was orga-
nized as a tournament, in which pairs of ephebic teams (sphaireis), representing five 
ôbai, the ancient constituent villages of Sparta, competed against each other (Kennel 
1995, 40). The Spartan ball game probably was the same as the game of episkuros 
(Kennel 1995, 61; cf. Crowther 1997, 6; the main source on episkuros is Pollux 9.103-
107). In a recent article, Elmer (2008, 420) interprets episkuros as “a symbolization of 
a boundary dispute.” The nexus of the boundary dispute and a rite of passage strik-
ingly resembles my suggestion of the ritual battle. 
82  Brelich 1961, 30-31. The Gymnopaediae was one of the principal Spartan festivals, 
as attested by Paus. 3.11.9. Its importance is also apparent in earlier periods: Ducat 
2006a, 266; Nagy 1990, 348, n. 56. The festival was attended by strangers at least 
from the Classical period on: Xen. Mem. 1.2.61, Plut. Ages. 29.1,  Plut. Cimon 10.6. 
My presentation is based on the recent discussion of the Gymnopaediae by Ducat 
2006a, 265-274; see also Pettersson 1992, 42-56; Robertson 1992, 147-165; Richer 
2005. 
83  See above n. 22. 
84  Athen. 15.678c. Translation Ducat 2006a, 269.  
85  Wade-Gery 1949, 80; Ducat 2006a, 271; cf. Kõiv 2003, 130-131. 
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done, nothing prevents us from assuming that the myth of the battle at Thyrea-
tis was a primary component of the Gymnopaediae. I propose that this myth, 
with its underlying ideology of the beautiful death, was the aition86 of the Gym-
nopaediae.87 Further, I suggest, as a working hypothesis, that the archaic prede-
cessor of the Gymnopaediae (which I will call the “proto-Gymnopaediae”) 
constituted for the Spartans the framework in which the ritual battles between 
the Spartans and the Argives took place.88 
The conjectured role of the ritual battles as coming-of-age rites matches the 
“initiatory themes”89 perceptible in the accounts of the Gymnopaediae from 
the Classical period on. It seems that the age-group of ephebes played a par-
ticularly prominent part at the Gymnopaediae.90 The festival’s name suggests 
that the participating paides (whom we probably can identify as the ephebes91) 
were naked – an impression confirmed by ancient texts.92 The nakedness 
strengthens the resemblance to an initiation ritual.93 A Spartan speaker in 
Plato’s Laws describes the Gymnopaediae as “a fearful act of endurance prac-
ticed in our own community, where people have to fight [diamakhomenôn] 
                                                
86  I adopt Nagy’s definition of an aition: “a myth that traditionally motivates an institu-
tion, such as a ritual.” Nagy 1999 (1979), 279 §2, n.2. Nagy stresses that the aeti-
ological tradition is not derivative, but parallel to the ritual. 
87  At present, no convincing hypothesis exists concerning the aetiology of the Gym-
nopaediae. Previously, the accepted position was Wade-Gery’s suggestion that the 
festival was instituted by the Spartans in 668 BC (the traditional date of the Gym-
nopaediae, deriving from Eusebius) as a morale-boosting measure following their 
defeat by the Argives at Hysiai in 669 BC (Wade-Gery 1949, 80-81). However, this 
idea has been criticized by Kelly, who contends that Paus. 2.4.7 is the only mention 
of the battle of Hysiai; moreover, the battle’s date (669 BC) is a result of a modern 
emendation (Kelly 1970a, 32, 34). 
88  On the Argive festival associated with the ritual battles, see below. 
89  Ducat 2006a, 274; cf. Pettersson 1992, 55. 
90  Paus. 3.11.9. See Kennell 1995, 68-69 (who thinks it is a late feature).  
91  Ducat (2006a, 268) remarks that the paides, frequently mentioned in the ancient 
sources as the participants of the Gymnopaediae, must have been paidiskoi, adoles-
cents in their late teens. (He comments, however, that -παιδία probably is not de-
rived from παῖς “child”, but is rather related to παίζειν “to play, to dance”. Ducat 
2006a, 266.) 
92  Athen. 14.631b; Hesych. s. v. Γυμνοπαίδια. Ducat 2006a, 272-273.  
93  Ducat 2006a, 274. One more indication of the connection between the Gymnopae-
diae and the rituals of coming of age can be derived from a peculiar Spartan law, 
which excluded the Spartans who failed to marry at the proper age from watching 
the Gymnopaediae, but compelled them to march naked around the agora in the 
winter, singing a self-imprecating song (Plut. Lyc. 15.1). Ferrari (2002, 120) interprets 
this chastisement as a disgraceful parody of the Gymnopaediae, “a perversion of the 
ritual through which they [the bachelors] had attained manhood.” 
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against fierce and stifling heat.”94 This portrayal of the festival as an ordeal is 
particularly reminiscent of an initiation rite. 
A question arises concerning the location of the proto-Gymnopaediae. If 
this festival featured the ritual battle, then it must have comprised a procession 
from Sparta to the battle site in the territory of Thyreatis. The historical Gym-
nopaediae, in contrast, was celebrated solely in Sparta. How do we explain this 
difference between the conjectural proto-form of the festival and its attested 
form? We know of one Spartan festival that was connected to the battle for 
Thyreatis and celebrated in the territory of Thyreatis: the Parparonia.95 Geor-
gius Choeroboscus mentions Parparos as a site of a battle between the Argives 
and the Spartans in Thyreatis;96 Hesychius speaks of agôn and choroi established 
at that site.97 The festival of Parparonia, attested in the famous Damonon in-
scription (5 c. BC), included athletic competitions.98 The situation in which 
both the Gymnopaediae and the Parparonia were connected to the myth of the 
confrontation over Thyreatis is explicable if the proto-Gymnopaediae, previ-
ously celebrated both in Sparta and in Thyreatis, was restructured following the 
elimination of the ritual battle in the sixth century. In the absence of the ritual 
battle, the part of the Gymnopaediae taking place in Sparta would have proba-
bly gained prominence. Subsequently, the celebration in Thyreatis could have 




A partnership between Argos and Sparta  
 
The idea of a ritual (as opposed to a real) confrontation between Sparta and 
Argos presupposes the existence of an amicable, cooperative relationship be-
tween the two states. Below I review some evidence, centered around the tradi-
tional theme of the Argive-Spartan confrontation over Thyreatis, that suggests 
a presence of such partnership between Argos and Sparta in the archaic period. 
We have noted earlier an arresting detail in Plutarch’s account of the Battle 
of Champions: the battle was managed by the body called the Amphictyonic 
                                                
94  Pl. Leg. 1.633c. Translation Ducat 2006a, 273, modified. I am particularly interested 
in Plato’s use of the military language in the figure of “battling with the heat.” While 
such representation of the festival as an endurance test is unique in our sources 
(Ducat 2006a, 273-274), it must be taken seriously as an early evidence. 
95  Wade-Gery 1949, 79, n.7; Brelich 1961, 31, n.42; Phaklares 1990, 226-227; Billot 
1992, 87-88; Robertson 1992, 179-207; Polignac 1995, 55, n.54; Kõiv 2003, 127-128. 
96  Choerob. in Theodos. 297, 4-6.  
97  Hesych. s.v. Πάρπαρος.  
98  IG v 1, 213 lines 44-49, 62-64. 
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Assembly (οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες).99 Plutarch (on the authority of Chrysermus) credits 
the Amphictyonic Assembly both with setting up the battle of the six hundred 
as a solution of the Argive-Spartan dispute over Thyreatis, and with the 
authoritative ruling of the Spartan victory. While many elements of Plutarch’s 
account, such as the story of the death of Othryades, clearly stem from the 
myth of the battle for Thyrea, it is tempting to interpret the reference to the 
Amphictyonic Assembly (whose exact identity requires further research) as a 
vestigial memory of the supervision of the Argive-Spartan ritual battles by an 
alliance of city-states.100 
Another hint concerning the association between Argos and Sparta comes 
from the passage in Pseudo-Plutarch’s treatise On Music recounting the estab-
lishment of the Gymnopaediae, the festival that we hypothetically linked with 
the ritual battles:  
 
“Now music was first organized at Sparta, under the direction of Terpan-
der; for its second organization Thaletas of Gortyn, Xenodamus of Cythera, 
Xenocritus of Locri, Polymnestus of Colophon, and Sacadas of Argos are 
said to have been chiefly responsible, since it was at their suggestion that 
the festival of the Gymnopaediae at Lacedaemon was instituted and so too 
the Apodeixeis in Arcadia and the so-called Endymatia [festival of Apparel-
ling] at Argos.”101  
 
There are several noteworthy features in the passage. The linkage of the poets 
from different parts of Greece to the inception of the Gymnopaediae depicts 
the festival as characterized by a strong Pan-Hellenic trend. It is particularly 
remarkable to find an Argive poet, Sacadas, connected to the foundation of the 
Spartan festival. On Music presents Sacadas as a quintessential Pan-Hellenic 
figure: in addition to crediting Sacadas with a series of victories at the inception 
of the Pythian games, the treatise also attributes to him the composition of a 
chorus that combined three systems of tuning – the Dorian, the Phrygian, and 
                                                
99  Plut. Parallela Minora 306a-b. 
100  See below n.108. 
101  Ps.-Plutarch, On Music 1134b-c. Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη κατάστασις τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν 
ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ, Τερπάνδρου καταστήσαντος, γεγένηται· τῆς δὲ δευτέρας Θαλήτας τε ὁ 
Γορτύνιος καὶ Ξενόδαμος ὁ Κυθήριος καὶ Ξενόκριτος ὁ Λοκρὸς καὶ Πολύμνηστος ὁ 
Κολοφώνιος καὶ Σακάδας ὁ Ἀργεῖος μάλιστα ³αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν ἡγεμόνες γενέσθαι· 
τούτων γὰρ εἰσηγησαμένων τὰ περὶ τὰς Γυμνοπαιδίας τὰς ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ³λέγεται 
κατασταθῆναι, <καὶ> τὰ περὶ τὰς Ἀποδείξεις τὰς ³ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ, τῶν τε ἐν Ἄργει τὰ 
Ἐνδυμάτια καλούμενα. Translation B. Einarson and P.H. de Lacy.  
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the Lydian.102 Another figure connected to the foundation of the Gymnopae-
diae, Polymnestus of Colophon, is similarly Pan-Hellenic, described by Pindar 
as “the voice common to all.”103 
The story of the institution of three Peloponnesian festivals on the advice 
of the same “committee” suggests a possibility of a historical connection be-
tween the festivals. Moreover, Gregory Nagy observes a semantic link between 
the names of the Spartan Gymnopaediae and the Argive Endymatia: they con-
tain “opposite notions of ritual undressing and dressing.”104 Such opposition 
strikingly recalls Herodotus’ report of the Spartan decision to wear long hair in 
contrast to the short hair of the Argives.105 Pseudo-Plutarch’s account seems to 
contain traces of the same cooperation-in-opposition as does Herodotus’ aeti-
ology of the hairstyles. It is plausible that the Endymatia was the festival associ-
ated with the ritual battle on the Argive side.106 
A consideration of the figure of Apollo Pythaeus, the deity presiding over 
the Gymnopaediae, further illuminates the paradoxical antagonistic concord 
between Argos and Sparta. We have briefly reviewed Brelich’s findings about 
the worship of this deity in both Argos and Sparta,107 the association between 
Apollo Pythaeus and the tradition of the Argive-Spartan confrontation, and the 
existence of a federal cult of Apollo Pythaeus that apparently counted both 
Argos and Sparta as members.108 However, how do these separate pieces of 
evidence coalesce into a historically nuanced understanding of the Argive-
                                                
102  Ps.-Plutarch, On Music 1134a. Compare Nagy 1990, 89-91. Pausanias (2.22.8) also 
ascribes to Sacadas the distinction of inventing the Pythian nomos.  
103  Strabo 14.1.28. 
104  Nagy 1990, 344; also Ducat 2006a, 187-188. 
105  Hdt. 1.82.7. 
106  Leitao (1995, 143) suggests that the Endymatia was “the occasion on which young 
men in Argos assumed warrior garb for the first time.” Similarly, Robertson 1992, 
207, who connects the festival to the tradition of the battle for Thyreatis; Ceccarelli 
1998, 119.  
107  Kowalzig (2007, 145-146) gives a concise summary of the literary and epigraphic 
attestation of the cult of Apollo Pythaeus in the Argolid and around the Argolic 
Gulf, including Cynuria, where two sixth-century inscriptions to Apollo Pythaeus 
were found in Tyras and Kosmas. The sanctuaries of Apollo in these two locales 
produced numerous dedications of weapons (both full-sized and miniature) and a 
bronze sixth-century statuette of a hoplite. Phaklares 1990, 176, 179-182; Polignac 
1995, 54. On the cult of Apollo Pythaeus see also Billot 1992; Kõiv 2003, 304-308; 
and Kowalzig 2007, 132-154 (discussed below).  
108  See above nn. 24,25,26. Kowalzig (2007, 149-153) connects the worship of Apollo 
Pythaeus with the archaic Calaurian amphictyony. Kõiv (2003, 304-310) similarly 
proposes the existence of an archaic amphictyony around the cult of Apollo Py-
thaeus. 
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Spartan relations in the archaic period, and how do they clarify the nature of 
the dispute over Thyreatis? 
Barbara Kowalzig makes a major step forward in answering these questions. 
Kowalzig notices the frequent association between the cult of Apollo Pythaeus 
and inter-polis boundaries.109 She proposes that the archaic cult of Apollo Py-
thaeus at Asine110 had the function of mediating between communities of the 
Argolid in their long-standing territorial disputes. Importantly, Kowalzig argues 
that the cult operated not by resolving the conflicts but by embracing the com-
peting versions of the disputing sides and commemorating their irreducible 
variance through recurrent rituals.111 Kowalzig also notes the prominence of 
Apollo Pythaeus in the conflict over Thyreatis,112 but she considers the deity to 
be an embodiment of the real hostility between the two states.113 However, 
Kowalzig’s reconstruction of the character of archaic Apollo Pythaeus as a 
mediator between communities at variance perfectly fits the idea that this deity 
oversaw the ritual battles between Argos and Sparta in the framework of the 
Gymnopaediae, uniting the two poleis in their confrontation.114 
 
 
The metamorphosis of the Hippe i s  
 
I have suggested that the ritual battle happened in Sparta in the framework of 
the Gymnopaediae (and perhaps in the framework of the Endymatia in Argos), 
and served as a coming of age rite for its participants. But who were these 
participants – whose rite of passage was it? A consideration of the Spartan 
institution of hippeis, which has not been taken into account until now, can help 
us to answer this question.  
                                                
109  Kowalzig 2007, 147-148; similarly, Polignac 1995, 54, n.52. 
110  See above n. 25. 
111  Kowalzig 2007, 132-154, esp. 147-149, 153-154.  
112  Kowalzig 2007, 155-157.  
113  “Apollo Pythaieus stood for what separated Argives and Spartans, imbued with 
connotations of the Spartano-Argive conflict.” Kowalzig 2007, 156. 
114  There is an indication that the territory of Thyreatis could at some point have been 
defined as a federal space of ritual, called μέσον. The attestation comes an enigmatic 
pronouncement: Ἄκρον λάβε καὶ μέσον ἕξεις (“Take the akron, and you will have the 
meson”). Apparently, this was an oracle that the Aeginetans received from Delphi in 
431 BC, when they were expelled from Aegina by the Athenians, and given Thyrea-
tis by the Spartans to settle (Zenobius 1,57, CPG 1.22-23; Apostolius 1,97, CPG 
2.264; Thuc. 2.27; Figueira 1993, 535-538). I propose that meson may have referred 
to the territory of Thyreatis as a sacred communal space once shared by Argos and 
Sparta. This sense of the word meson is attested on Lesbos (Messon): see Nagy 2007, 
24.  
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The Spartan hippeis were an elite corps of hoplites (their equestrian appellation 
notwithstanding), who numbered three hundreds. In the Classical period, the 
hippeis fought in close proximity to the king and had the task of protecting him. 
They also served as the Spartan “emergency force” in cases of internal or ex-
ternal danger.115 The hippeis were chosen on the basis of their excellence from 
the body of hêbôntes.116 The relevance of the hippeis to the present discussion 
stems from their character as picked troops and from their number, coinciding 
with the number of the Spartan warriors at Thyrea. In a recent article, Thomas 
Figueira suggests that the three hundred Spartans who fought in the Battle of 
Champions must have been hippeis.117 In the light of the previous discussion, we 
can modify Figueira’s suggestion: the battle, in which all the Spartan partici-
pants die heroically, can be construed as a foundation myth of the hippeis, set-
ting a benchmark for their fighting conduct. 
Here, however, a question arises. I have hypothesized previously that the 
Battle of Champions is a foundation myth for the Gymnopaediae; now the 
battle seems to fit also as a foundation myth for the institution of hippeis. Are 
the Gymnopaediae and the hippeis related to each other, and if yes, what is the 
nature of their connection? My first observation is that the festival and the 
military unit show similarities with the non-overlapping aspects of the myth.118 
This fact opens the possibility that the Gymnopaediae and the hippeis are two 
distinct institutions resulting from a split of their common predecessor, which 
prior to the split fully matched the myth of the battle. How can we imagine the 
entity uniting the hippeis and the Gymnopaediae? The easiest solution would be 
to conceive of a festival (the proto-Gymnopaediae) in which the proto-hippeis 
took part. Their role, I propose, would be fighting in the ritual battle. Thus, I 
reconstruct the ritual battle as an initiation into the category of the proto-hippeis.  
The idea that the proto-hippeis played the key role in the ritual of coming of 
age entails an assumption that they were an age grade.119 The historical institu-
tion of hippeis was certainly not an age grade. While the hippeis were chosen 
from the age grade of hêbôntes, only some of the hêbôntes were promoted to the 
status of hippeis. Age-grade transition, on the contrary, involves all members of 
                                                
115  Figueira 2006, 58-60. 
116  Xen. Lac. 4.3-4. Figueira 2006, 62-67. 
117  “It would be incongruous for the Spartans to choose another elite group of the 
same size, inasmuch as the hippeis probably already existed.” Figueira 2006, 60.  
118  The resemblance between the hippeis and the myth of the battle lies, as we have 
observed, in the number of the warriors, and in their elite status. In contrast, the ba-
sis of the Gymnopaediae’s link to the myth of the battle for Thyreatis is the explicit 
ancient attestation that the festival featured “thyreatic crowns” and hymns honoring 
the fallen at Thyrea. 
119  My use of the term “age grade” is based on the discussion by Bernardi 1985, 2-4.  
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a particular age-class. However, while the historical hippeis did not constitute an 
age grade, they apparently were sometimes perceived as such. Aristophanes of 
Byzantium in his treatise on the terms describing age categories, charts the 
following progression of the ages: meirakion, meirax, neaniskos, neanias. Concern-
ing the latter he says: “The Spartans called these hippeis, and those who manage 
them hippagretai.”120 This “flavor” of an age grade displayed by the historical 
hippeis might be an echo of the prehistory of this institution.  
Let us now attempt to sketch the trajectory of the development and oblit-
eration of the ritual battles between Argos and Sparta alongside with the 
changes in the character of the proto-hippeis. The comparative evidence from 
other Greek city-states indicates that the Spartan hippeis at first must have been 
a body of aristocratic horsemen.121 It is possible that the practice of the ritual 
battles with the Argives existed already in that period, as an elite activity, but we 
cannot say anything about its organization or function. Next, at the historical 
stage when a homogenizing restructuring of the Spartan society took place, the 
aristocratic group of “ur-hippeis” must have been subsumed into the new social 
framework.122 Eventually, the age-grade of hoplite proto-hippeis emerged from 
this process. I believe that the practice of the ritual battles as reconstructed in 
this paper started in that period. For the archaic period a rough demographic 
estimation shows that the number of the Spartiates born in the same year by 
their mid-twenties would be 100-200 men.123 Thus, if we presume that the 
number of the participants in the ritual battle approximated the number of the 
three hundred champions, it follows that the older hêbôntes were assembled for 
the ritual battle every two or three years. The ritual battles must have been 
abolished at the latest in the middle of the sixth century, when Sparta adopted 
more aggressive expansionist politics in the Peloponnese and annexed Cynuria. 
The age-grade of hippeis was at some point transformed into an elite military 
unit; the details of this makeover are unclear. However, one can envisage a 
scenario in which the transformation would be precipitated by the very practice 
of the ritual battles: the strategy of choosing the best soldiers among all of the 
available young men, instead of manning the field indiscriminately with particu-
                                                
120  Arist. Byz. Nomina aetatum (fragmenta) 275.8-9. Figueira 2006, 64.  
121  Figueira 2006, 68, and nn. 95,96 with further references.  
122  Ibid. 
123  I omit the calculation here for the brevity of the presentation. I follow Figueira 
1986, 168, n. 10 in using the Male Mortality Level 4 of the “South” populations 
(Coale and Demeny 1966, 782-783) as an approximation of the Greek population 
pattern, and also in assuming that the number of 5000 of the Spartan Homoioi par-
ticipating in the campaign of 479 BC (Hdt. 9.10.1, 9.11.3, 9.28.2) included men 20-
49 years old. Figueira 1986, 167-168.  
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
© 2012, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz 
ISBN Print: 9783938032510 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317845
72 Natasha Bershadsky  
 
lar two or three age-classes, would result in a much stronger fighting force with 
higher chances of victory.124 
 
 
The Argive proposal again  
 
Let us now return to the starting point of this exploration, the Argive proposal 
to the Spartans in 420 BC to conclude a peace treaty, accompanied by a ritual-
ized rerun of the battle for Cynuria.125 The preceding discussion suggests that 
this proposal derived from the historical antecedent of the archaic Argive-
Spartan ritual battles for the territory of Thyreatis. But what were the syn-
chronic goals of the Argives in resurrecting the practice of the ritual battles? My 
answer to this question can be only previewed in the framework of this exposi-
tion; I plan to present it at length in a different publication. 
In Argos in 421-417 BC there was a strong political tension, eventually de-
veloping into an open strife, between the oligarchic and democratic factions. In 
general, the oligarchic party advocated peace with Sparta, while the democratic 
party endorsed the war with Sparta (and an alliance with Athens).126 The strug-
gle between the factions resulted in abrupt shifts in the Argive foreign policy, 
oscillating in its alignment between Sparta and Athens. I submit that the Argive 
suggestion of replaying the Battle of Champions in the framework of a peace 
treaty with Sparta was a motion promoted by the oligarchic faction.127 Who 
were the Argive oligarchs? One group that we can identify is the thousand 
picked warriors – an elite force resembling the Spartan hippeis – who, assisted by 
the Spartans, carried out an oligarchic coup in Argos in 418 BC.128 According 
to Diodorus, the Argives instituted the unit of the Thousand, to be trained at 
public expense, in 421 BC. The Thousand consisted of the “younger citizens 
who were at the same time the most vigorous in body and the most wealthy.”129 
I argue that these thousand aristocratic young supporters of oligarchy were 
intended to fight with the Spartans in the rerun of the Battle of Champions.130 
                                                
124  Such selectivity is more likely to develop closer to the point of the disintegration of 
the tradition of the ritual battles, when the perception of the battle as a rite of pas-
sage would be attenuated. 
125  Thuc. 5.41.2-3. 
126  Thuc. 5.76.2-3. Hornblower 2002, 84; Kagan 1962. 
127  So already Kagan 1962, 210. Characteristically, this proposal of the peace with 
Sparta was abruptly abandoned by the Argives in favor of an alliance with Athens, 
called in the context “a sister democracy.” Thuc. 5.44.1. 
128  Thuc. 5.81.2, Diod. 12.80.2-3.  
129  Diod. 12.75.7. Translation C.H. Oldfather.  
130  Piérart (2009, 278) makes a similar suggestion. 
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Thus, the reintroduction of the practice of the ritual battles would have greatly 
strengthened the position of the Argive oligarchic faction. Even though the 
ritual battles were not reinstituted in 420 BC, in the Thousand the oligarchs 
acquired the backing of a highly trained military force, which was later put to 
use in the oligarchic coup of 418 BC. 
In the heated political atmosphere of Argos between 421 and 417 BC, with 
its volatile foreign policy and the oligarchic and the democratic factions vying 
for popularity, both factions appealed to the authority of the tradition. Gener-
ally, the democrats put emphasis on the myth of the war for Thyreatis and 
presented the perspective of fighting with Sparta as the extension of that 
myth.131 The oligarchs, interested in the peace with Sparta, advanced the possi-
bility of the ritual resolution of the dispute over Thyreatis.  
However, the oligarchs’ drive for power apparently required a more flexible 
attitude than an unrelenting promotion of the peace with Sparta. For example, 
the Argive Thousand made some spectacular switches in their attitude to 
Sparta: in between the plan to fight in the ritual battle in 420 BC and the Spar-
tan-assisted coup of 418 BC, the Thousand heroically confronted the Spartans 
in the battle of Mantinea (summer 418 BC), which earned them a great popu-
larity in Argos.132 I propose that the propagandistic device that assisted the 
Thousand in switching fluently between the pro-Spartan and anti-Spartan ori-
entation was their adroitness in emphasizing or obscuring the connection be-
tween the myth of the ancient struggle for Thyreatis and the ritual battle for 
that territory. By substituting the exhortation to battle with an exhortation to 
ritual battle, a spokesman of the Thousand could have kept employing the 
charismatic rhetoric of military valor and struggle for the primordially Argive 
land, even if the underlying message was of peace with Sparta; this belligerent 
diction also would smooth the transition when it became necessary to maneu-
ver toward backing the war with Sparta. 
A comparison of the archaic practice of the ritual battles for Thyreatis, and 
the manipulations of the myth-ritual complex of the confrontation over Thy-
reatis in the Argive politics of 421-417 BC highlights the extremely variable and 
                                                
131  However, the pretext under which Argos set out to war with Epidaurus in 419 BC – 
that the Epidaurians failed to deliver a sacrificial victim that they owed to Apollo Py-
thaeus (Thuc. 5.53.1) – shows that the Argive democrats (who apparently were be-
hind the Epidaurian war) could also use references to ritual to their political advan-
tage. Interestingly, Diodorus (12.78.1) states that the Argives accused the Spartans of 
not delivering the victim to Apollo Pythaeus. I see in the Argive accusation another 
reverberation of the theme of the confrontation over Thyreatis, now used by the 
democratic faction. See Brelich 1961, 32-34; Kowalzig 2007, 154-160 on the Argive 
attempts to appropriate the cult of Apollo Pythaeus in the fifth century BC.  
132  Thuc. 5.72.3; 5.73.4; Diod. 12.79.4-7; Arist. Pol. 1304a25-26. 
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and adaptable relations between the myth and ritual, and their embeddedness in 
the political and social circumstances of the day. The ritual morphs into a real 
conflict, and then mutates back into a ritual, according to the aspirations of the 
participants and their preference for war or peace. 
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The Greeks, for all their concern with war, peace, and international relations, 
did not have what we would call today a proper theory of diplomatic negotia-
tion; while Demetrius of Phalerum wrote a now-lost Presbeutikos, “On Ambas-
sadorship,” which might have told us much, instead we must examine our 
sources that deal with negotiation and diplomacy carefully to arrive at any sort 
of theory of negotiation among the Greeks. I wish to look at several key nego-
tiation-scenes in Thucydides’ History: the final pre-war negotiations at the end 
of Book 1 and the Melian Dialogue. These should give us pointers as to what 
Thucydides, and presumably his readers, believed about the principles of nego-
tiation in the fifth and early fourth centuries BC and the keys to creating peace 
and stability in ancient Greece. In the first negotiation-scene, Thucydides 
shows two states roughly equal in power – Athens and Sparta – negotiating 
purely in their own self-interest, to delay the imminent Peloponnesian War, but 
not eliminate the possibility of its occurrence. In the second, the so-called 
“Athenian thesis”, the idea that the strong naturally rule the weaker, is pro-
pounded and the dialogue reflects the profound change on diplomatic negotia-
tion that this has. Readers of Thucydides know him well as a cynical, pessimis-
tic, proto-Realist, but here I wish to suggest that Thucydides is not just stating 
his world-view in these scenes; rather, he is drawing attention to a serious and 
increasing problem in Greek diplomacy, the interference of power and self-




The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War 
 
Before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans and the Atheni-
ans engaged in complex negotiations.1 The nature of these negotiations has not 
been closely examined from a diplomatic point of view. The Spartans first 
demanded that the Athenians expiate the Curse of the Alcmaeonidae; the 
Athenians in turn demanded that the curses of Taenarum and the Brazen 
House be expunged. These demands allow Thucydides to digress at some 
                                                
1  Thuc. 1.126-146. 
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length on the Spartan regent Pausanias and the Athenian statesman Themisto-
cles. When he returns to the narrative, the negotiations continue:  
 
“The first embassy of the Spartans was as I have described [1.126]: they 
demanded that those under the curse [of the Alcmaeonidae] should be driv-
en out, and they received a counter demand from Athens in the same terms 
[1.128, the curses of Taenarum and the Brazen House]. Later they sent 
another embassy to demand that Athens should abandon the siege of Po-
tidaea and should give Aegina her independence. But the chief point and 
the one that they made most clear was that war could be avoided if Athens 
would revoke the Megarian Decree which excluded the Megarians from all 
ports in the Athenian Empire and from the market in Attica herself. The 
Athenians would not give in on the first points, nor would they revoke the 
decree. They accused Megara of cultivating consecrated ground, of cultivat-
ing land that did not belong to them, and of giving shelter to slaves who 
had escaped from Athens. Finally an embassy arrived with the Spartan ulti-
matum…[t]hey made no reference to the usual subjects that had been spo-
ken of before, but said simply, ‘Sparta wants peace. Peace is still possible if 
you will give the Hellenes their freedom.’”2  
 
Pericles responds to the Spartan ultimatum with the suggestion that the Spar-
tans should grant autonomy to their own allies and eliminate their practice of 
xenelasia, the ritual expulsion of foreigners.3 Ultimately, Book 1 of Thucydides 
concludes with the sentence, “There was still communication between the two 
                                                
2  Thuc. 1.139. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς πρώτης πρεσβείας τοιαῦτα ἐπέταξάν τε καὶ 
ἀντεκελεύσθησαν περὶ τῶν ἐναγῶν τῆς ἐλάσεως: ὕστερον δὲ φοιτῶντες παρ᾽ 
Ἀθηναίους Ποτειδαίας τε ἀπανίστασθαι ἐκέλευον καὶ Αἴγιναν αὐτόνομον ἀφιέναι, 
καὶ μάλιστά γε πάντων καὶ ἐνδηλότατα προύλεγον τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα 
καθελοῦσι μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον, ἐν ᾧ εἴρητο αὐτοὺς μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς λιμέσι τοῖς 
ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἀγορᾷ. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι οὔτε τἆλλα ὑπήκουον 
οὔτε τὸ ψήφισμα καθῄρουν, ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς 
καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἀφισταμένων. [3] τέλος δὲ 
ἀφικομένων τῶν τελευταίων πρέσβεων ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος … καὶ λεγόντων ἄλλο μὲν 
οὐδὲν ὧν πρότερον εἰώθεσαν, αὐτὰ δὲ τάδε ὅτι ‘Λακεδαιμόνιοι βούλονται τὴν εἰρήνην 
εἶναι, εἴη δ᾽ ἂν εἰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖτε,’ ποιήσαντες ἐκκλησίαν οἱ 
Ἀθηναῖοι γνώμας σφίσιν αὐτοῖς προυτίθεσαν, καὶ ἐδόκει ἅπαξ περὶ ἁπάντων 
βουλευσαμένους ἀποκρίνασθαι. [4] καὶ παριόντες ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ ἔλεγον ἐπ᾽ 
ἀμφότερα γιγνόμενοι ταῖς γνώμαις καὶ ὡς χρὴ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὡς μὴ ἐμπόδιον εἶναι τὸ 
ψήφισμα εἰρήνης, ἀλλὰ καθελεῖν, καὶ παρελθὼν Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου, ἀνὴρ κατ᾽ 
ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος, παρῄνει 
τοιάδε. All translations are from R. Warner’s Penguin edition unless otherwise not-
ed. 
3  Thuc. 1.144.2. On xenelasia, see Figueira 2003; Gomme, HCT ad loc. 
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states, and people traveled to and fro without heralds, though with considerable 
suspicion, since events were going on which amounted to a cancellation of the 
treaty and an excuse for open war”.4 Book 2 then begins with the actual com-
mencement of hostilities.5 
Within Thucydides’ narrative, these negotiations provide several valuable 
functions. First, the narrative of the negotiations gives Thucydides an occasion 
to embark upon the biographical digression on the Spartan Pausanias and the 
Athenian Themistocles, the two great Greek leaders of the Persian War era.6 
The Pausanias excursus is introduced by the demand about the curse of the 
Brazen House, and the Themistocles excursus picks up at the end of Pausani-
as’s tale. Thucydides resumes the main narrative at 1.139, describes the remain-
ing negotiations, and then uses the final sentence of 1.139 to introduce the first 
speech of his hero Pericles, “the leading man of his time among the Athenians 
and the most powerful both in action and in debate.”7 Pericles had already been 
formally introduced in the History at 1.127.3 in the context of the Spartan de-
mand about the Curse of the Alcmaeonidae as “one of the most able men of 
his day and the leading man of the state.”8 
The negotiation-scene also contributes to the historical puzzle of the causes 
of the Peloponnesian War; 1.139 is one of the only two points in the History at 
which Thucydides mentions the Megarian Decree,9 often taken by scholars 
today as a major cause of the war, but largely excluded by Thucydides, perhaps 
because it may have reflected poorly on Pericles.10 But beyond those points, 
what do these demands and counter-demands tell us about the expectations of 
negotiations in classical Greece and within Thucydides’ narrative? Thucydides’ 
account of the negotiations is presumably largely historical, since the grievances 
to which he refers are confirmed by other sources or his own earlier narrative.11 
 
                                                
4  Thuc. 1.146. ἐπεμείγνυντο δὲ ὅμως ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων ἀκηρύκτως 
μέν, ἀνυπόπτως δὲ οὔ: σπονδῶν γὰρ ξύγχυσις τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν καὶ πρόφασις τοῦ 
πολεμεῖν. 
5  Thuc. 2.2 ff. 
6  Thuc. 1.128-138. 
7  Περικλῆς ὁ Χανθίππου, ἀνὴρ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ 
πράσσειν δυνατώτατος. 
8  ὥν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν. 
9  Cf. Thuc. 1.67.4. 
10  The main proponent of this theory is de Ste. Croix 1972, but see Hornblower ad 
1.67.4. 
11  Cf. Gomme ad loc. and Hornblower ad loc. 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
© 2012, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz 
ISBN Print: 9783938032510 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317845
 Thucydides’ Theory of Negotiation     81 
 
The actual exchange of demands in the negotiation process runs as follows: 
 
 Spartans Athenians  
1) Expunge the Curse of the Alcmae-onidae 
Expunge the Curse of Taenarum 
Expunge the Curse of the Bra-
zen House 
2) 
Abandon the siege of Potidaea 
Free Aegina 
Repeal the Megarian Decrees 
No counter-demand 
 
Accusations against the Megari-
ans 
3) Give the Greeks their freedom 




Figure 1. Exchange of Athenian-Spartan Demands at Thuc. 1.126-146  
     
The first round of negotiations belongs to the realm of the improbable. The 
demand about the Curse of the Alcmaeonidae is clearly aimed at Pericles, re-
lated to the family through his mother.12 And, although the Curse of the 
Alcmaeonidae had been incurred in 632, the demand to expiate it had first been 
made by the Spartans in 508, when their aim was to remove the Alcmaeonid 
reformer Cleisthenes from Athens.13 The Athenians had ultimately resisted the 
Spartans then, and it was a foregone conclusion that they would do so again 
with this demand. Pericles had been introduced at Thuc. 1.127 and will be 
introduced again at 1.139 as the Athenian leader. If he was as pro-war as other 
ancient sources and many modern scholars believe, his removal might well have 
had the effect of stymieing the war, or it might have solidified Athenian hostil-
ity towards the Spartans.14 In either event, the Spartans were gambling with this 
demand. 
Likewise, the initial Athenian demands mimic the Spartan demands. The 
curse of Taenarum is given short shrift by Thucydides; it involved the Spartans 
                                                
12  Thuc. 1.127.1. 
13 Hdt. 5.72. 
14  On the inevitability of the Archidamian War, see Hornblower ad 1.23.6. 
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killing helot suppliants at the altar of Poseidon at Taenarum.15 The curse of the 
Brazen House is given in more detail; the Spartans had again violated divine 
sanctuary by starving the regent Pausanias to death as he hid in the Temple of 
Athena Chalkioikos on the Spartan acropolis. The Spartans had already taken 
steps to expiate this curse by dedicating bronze statues to the goddess, and they 
believed that they had been punished for the violation of Taenarum with the 
great earthquake of 465, which devastated the Spartan population.16 Neither of 
these Athenian demands is especially effective, as neither would have altered 
the build-up to war, as the expulsion of Pericles from Athens might have done. 
The only advantage that might accrue to them from these demands is that by 
doubling the Spartans’ demand about expiating curses, they make a point about 
Spartan internal affairs as well – their treatment of helots and their sacrilege in 
Pausanias’ death. But this moral currency will do them little good in these nego-
tiations. 
We have here in the initial stage of the negotiations two demands that bal-
ance each other; all involve violations of divine sanctuaries with bloodshed. 
These are serious crimes in ancient Greece, but none of the demands address 
the matter at hand in these negotiations: preventing the outbreak of war. The 
Spartans attempt to address the issue of Pericles’ leadership, but it is not clear 
historically whether his expulsion would have prevented war, and the unimagi-
native means by which the Spartans pursue this goal, thinking that what tempo-
rarily worked with Cleisthenes in 508 would work with Pericles in 432, as well 
as their claim that his expulsion would “honor the gods” (1.127), only led the 
Athenians to make a silly counter-demand, with no relevance to the situation at 
all. 
The second round of negotiations brought more concrete demands from 
the Spartans about the Peloponnesian allies Megara, Aegina, and Potidaea. The 
complaints of the Megarians and the Aeginetans had been noted before by 
Thucydides during the first Congress at Sparta.17 The Corinthians had also 
complained about Potidaea then, so none of these complaints are unexpected – 
in fact, Thucydides uses the verb “to be accustomed”18 to describe these de-
mands. The Athenians do not respond with a counteroffer, but simply defend 
themselves against the Megarians. 
Although the demands were “customary,” would Athenian fulfillment of 
them have averted the war? It seems unlikely; these requests had been made 
                                                
15  Thuc. 1.128.1. 
16  Thuc. 1.128.2, 134. 
17  Thuc. 1.67.2-4. 
18  εἰώθεσαν, 1.139.3. 
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before,19 and the Athenian lack of response shows their lack of regard for 
them. The mention of Potidaea in particular stresses this fact: the siege was one 
of the two aitiae that Thucydides gives for the war, and his description of it 
indicates the determination of both the Athenians and the Corinthians to hold 
the place.20 These demands, likewise, are not really interested in stopping the 
war, but on getting the arguments of each side on record. The Spartans first 
claimed to be interested in honoring the gods; now they show that they are 
honoring their allies by taking their side against the Athenians. Likewise, the 
Athenians get their arguments against the Megarians on record. 
The final Spartan demand is clearly the most serious. They state firmly that 
they want peace, and it can be achieved if the Athenians allow their allies to be 
autonomous. Pericles then demands in his subsequent speech that the Spartans 
give up their habit of expelling foreigners from Laconia and allow their own 
allies to be autonomous. These demands are as implausible as the preceding 
two; giving up their empire and their allies is impossible for the Athenians. 
Their democracy and their economy were tied incredibly closely to their empire 
and their allies’ contributions of tribute.21 It is an impossible demand, just as 
Pericles’ counter-demands strike at the heart of Spartan culture: giving up xene-
lasia would permit forbidden foreign influence in Sparta, endangering (in the 
Spartans’ eyes) their culture, and giving up their political control over their allies 
would endanger the defensive benefits Sparta received from the Peloponnesian 
League,22 especially against a helot revolt or trouble from Argos, which would 
also endanger Sparta. So the final demands of each side suggest a lack of practi-
cal concern for the other side fulfilling the conditions asked for. The wording 
of the final Spartan demand – directly quoted by Thucydides – suggests too a 
propaganda aspect. The Spartans had built themselves up throughout the fifth 
century as the liberators of Greece,23 and having seen off the Persians, will now 
take on the Athenians. 
What can we learn from these negotiations? First, the demands after the 
first round are generally taken as historical by scholars, as they speak to some of 
the tensions that led up to war. They may represent negotiations over a longer 
course of time than the few weeks or months that Thucydides suggests. From 
the Spartan perspective, the conditions they ask for – the removal of Pericles, 
better treatment for their allies, the dissolution of the Athenian arche – would all 
                                                
19  See previous note. 
20  Thuc. 1.23.6, 56-66. 
21  Cf. Rhodes 2007. 
22  Cf. Bolmarcich 2005, nn. 1-2 for full bibliography on the defensive nature of the 
Peloponnesian League. 
23  See Hornblower ad 1.69.1 for this Spartan meme. 
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have prevented war, or should have prevented war. Yet Thucydides states quite 
clearly that the Spartans negotiated “so that there should be a good pretext for 
making war if the Athenians paid no attention to them.”24 The Athenians, of 
course, did pay attention, but only to make their own counter-demands, none 
of which would have eliminated the threat of war. Even if Thucydides has 
altered his description of the negotiations for the larger literary purposes of his 
work, for instance by compressing the timeframe of the negotiations, the ac-
count he gives must have been a familiar story to his readers to be accepted by 
them. 
These are not diplomatic negotiations intended to be successful. Serious di-
plomacy relies on the concept of mutual gains by both sides; states must there-
fore make, first of all, reasonable demands (not demands that strike at the heart 
of the other state’s government and society, as the Athenians and Spartans do), 
and, second of all, be prepared to concede some of their own desires. Neither 
the Spartans nor the Athenians are doing this here. Their goal is not to prevent 
war; it is to prolong the advent of war in order to prepare for it best. The 
American humorist Will Rogers once observed, “Diplomats are just as essential 
to starting a war as soldiers are for finishing it (…). You take [the] diplomacy 
out of war, and the thing would fall flat in a week.” The Spartan-Athenian 
negotiations and the type of demands they make are key to the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War, as their position at the end of Book 1, the introduction of 
Pericles, and the Theban attack on Plataea early in Book 2 make clear. 
 
 
The Melian Dialogue25 
 
Now, these are hardly the only negotiations Thucydides makes note of. The 
most famous, naturally, is the Melian Dialogue, to which I now turn. It is diffi-
cult to judge the historicity of the dialogue itself, of course; Thucydides may be 
reporting actual arguments made by Athenians and Melians in 416 BC, but he 
may also have added or embellished the arguments himself. What is very strik-
ing about the dialogue is that it is a dialogue in form only; it is not a dialogue in 
terms of a meeting of the minds. Its purpose is, rather, to air the various view-
points available in an informal diplomatic discussion. And, tellingly, it enters 
Thucydides’ narrative after Book 5, a long tale of failed treaties and negotia-
tions from 421-416 BC. Those treaties and negotiations had been quite tradi-
                                                
24  Thuc. 1.126. ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ἢν μή τι 
ἐσακούωσιν. 
25  There is a vast bibliography on the Melian Dialogue. For a summary, see Horn-
blower 3.216-225. 
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tional in the Greek sense, but the Melian Dialogue and its conduct transform 
those customary procedures of diplomacy.  
Why Melos provoked an attack from Athens in 416 is not entirely certain: 
was it because she had resisted Athens in 426,26 or because she was a delin-
quent member of the Athenian Empire,27 or simply because she was a Spartan 
colony, and supported her financially in the war, as the inscription recording 
contributions to the Spartan war fund tells us28? What is certain is that she 
provoked Athenian wrath, and the dialogue occurs while Athenian troops were 
on Melos, but had not yet attacked the city. The dialogue is Melos’ chance to 
stave off an attack by either acceding to Athenian demands, or to convince the 
Athenians to spare her. 
The Melians take the initiative in the discourse, making the issue at hand ei-
ther war between Athens and Melos or slavery for the Melians if they join the 
Athenian Empire. They immediately accuse the Athenians of setting themselves 
up as judges: “We see that you have come prepared to judge the argument 
yourselves, and that the likely end of it all will be either war, if we prove that we 
are in the right, and so refuse to surrender, or else slavery.”29 This is an ex-
traordinarily stark statement: admitting the Athenians’ greater power, the 
Melians draw attention to their plight – if they negotiate successfully, they will 
be at war with Athens, and if they fail, they will become subject to Athens. 
These sort of polarized goals make the dialogue a lose-lose situation for the 
Melians, and it highlights starkly the problems of negotiation in classical 
Greece: just as the failure of negotiations in Book 1 meant war, so the success 
of the same negotiations would have meant that either Athens or Sparta or 
both altering themselves in a significant way and in effect subordinating them-
selves to the other party. Here, the opposite of “normal” diplomacy occurs – 
success means war, and failure means subjection. In the Melian Dialogue, then, 
Thucydides may be drawing our attention to other problems with classical 
diplomacy. 
The Athenians respond to the Melian summary by reiterating it: “or if you 
have met here for any other reason except to look the facts in the face and on 
the basis of these facts to consider how you can save your city from destruc-
                                                
26  Thuc. 3.91.1. 
27  Her name appears on the Athenian tribute reassessment of 425, IG i3 71.I.65. 
28  IG v.1.1.1-2, 14 side. 
29  Thuc. 5.86. ὁρῶμεν γὰρ αὐτούς τε κριτὰς ἥκοντας ὑμᾶς τῶν λεχθησομένων καὶ τὴν 
τελευτὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς περιγενομένοις μὲν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ μὴ 
ἐνδοῦσι πόλεμον ἡμῖν φέρουσαν, πεισθεῖσι δὲ δουλείαν. 
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tion, there is no point in our going on with the discussion.”30 The Athenians 
recast the Melian statement into a pro-Athenian light, just as the Melians had 
cast their statement in an anti-Athenian light. It is the Melians, in the Athenian 
version, who are holding up the negotiations; in the Melian version it is the 
Athenians who thwart the negotiations. 
The Melians acknowledge the Athenians’ point about the purpose of the di-
alogue in their response: “It is natural and understandable that people who are 
placed as we are should have recourse to all kinds of arguments and different 
points of view. However, you are right in saying that we are met together here 
to discuss the safety of our country.”31 The Melians concede the Athenians’ 
point; but they also take the negotiations off-point by saying that any ar-
guments – not necessarily those that have to do with the situation at hand or 
the interests of Athenians and Melians – are acceptable in this formerly diplo-
matic discourse, just as in Book 1 some off-point demands were part of the 
Spartan-Athenian negotiations. And indeed the dialogue within a few chapters 
will become a consideration of much larger issues like justice and self-interest, 
not a diplomatic give-and-take over the fate of Melos. 
The Athenians for their part respond to the Melians’ attack on the subject 
of their negotiations with an attack on the type of rhetoric that accompanies 
negotiations: 
 
“Then we on our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example, that we 
have a right to our empire because we defeated the Persians, or that we 
have come against you now because of the injuries you have done us – a 
great mass of words that nobody would believe. And we ask you on your 
side not to imagine that you will influence us by saying that you, though a 
colony of Sparta, have not joined Sparta in the war, or that you have never 
done us any harm. Instead we recommend that you should try to get what is 
possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really do 
think; since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are dis-
cussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality 
of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power 
to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”32 
                                                
30  Thuc. 5.87. ἢ ἄλλο τι ξυνήκετε ἢ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ὧν ὁρᾶτε περὶ σωτηρίας 
βουλεύσοντες τῇ πόλει. 
31  Thuc. 5.88. εἰκὸς μὲν καὶ ξυγγνώμη ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε καθεστῶτας ἐπὶ πολλὰ καὶ λέγοντας 
καὶ δοκοῦντας τρέπεσθαι: ἡ μέντοι ξύνοδος καὶ περὶ σωτηρίας ἥδε πάρεστι. 
32  Thuc. 5.89. ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὔτε αὐτοὶ μετ᾽ ὀνομάτων καλῶν, ὡς ἢ δικαίως τὸν Μῆδον 
καταλύσαντες ἄρχομεν ἢ ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα, λόγων μῆκος ἄπιστον 
παρέξομεν, οὔθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦμεν ἢ ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίων ἄποικοι ὄντες οὐ 
ξυνεστρατεύσατε ἢ ὡς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἠδικήκατε λέγοντας οἴεσθαι πείσειν, τὰ δυνατὰ δ᾽ 
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In the previous passage, the Melians had created a new rule for negotiations: 
anything goes in terms of arguments. The Athenians create their own new rule: 
negotiators should speak straight to the point, not of the issues at hand, but of 
the underlying causes of the conflict. All the types of arguments they mention 
had been used earlier in the History in negotiations or conferences: the Atheni-
ans themselves, as well as the Plataeans, had made much of their former service 
to Greece in the Peloponnesian Wars in Books 1 and 3.33 In Book 3 the Platae-
ans had been unable to answer the question “Have you been of any aid to the 
Spartans in this war?” affirmatively, just as the Melians could not answer it 
affirmatively for the Athenians; and Melian neutrality is as anathematic to the 
Athenians as Plataean neutrality was to the Spartans in Books 2 and 3. Rather, 
the Athenians offer in place of traditional negotiation the so-called “Athenian 
thesis”: “the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel 
and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak 
accept what they have to accept.” The ultimate import of this thesis is that 
negotiation is pointless; in any conflict of state interests, the more powerful 
party should immediately be given preference and authority, while the weaker 
state should try to salvage what crumbs it can. This is what the Athenians 
would like to see, but Greece had not yet reached this state, as the very dialogue 
between the Melians and the Athenians proves. 
Later, the Athenians do make some attempt to relate to the Melians and ex-
plain themselves to them: “What we shall do now is to show you that it is for 
the good of our own empire that we are here and that it is for the preservation 
of your city that we shall say what we are going to say. We do not want any 
trouble in bringing you into our empire, and we want you to be spared for the 
good both of yourselves and of ourselves.”34 This is more like it; the Athenians 
claim they want to explain their position, as a state would in traditional diplo-
matic negotiations. The Athenians have the goal of making the least trouble 
possible, and to achieve that they must communicate better with the Melians. 
The Melians do not believe it and are not in the mood to communicate fur-
ther: 
 
                                                                                                    
ἐξ ὧν ἑκάτεροι ἀληθῶς φρονοῦμεν διαπράσσεσθαι, ἐπισταμένους πρὸς εἰδότας ὅτι 
δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ 
προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν. 
33  Cf. the Athenian speech at Sparta (Thuc. 1.73-78) and the Plataean defense speech 
to the Spartans (Thuc. 3.53-59). 
34  Thuc. 5.91. ὡς δὲ ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ τε πάρεσμεν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ νῦν 
τοὺς λόγους ἐροῦμεν τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως, ταῦτα δηλώσομεν, βουλόμενοι ἀπόνως μὲν 
ὑμῶν ἄρξαι, χρησίμως δ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀμφοτέροις σωθῆναι. 
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“Melians: And how could it be just as good for us to be the slaves as for 
you to be the masters? 
Athenians: You, by giving in, would save yourselves from disaster; we, by 
not destroying you, would be able to profit from you. 
Melians: So you would not agree to our being neutral, friends instead of 
enemies, but allies of neither side? 
Athenians: No, because it is not so much your hostility that injures us; it is 
rather the case that, if we were on friendly terms with you, our subjects 
would regard that as a sign of weakness in us, whereas your hatred is evi-
dence of our power.”35 
 
The way in which the Athenians now imagine diplomacy, as more focussed 
with the more powerful party, changes the entire idea of negotiating. “Not 
being destroyed” is a basic right of states; the Athenians are attempting to make 
their interests equal to another state’s right to self-preservation, an equation so 
skewed that it eliminates any idea of diplomacy at all. This is the sort of de-
mand the Athenians appear to make outside of Thucydides’ History as well; for 
instance, in their regulations for the subdued Chalcidians after their revolt in 
446, the Athenians and the Chalcidians swear oaths.36 The Chalcidians swear 
near-absolute fealty to the Athenians; the Athenians by contrast promise not to 
destroy or kill the Chalcidians or harm them in any other way. The Melians’ 
seemingly reasonable compromise, a position of neutrality, is rejected by the 
Athenians because their failure to control every island state would appear to be 
weakness. Once power enters the picture, negotiation becomes increasingly 
useless, not because the powerful naturally dominate the weak, as the Athenians 
have it, but because power and its maintenance come with an entirely different 
set of rules than the rules for negotiation that exist between states that consider 
themselves equal in premise if not in fact. The Athenian development of their 
power skews not only their ability to negotiate successfully, but also that of 
other states like Melos. It makes war more likely and peace less likely, because 
of the conditions powerful states must meet to fulfill their own self-interest and 
protection. This does not mean that power is bad, necessarily, or that the Athe-
                                                
35  Thuc. 5.92-95. ΜΗΛ. καὶ πῶς χρήσιμον ἂν ξυμβαίη ἡμῖν δουλεῦσαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὑμῖν 
ἄρξαι; 
ΑΘ. ὅτι ὑμῖν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τὰ δεινότατα παθεῖν ὑπακοῦσαι ἂν γένοιτο, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ 
διαφθείραντες ὑμᾶς κερδαίνοιμεν ἄν. 
ΜΗΛ. ὥστε [δὲ] ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας ἡμᾶς φίλους μὲν εἶναι ἀντὶ πολεμίων, ξυμμάχους δὲ 
μηδετέρων, οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε; 
ΑΘ. οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς βλάπτει ἡ ἔχθρα ὑμῶν ὅσον ἡ φιλία μὲν ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ 
μῖσος δυνάμεως παράδειγμα τοῖς ἀρχομένοις δηλούμενον. 
36  IG i3 40.4-32. 
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nians are; it does mean that powerful states are required by their very nature to 
operate differently from other, “normal” states. 
There is a significant difference between the negotiations in Book 1 and the 
Melian Dialogue. The negotiations in Book 1 begin from a premise of equality; 
although the demands each side makes are unlikely to be fulfilled by the other 
side, they are roughly equivalent. Under the duress of the Peloponnesian War, 
the Athenians’ interest in maintaining a fiction at least of equality with other 
states appears to have disappeared. Although these two scenes are far from the 
only negotiations in Thucydides, they are two major episodes. Other scenes of 
negotiation back up Thucydides’ presentation of these two scenes; the Plataean-
Spartan negotiations of Book 3, for instance, have the Plataeans reminding the 
Spartans of their glorious past and service to Greece in the Persian Wars, while 
Archidamus and the Spartans are more interested in their “reasonable demand” 
that the Plataeans help them here and now.37 The negotiations for a truce dur-
ing the siege of Sphacteria have the Spartans offering the Athenians “peace, 
alliance, friendly and neighbourly relations”38 in exchange for some very spe-
cific demands, specifically the release of the Spartans on Sphacteria. Negotia-
tions quickly fall through once specific demands are exchanged by both sides: 
in return for the men on the island, the Athenians want several clauses of the 
Thirty Years’ Peace to be abrogated and the return of Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, 
and Achaea. Negotiation in Thucydides’ History is often a fruitless affair, for 





In conclusion, Thucydides takes a view of negotiations, especially those under-
taken to avert war or hostilities, that could – perhaps not surprisingly – be read 
as cynical, pessimistic, or proto-Realist. It is sometimes tempting to dismiss 
Thucydides because he often speaks in what seems like a very modern voice; 
but he represents at least one point in Greek thought on interstate relations. 
Neither of the scenes discussed here need to be present in the History; they draw 
attention to themselves. His basic points in these two negotiation-scenes appear 
to be that states will act inflexibly in their own self-interest, that negotiations 
are often a delaying tactic to prepare for war or assault, and that the respective 
power of states must always be taken into account. It is the first and last points 
that are the most surprising in terms of Greek diplomatic history: these are 
                                                
37  Thuc. 3.52-68. 
38  Thuc. 4.19. (…) διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ 
οἰκειότητα. 
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some of the first and most bald statements to that effect in Greek literature. 
archaic and early classical Greek diplomacy often appears to have been predi-
cated upon equality or at least a pretense of equality between city-states; Persian 
and Athenian imperialism change that irrevocably, and Thucydides chronicles 
the transformation for us in his History. Whether or not one subscribes to Thu-
cydides’ theory of international relations, the Athenians were right at least 
about the fact that power and self-interest mattered most in negotiations, and 
until the Greeks took that into account, peace and stability would be impossi-
ble. 
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War and Peace at the Beginning of the Fourth Century 




“After this, Lysander sailed into the harbor of the Piraeus, and the exiles re-
turned. With great zeal they dismantled the walls, to the accompaniment of 
music provided by flute girls, and they believed that that day would be the 
beginning of freedom for all of Greece.”1  
 
This is how Xenophon famously describes the situation after the capitulation of 
Athens in 404 BC in his Hellenica, thus clearly characterizing the end of the 
Peloponnesian War as a turning point in Greek history. The military conflicts 
that had affected virtually all of Greece for decades were over, and the yearning 
for peace articulated time after time throughout the war seemed to finally have 
been fulfilled.2 Sparta’s clear victory and the end of the Athenian Empire re-
vived hopes that the promises of autonomy constantly articulated especially by 
Sparta would now be implemented and that “just order” would be restored 
once again in the community of free poleis throughout Greece.3 But very soon 
after the capitulation of Athens, it became clear that the long-awaited time of 
peace and universal Greek freedom had not yet been attained. Thus, the laconic 
brevity of the passage cited above also makes evident that for Xenophon, the 
frustration, and indeed, the naiveté of these hopes had become manifest. But of 
course, he was writing with knowledge of how internal Greek warfare had 
persisted throughout the decades that followed.4 
For Sparta the end of the war created a position of power unprecedented in 
Greek history. Sparta stood out against all the other Greek states as the sole 
remaining hegemonic power. Not one among them could challenge its status as 
the leading city in Hellas.5 However, despite Sparta’s clear preeminence, efforts 
                                                
1  Xen. Hell. 2.2.23. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Λύσανδρός τε κατέπλει εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ καὶ οἱ 
φυγάδες κατῇσαν καὶ τὰ τείχη κατέσκαπτον ὑπ᾽ αὐλητρίδων πολλῇ προθυμίᾳ, 
νομίζοντες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν τῇ Ἑλλαδι ἄρχειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Translation J. 
Marincola; cf. Plut. Lys. 15,4. 
2  Cf. Murray 1944, 1. Zampaglione 1973. Spiegel 1990. Raaflaub 2001. Raaflaub 2009.  
3  For the propaganda for autonomy and freedom cf. Raaflaub 1981, esp. 216. For the 
situation after the Peloponnesian War cf. Hamilton 1979, 17. Buckler 2003, 1: “In 
short, victory had not brought peace. Rather, it caused more problems as it had 
supposedly solved.” 
4  Cf. Buckler – Beck 2008, 1. 
5  Hamilton 1979, 17. 
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to establish stability in the relationship between the Greek states failed, and a 
mere ten years after the fall of the walls of Athens, Sparta not only found itself 
at war with Persia, but also against a coalition of Greek states including Athens, 
Thebes, Corinth and Argos. Not until 386 BC was the attempt finally made, 
with the King’s Peace, to seek a long-term stabilization of conditions in Greece 
and to establish a lasting framework for peace. 
As is commonly known, this treaty also failed to lead to the “Common 
Peace” (koine eirene) envisaged between autonomous Greek states, but was mis-
used instead as an instrument of Spartan power politics for the purpose of 
safeguarding and augmenting its hegemony. Since this phenomenon was also 
repeated in the case of ensuing koinai eirenai by alternately predominant poleis, 
modern studies have been dominated by an emphasis on the use of Common 
Peace treaties as an instrument of power politics.6 In this paper, by contrast, the 
emergence of the koine eirene will be investigated as an idea, concept and a new 
form of interstate agreement, as it encompasses a number of significant new 
developments in Greek interstate relations: for the first time, treaties were 
concluded between multiple parties, and moreover, they were set up to remain 
in force indefinitely. Yet in terms of their substance, Common Peace treaties 
represented an even more far-reaching innovation. For the first time, a com-
prehensive regulating principle was codified through a general guarantee of 
autonomy. At the same time, peace (eirene) was now introduced into Greek 
international law as a positive legal condition.7  
The concept of the koine eirene was, however, initially emerged not in 386 
BC, but rather in the course of peace negotiations in 392/391 BC. Even though 
these efforts failed, in large part because of Athens’ negative vote, it is in these 
negotiations that one can find the birth of the idea of a koine eirene. In the fol-
lowing, its emergence will be examined in its specific historical context and 




The Spartan hegemony and the Corinthian War to 392/391 BC 
 
Right after the end of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta was recognized by all 
parties as the only hegemonic power in Greece – and the Lacedaemonians 
                                                
6  Ryder 1965. Jehne 1992. Jehne 1994.  
7  Ryder 1965, 1. Quass 1991, 33. Jehne 1992, 99-100. The exact wording of the King’s 
Peace has to be reconstructed especially based upon Xen. Hell. 5.1.31; Diod. 
14.110.3; cf. StV 242. For the historical relevance of the period between 404 and 
386 BC for the late classical period in general cf. Hamilton 1979, 9. 
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themselves were quite aware of their unique power.8 This resulted in an am-
biguous situation: through its war propaganda, Sparta had contributed signifi-
cantly to the dissemination and general acceptance of the principles of auton-
omy and freedom, and their implementation must have seemed like a clear duty 
in the wake of Sparta’s victory over Athens.9 At the same time, however, in 
many parts of the Aegean the ruling system created by Lysander based on de-
carchies and harmosts was still in operation, although these had now lost their 
official reason for existence.10 Finally, it appears that in view of the undisputed 
supremacy of the Spartans and despite their rhetoric of freedom, certain small 
and medium-sized poleis were keenly aware of their dependency upon the new 
power, and accepted Spartan hegemony or rushed ahead to quickly demon-
strate their obedience and allegiance.11 
In Sparta itself there was a sense of being overextended by the expectations 
now placed on the remaining superpower, and the Spartans had no generally 
accepted idea of how Greece should be organized. On the one hand, Sparta 
took advantage of the situation and continued Lysander’s power politics. It 
expelled the Messenians from Naupactus and Cephallenia,12 and waged war 
against Elis on specious grounds.13 However, one faction (in modern scholar-
ship usually associated with Pausanias) favored a more reserved and, in the 
Spartan sense, more “conservative” approach to foreign policy. The abolition 
of the decarchies at the beginning of the fourth century was clearly the work of 
                                                
8  The Spartans felt so confident that they even denied their allies their due portion of 
the spoils of the war against Athens, Xen. Hell. 2.3.8, 3.5.12; Iust. 5.10.12. It seems 
that the Thebans in the Deceleia only could secure the tithe for Delphi, Xen. Hell. 
3.5.5; Hamilton 1979, 65-66.  
9  Cf. Xen. Hell. 2.2.23. Raaflaub 1981, 216.  
10  Xen. Hell. 3.4.2, 7; Diod. 14.3.4, 10.1-2, 13.1; Plut. Lys. 13.3-14.1.  
11  Cf. Xen. Anab. 6.6.12: “The Lacedaemonians stand as the leaders of Greece, and 
they are able, nay, any single Lacedaemonian is able, to accomplish in the cities 
whatever he pleases.” (τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν: ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι 
καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι. Trans-
lation C.L. Brownson); cf. also Xen. Hell. 3.1.5. For the cult established for Lysander 
in various poleis see Plut. Lys. 18 including a paean of Duris (fr. 65, cf. Ath. 15.696e); 
Hesych. s.v. Lysandreia; Paus. 6.3.14. 
12  Diod. 14.34.2, cf. 14.78.5; Paus. 4.26.2. Buckler 2003, 19-20. 
13  Xen. Hell. 3.2.21-23; Diod. 14.17.4-6 (wrongly naming Pausanias instead of Agis); 
Polyaen. 6.36; Paus. 3.8.3. Hamilton 1979, 110-111. Buckler 2003, 15. Welwei 2007, 
276. For the “Lysandrean” policy in general see Lotze 1964. Hamilton 1979, esp. 56-
68. Hamilton 1982, 72-73. 
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this group, but they were unable to define Spartan policy for a longer period of 
time.14 
More often, the demeanor of Sparta was perceived as hegemonic and pre-
sumptuous by many of its former anti-Athenian allies, so Thebes and Corinth 
in particular were quick to withdraw from the previous coalition15 and their 
relationship with Sparta was strained. The other poleis in Greece also reacted 
with disappointment to the discrepancy between their great hopes following the 
end of the war and the realities of Spartan power politics. Accordingly, the 
comic poet Theopompus likened the Lacedaemonians to tavern-women, be-
cause they gave the Greeks a very pleasant sip of freedom, and then dashed the 
wine with vinegar.16 
                                                
14  Xen. Hell. 3.4.2, 7; Plut. Lys. 14.2, cf. Ages. 6.1; Nep. Lys. 3.1. Hamilton 1982, 73. 
Welwei 2007, 276.  
15  Tensions were already manifest at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, as only 
Sparta’s protests held back Thebes and Corinth from the destruction of Athens 
(Xen. Hell. 2.2.19-20, cf. 3.5.8, 6.5.35, 46; Plut. Lys. 15.2-3; Andoc. 1.142; 3.21; Isoc. 
14.31-32, 18.29; Demosth. 19.65; Iustin. 5.8.4; Ael. VH 4.6; Parke – Wormell 1956, 
no. 171). In addition, Sparta’s previously cited refusal to share its portion of the 
booty acquired in the victory over Athens with its allies strengthened the split be-
tween the former confederates (Xen. Hell. 2.3.8, 3.5.12; Iustin. 5.10.12). Thebes and 
Argos thus turned unequivocally against the Spartan decree not to take in democ-
ratic exiles from Athens. Megara, Elis and Chalkis in Euboea also appear to have re-
sisted the order, at least de facto (Lys. 12.17, 24.25; Xen. Hell. 2.4.1; Isoc. 18.49; 
Demosth. 15.22; Din. 1.25; Dion. Hal. De Isaeo 6; Diod. 14.6.1-3, 32.1, 15.25.4; Plut. 
Pelop. 6.2; mor. 835A, F; Iustin. 5.9.3-5). Shortly afterwards, both Thebes and Corinth 
refused the call to send armed forces when Sparta turned once more against Athens 
to put down the civil war and Sparta also had to undertake its subsequent campaign 
against Elis without their assistance (Xen. Hell. 2.4.30, 3.2.25; Diod. 14.17.7). The-
bes, on the other hand, took steps to expand its own regional influence and reinte-
grated Oropos into the Boeotian League, but it must have felt constrained and con-
trolled by the new Spartan garrison in Heraclea Trachinia (Diod. 14.38.4-5; cf. 82.6-
7; Polyaen. 2.21). After the Spartans had responded to a call for help from the poleis 
in Asia Minor, the war against Persia offered an opportunity to reestablish Sparta’s 
increasingly tarnished reputation and at the same time to forge a coalition of Greek 
states under Spartan leadership. The Boeotian disruption of Agesilaus’ sacrifice in 
Aulis, imitating Agamemnon, was probably only left unpunished because the king 
wanted to carry on waging war in Asia Minor (Xen. Hell. 3.4.3-4; Plut. Ages. 6.5-6; 
Paus. 3.9.3-5). 
16  Theopompus com. fr. 65 (apud Plut. Lys. 13.5). Plutarch, however, criticized this 
statement because he did not see a change in Sparta’s policy (ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κωμικὸς 
Θεόπομπος ἔοικε ληρεῖν ἀπεικάζων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ταῖς καπηλίσιν, ὅτι τοὺς 
Ἕλληνας ἥδιστον ποτὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας γεύσαντες ὄξος ἐνέχεαν: εὐθὺς γὰρ ἦν τὸ 
γεῦμα δυσχερὲς καὶ πικρόν, οὔτε τοὺς δήμους κυρίους τῶν πραγμάτων ἐῶντος εἶναι 
τοῦ Λυσάνδρου, καὶ τῶν ὀλίγων τοῖς θρασυτάτοις καὶ φιλονεικοτάτοις τὰς πόλεις 
ἐγχειρίζοντος). Cf. also Theodoros Metochites, Miscellanea p. 792 (Millier), who 
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Thus, in the years after the capitulation of Athens, Sparta had proved to be 
incapable of implementing a stable and universally accepted post-war order in 
Greece, one that would be considered legal and reasonable by the other Greek 
states that had also fought against Athens, especially Thebes and Corinth. Thus, 
Spartan supremacy was clearly accepted as a reality, and yet the behavior of the 
hegemonic power generated profound mistrust, a sentiment that remained 
powerful in the period that followed and without which it is impossible to 
understand the developments that took place in subsequent decades.17  
However, the war between Sparta and the Persian Empire, which escalated 
considerably in intensity and seriousness following Agesilaus’ assumption of 
command, changed the long-term strategic situation in Greece. The increasing 
burdens placed on Sparta by the war in Asia Minor and the offer on the part of 
the Persians to support any of the Greek states which turned against the enemy 
changed this situation. On behalf of the Great King, Timocrates of Rhodes 
offered a number of Greek poleis and anti-Spartan factions money to encourage 
them to wage war against Sparta. The actual influence of these payments and 
promises of further financial assistance cannot be fully assessed on the basis of 
our sources, which tend to be partisan in different directions.18 However, 
mounting successes, especially on the part of the Persian fleet under the com-
mand of Conon, strongly influenced public opinion in Greece, and demon-
strated for the first time the prospects that a joint campaign with Persia against 
Sparta might be successful.19 Thus, after internal conflicts, the anti-Spartan 
group around Ismenias prevailed in Thebes20 and in 395 BC the conflict flared 
up in the course of a local dispute between the Phocians and the Locrians.21 In 
Athens, the ekklesia voted to accept the ensuing Theban offer of an alliance, 
although it must have been clear to every citizen that this would mean war with 
Sparta.22 As a result, Sparta and its allies ultimately were up against a coalition 
that was led by Thebes, Athens, Corinth and Argos and openly supported by 
the Persians. 
                                                                                                    
wrongly attributes the quote to the historian Theopompus; for this possibility see 
Bruce 1987, 3-4. 
17  Jehne 1992, 99. Baltrusch 1994, 198. Welwei 2007, 281. 
18  Xen. Hell. 3.5.1-2; Hell.Oxy. (ed. Behrwald) 10.2; Plut. Ages. 15.6; Lys. 27.1; Paus. 
3.9.8.  
19  For the victory at Cnidus as a turning point see Isoc. 5.62-64, 129; 7.65; 9.54-56; 
12.56; Demosth. 20.68. Hamilton 1982, 69.  
20  Hell.Oxy. (ed. Behrwald) 20.1-2, 21.1; Xen. Hell. 3.5.1-2.  
21  Hell.Oxy. (ed. Behrwald) 21.2-5; Xen. Hell. 3.5.3-6.  
22  RO 6; Xen. Hell. 3.5.7-16; Andoc. 3.25; Lys. 16.13; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 148; 
StV 223. For the debates and factions in Athens in general cf. Funke 1980. Strauss 
1986.  
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It is impossible to reconstruct the debates that took place in the involved poleis 
prior to the outbreak of the conflict and during the first years of the war, but 
there is no evidence suggesting the existence of an explicit peace party in any 
city, or for a yearning for peace similar to that which existed during the Pe-
loponnesian War. Early on, the ambiguous military situation – in which, despite 
individual successes for each side, neither warring party could achieve a clear 
advantage – may have contributed to the preference for an approach that em-
phasized victory rather than peace or a willingness to compromise. True war-
weariness was therefore demonstrated for the first time in this conflict in 
392/391 BC when an attempt was risked to achieve a lasting peace through 
diplomatic means.  
 
 
The peace negotiations of 392/391 BC  
 
The negotiations that took place in 392/391 BC may be divided into two parts, 
according to where they took place (Sardis and Sparta), who negotiated and 
what their respective goals were. Nevertheless, they should be considered to-
gether as they were causally connected. The basic problem in studying these 
negotiations is the inadequacy of the sources. While Xenophon reports on the 
meeting in Sardis, he remains silent concerning the ensuing negotiations in 
Sparta.23 These are accessible to us primarily through the peace oration deliv-
ered by Andocides, who personally took part in the conference and who after-
wards publicly spoke in favor of the proposal in the Athenian ekklesia.24 His 
speech can be supplemented by additional sources. Although the significance of 
the negotiations of 392/391 BC has been frequently underestimated in modern 
scholarship, there are a number of studies on the question of sources, chronol-
ogy and the events in general. As a result, there is now a well-grounded general 
consensus that the conference in Sparta emerged from the negotiations in 
Sardis and that it was the failure of the latter that led to the invitation of the 
Greek warring parties to the Peloponnese.25  
 
 
                                                
23  Xen. Hell. 4.8.12-16.  
24  Andoc. 3 (De Pace).  
25  For the chronology see esp. Ryder 1965, 165-169. Aucello 1965, 341-342. Hamilton 
1979, 252-253. De Voto 1986, 196. Jehne 1991. The reverse order, i.e. that the meet-
ing in Sparta took place before the gathering at Sardis, was suggested in particular by 
Wilcken 1941, 4-11, followed by Bengtson 1977, 268; Wilcken’s thesis was refuted 
especially by Martin 1949, 128-131.  
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The negotiations in Sardis  
 
The point of departure for the negotiations in Sardis was established by Sparta’s 
attempt to achieve peace with the Persians. In 392 BC, the war was in a state of 
deadlock, both in Asia Minor and in Greece, and none of the warring parties 
had shown itself to be generally dominant during the preceding years. In Sparta, 
the recognition had spread that waging war on two widely disparate fronts 
exceeded its own capacities.26 Quite rightly then, the conflict in Greece was 
accorded more importance than the quest for supremacy in Asia Minor. 
The only source we have regarding the peace negotiations in Sardis is Xen-
ophon’s brief report in the Hellenica. According to his account, in the spring or 
the summer of 392 BC, the Spartans sent Antalcidas to the satrap Tiribazus in 
Sardis bearing the message  
 
“that he had come to ask for peace between his city and the King, a peace 
that the King himself desired: for the Spartans would now lay no claim 
against the King to the cities in Asia and would be content that all the is-
lands and the Greek cities in general should be independent.”27 
 
For Sparta, the primary goal was to secure an agreement with Persia, and for 
this purpose, it was even willing to accept the Great King’s claim to power over 
Asia Minor, including the Greek poleis in Ionia.28 As a second element, the 
Spartan offer of peace included general autonomy for the Greek motherland 
and the entire Aegean. This proposal already bears resemblance to the auton-
omy guarantee as a key element of the later koine eirene treaties, but such an 
interpretation misjudges the structure and the intention of the Spartan peace 
plan.29 The goal of Antalcidas’ mission was a “separate peace” between Sparta 
and Persia, and the war with Sparta’s Greek enemies was not the subject of the 
negotiations, but only arose as a secondary issue because Sparta hoped that this 
would be a way to stop Persian support for the Corinthian alliance. In this 
context, the provision of autonomy did not represent a peace plan for Greece, 
                                                
26  Cf. Hamilton 1979, 243. Hamilton 1982, 76. De Voto 1986, 191-192. Buckler 2003, 
128; 139.  
27  Xen. Hell. 4.8.14. (…) ὅτι εἰρήνης δεόμενος ἥκοι τῇ πόλει πρὸς βασιλέα, καὶ ταύτης 
οἵασπερ βασιλεὺς πάλαι ἐπεθύμει, τῶν τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων 
Λακεδαιμονίους βασιλεῖ οὐκ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, τάς τε νήσους ἁπάσας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας 
πόλεις ἀρκεῖν σφίσιν αὐτονόμους εἶναι. Translation J. Marincola.  
28  Zahrnt 2000, 300. 
29  Wilcken 1941, 4-6. Seager 1967, 104-105. De Voto 1986, 193. In contrast, the Spar-
tan proposal is interpreted as a direct forerunner of the later koinai eirenai by Hampl 
1938, 86. Martin 1944, 19-20. Ryder 1965, 28. Quass 1991, 37.  
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but instead, was primarily conceived as a guarantee of security. The Great King 
was to renounce any expansion beyond the coast of Asia Minor, and in return, 
the Spartans would refrain from building a hegemonic structure in Greece that 
would pose a potential threat to the Persian Empire. This is also clear in Xeno-
phon’s report, where he has Antalcidas say:  
 
“And if we (...) would accept such terms, why should the King continue to 
make war against us or spend his money? For the Athenians could not pos-
sibly make war against the King if we did not take the lead, nor would it be 
possible for us to do that if the cities were autonomous.”30  
 
It is evident from this passage that the autonomy clause was intended first and 
foremost as a guarantee for the Persian Empire. Given the Persians’ previous 
experiences with Spartan treaty partners, such a security clause seems entirely 
appropriate. The previous Spartan-Persian treaty of 411 BC, which had brought 
critical Persian support for Sparta in its war against Athens, had also recognized 
the Great King’s dominion over Asia Minor, but had been broken only a dec-
ade later.31  
In addition, it becomes clear that Sparta was in no way seeking a compre-
hensive peace, but simply the termination of hostilities with the Persian Em-
pire. The Persians were to end their support for the Corinthian alliance in com-
pensation for the acceptance of their rule over Asia, and Antalcidas’ discrete 
warning that a reinvigorated Athens could also develop into a menace for Per-
sia was intended to further undermine the current unity among Sparta’s ene-
mies.32 
For Sparta, a successful conclusion of Antalcidas’ mission would have 
meant not only that it could once again concentrate its attention on the Greek 
military theater, but that it could also entertain a reasonable hope of bringing 
the anti-Spartan coalition to its knees once the Persian subsidies had ceased. 
With the end of the war in Asia Minor, a secure agreement with the Persian 
Empire and victory over its Greek opponents, Sparta would thus have restored 
its hegemony in the Greek motherland and secured its long-term future. Of 
course, a hegemonic policy à la Lysander would no longer be possible on ac-
                                                
30  Xen. Hell. 4.8.14. καίτοι, ἔφη, τοιαῦτα ἐθελόντων ἡμῶν, τίνος ἂν ἕνεκα πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἱ 
Ἕλληνες ἢ βασιλεὺς πολεμίη ἢ χρήματα δαπανῴη; καὶ γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ βασιλέα 
στρατεύεσθαι δυνατὸν οὔτε Ἀθηναίοις μὴ ἡγουμένων ἡμῶν οὔθ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτονόμων 
οὐσῶν τῶν πόλεων. Translation J. Marincola.  
31  Thuc. 8.58.1-7; cf. 8.18.1-3; 37.1-5. Ryder 1965, 27. Quass 1991, 37. Zahrnt 2000, 
300. Welwei 2007, 285-286.  
32  Jehne 1994, 31-32. Zahrnt 2000, 300-301.  
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count of the autonomy clause, but for those Spartans who were proponents of 
a more restrained foreign policy such an outcome would have seemed worth 
striving for.33 The treaty envisaged between Sparta and Persia thus implied 
quite significant effects upon the interstate political order in Greece as well; 
however, the peace plan only acquired a truly regulatory character as a conse-
quence of an unforeseen shift in the negotiations – the intervention of the 
Corinthian alliance. 
In the meantime, Sparta’s Greek opponents had learned of Antalcidas’ mis-
sion and immediately recognized the threat a possible Spartan-Persian agree-
ment might pose. Therefore, they quickly dispatched delegations to Sardis, so 
they would arrive there before Antalcidas could come to an agreement with 
Tiribazus.34 As current military partners of the Persians, they then had to be 
included in the consultations. Although they were not empowered with com-
prehensive diplomatic authority, their goal was to prevent an agreement be-
tween Antalcidas and Tiribazus. Their presence, however, made it necessary to 
talk about potential options to end the war in Greece as well. The precise 
course of these consultations remains unknown, since Xenophon only provides 
us with a summary.35 However, based upon these conditions, Antalcidas’ rec-
ommendations unintendedly took on a new character and now opened up a 
possibility for a comprehensive plan, one that was intended to bring peace to 
Greece as well.36 
And yet, the autonomy clause proposed by Antalcidas provoked intense 
opposition on the part of the Athenian, Argive and Theban delegates. Accord-
ing to Xenophon’s report, the Athenians were worried about their recently 
regained domain over Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, whereas the Thebans saw 
their leadership in the Boeotian League threatened. In addition, the Argives 
refused to give up their close relationship with Corinth.37 Not least on account 
of the resistance of the allies, but also because of the overall scope of the deci-
sion, Tiribazus could do nothing more than to present himself in Susa to de-
liver the offer to Artaxerxes.38 However, he demonstrated the fact that he per-
sonally favored the proposals in that he detained Conon, who had traveled to 
                                                
33  Cf. De Voto 1986, 193-194. Urban 1991, 66. Welwei 2007, 286. 
34  Xen. Hell. 4.8.13. 
35  Xen. Hell. 4.8.14-16.  
36  Buckler 2003, 142-143.  
37  Xen. Hell. 4.8.15. Since according to Xen. Hell. 4.8.13 Corinthian ambassadors were 
present at Sardis, the synoikismos had not taken place yet, but close relations had al-
ready been put into effect.  
38  Xen. Hell. 4.8.16. 
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Sardis as an Athenian delegate, and, in addition, secretly sent Antalcidas funds 
for the Spartan fleet.39  
Despite all efforts, however, the Spartan attempt to settle the conflict with 
Persia failed. In contrast to Tiribazus, the Great King was not ready to con-
clude peace with the Spartans, and he probably did not trust their offer follow-
ing their violation of the treaty of 411 BC and their support of Cyrus. In fact, 
Artaxerxes did not simply deny the request by rejecting it, but instead removed 
the peace-seeking Tiribazus and replaced him with Struthas, who was known to 
be a friend of Athens.40 Even before the news of this had reached Greece, the 
decision had to be considered tabled, and yet on account of discussions con-
cerning the autonomy provision in Sardis, a new peace solution hung in the air.  
 
 
The negotiations in Sparta 
 
Despite the postponement resulting from Tiribazus’ journey to Susa, and de-
spite the rejection of the Spartan proposals by the emissaries of the Corinthian 
alliance, there was ongoing discussion about the potential for a peace treaty. 
Clearly, exhaustion and war-weariness were spreading. In Thebes, a waning 
degree of commitment to the battle had already been evident for some time. 
For Athens, some passages in Aristophanes’ Ekklesiazusai, probably performed 
in 391/390 BC, might hint at increasing economic problems.41 In Sparta, a 
decision to sound out the possibilities for peace in Greece was apparently 
reached very soon after the return of Antalcidas from Sardis, and so the Spar-
tans invited the warring parties to a peace congress.42 This general readiness for 
serious negotiations is demonstrated not only by the very broad participation in 
this conference in Sparta but also by the fact that the leading poleis did not send 
only ambassadors for a mere exchange of opinions, but empowered their dele-
gates with decision-making power as presbeis autokratores.43 Hence, discussions 
had already taken place about a peace treaty and its possible conditions in order 
                                                
39  Xen. Hell. 4.8.16. Conon’s arrest (without any allusions to the negotiations) is also 
mentioned in Isoc. 4.154; Diod. 14.85.4; Nep. Con. 5.3-4.  
40  Xen. Hell. 4.8.17. 
41  Aristoph. Ekkl. 814-825; cf. also Isoc. 17.41. Aristoph. Ekkl. 233-235 might be read 
as a hint to a growing war-weariness as well; Strauss 1986, 140.  
42  Ryder 1965, 31-32. Aucello 1965, 366-367. Jehne 1994, 33. Hamilton 1979, 252-254 
instead argues that the Athenian “peace party” initiated the meeting at Sparta. 
43  Andoc. 3.33, 34; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 149b. For presbeis autokratores in general 
see also Xen. Hell. 2.2.17-19; Andoc. 3.39; Diod. 11.24.3-4. Pownall 1995. Buckler 
2003, 150-151. 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
© 2012, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz 
ISBN Print: 9783938032510 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317845
102 Julia Wilker  
 
to establish the negotiating positions and decision frameworks for their own 
representatives.44  
In his Hellenica, Xenophon does not mention the negotiations in Sparta;45 
our main source is therefore the third oration of Andocides, in which he seeks 
to move the Athenians to accept the peace proposal. The Athenian delegation 
consisted of Andocides, together with Epicrates, Cratinus and Eubulides;46 in 
addition, the presence of negotiators from Thebes and Argos is well docu-
mented.47 It is probable, although far from certain, that there were also repre-
sentatives from other smaller warring parties who took part in the negotiations, 
especially on the side of Sparta’s opponents.48 The nature of Sparta’s own pro-
posal, which it must have presented in its capacity as initiator of the negotia-
tions, is not known, but it can be assumed that it was based upon the earlier 
discussions in Sardis. The precise text of the draft treaty that was agreed upon 
in Sparta has not been preserved either, but it is possible to reconstruct at least 
its most important points. 
It appears that a proposal for future peace in Greece was presented in 
terms of a general guaranty of autonomy for all the Greek poleis. The islands of 
Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros were made explicit exceptions, and were to remain 
in the possession of Athens.49 The Spartans also offered an accommodation to 
Thebes by accepting the continued existence of the Boeotian League under 
Theban leadership. In return, Thebes would only be required to forego the 
recovery of Orchomenos, which had seceded.50 However, the Spartan side 
considered the close alliance between Corinth and Argos as unacceptable, since 
                                                
44  Other sources can possibly support the notion of a growing public discourse on 
peace among the Greek states. In the Olympiakos, which can been dated either to 408 
or 392 BC, Gorgias urged the Greeks to be united against the Persian Empire (DK 
82 B 7. 8a), cf. Blass 1886, 58-61. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1893, I 172-173. Funke 
1980, 39. Flower 2000, 92-93. A date around 392/391 BC has been also suggested 
for Lysias’ Epitaphios which contains some similar arguments in regard to Persian-
Greek relations, Kartes 2000, 117-125, cf. Grethlein 2010, 107.  
45  For Xenophon’s silence on the gathering at Sparta cf. Tuplin 1993, 77. Zahrnt 2000, 
302-303; cf. also famously Cawkwell 1973, 57-58 (with regard to the foundation of 
the Second Athenian League): “(…) the silences of Xenophon can never prove that 
what he does not recount did not happen.”  
46  Andoc. 3.33; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 149a; Dem. 19.277. 
47  Cf. Andoc. 3.13, 20, 24-25, 26-28, 41.  
48  On the possibility that observers from poleis that were not actively involved in the 
Corinthian War, but had a vital interest in the success of the conference were pre-
sent in Sparta see Jehne 1994, 34. Less probable is the presence of other members 
of the Peloponnesian League, cf. Rhodes 1999, 37.  
49  Andoc. 3.12, 14.  
50  Andoc. 3.13, 20.  
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the union of its two rivals would have seriously threatened the Spartan suprem-
acy over the Peloponnese.51  
At first glance, we are inclined to think that this proposal was only a modi-
fication of Antalcidas’ offer from Sardis including some concessions on the 
part of Sparta, but in fact, the new composition of potential treaty partners had 
substantially altered the intent and the orientation of the negotiations. Now, the 
object of discussion was a peace solution for Greece. Therefore, the autonomy 
clause no longer served as a security guarantee for the Persian Empire, but 
instead, was to be codified as a permanent, valid structuring principle for inter-
state relations in Greece. This represented a critical transformation and, for the 
first time, formulated what would be a key element of all later Common Peace 
treaties: a general autonomy guarantee of unlimited term that, at least in princi-
ple, would involve all of the Greek states. As a direct consequence, a new type 
of treaty was discussed that broke with traditions of international law by pro-
viding for a pure peace treaty, concluded between multiple parties and set up to 
have permanent legal force. Thus, it was not in the negotiations in Sardis but 
rather in the ensuing discussions in Sparta that the foundations for the koine 
eirene were formulated for the first time. 
While there is no evidence for a direct participation by Persian envoys in 
the consultations in Sparta, it is unclear whether the news of Artaxerxes’ rejec-
tion of the Spartan peace offer had reached Greece at the time of the negotia-
tions. However, Martin Jehne has persuasively shown that it is more than prob-
able that the Greeks were well aware of the Persian plans to continue waging 
war.52 The Spartan willingness to accommodate especially Athens and Thebes 
indicates that they were feeling pressed; they probably would have behaved 
much more confidently if they had not already learned of the disillusioning 
news from Susa. In addition, the negative attitude shown by the Athenians, 
which will be discussed in more detail later, suggests that they, too, had already 
heard about Tiribazus being replaced by Struthas, an avowed friend of the 
Athenians. Thus, some knowledge about the Persian king’s decision can be 
assumed, but it is no prerequisite for explaining the new initiative now directed 
towards Greece.53 
The negotiating parties in Sparta were manifestly aware of the new elements 
in the proposed treaty, yet their demands and decisions were primarily deter-
mined by the concrete political and military situation and the aims that had 
been mandated by their respective poleis. In Sparta, a positive reaction to the 
peace proposal developed. For even though it meant that Sparta would have to 
                                                
51  Jehne 1994, 37. Buckler 2003, 148. Welwei 2007, 278.  
52  Jehne 1991. 
53  Hamilton 1969, 256. Jehne 1991. Jehne 1994, 34-35.  
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renounce Lysandrian power politics, the offer of long-term autonomy assured 
that Sparta would nonetheless remain the strongest and most powerful polis in 
Greece. The treaty provided a way to stop the renewed emergence of Athens as 
a great power, and at least those factions in Sparta that argued for a more re-
strained foreign policy could now hope to see their ideal become reality.54 The 
Boeotians had already begun pulling back from the war prior to the negotia-
tions in Sparta. For Thebes, after years of war without significant progress or 
victory, the main goal was to affirm and secure their own leadership position in 
the Boeotian League, so it is not surprising that the Theban emissaries readily 
embraced the proposal in Sparta.55 By contrast, for Argos the targeted or al-
ready completed union with Corinth was too important to relinquish, and for 
this reason, the Argive and Corinthian representatives apparently rejected the 
peace proposal right on the spot.56  
The situation was more problematic for the Athenian delegates. Athens had 
acquired a decisive role in the current negotiations based upon its real and 
intended leadership position among Sparta’s opponents, something that the 
negotiators were keenly aware of. The Athenian delegates themselves were 
quite positively disposed to the draft treaty, but as the presented proposals 
deviated from the mandate they had been given, they decided to return to Ath-
ens and leave the decision to the ekklesia. However, before we consider the 
debates that ultimately led to the Athenian rejection of the peace plan, we 
should first analyze the proposal in greater detail with regard to its most impor-
tant substantive and formal elements. 
 
 
The main features of the peace proposal 
 
With its basic character as a peace treaty, its multilateral design and its aim to 
implement a permanent and stable order throughout Greece, the peace pro-
posal negotiated at Sparta contained some revolutionary innovations. However, 
these new stipulations were not totally unforeseeable. At the core of the peace 
proposal is the principle of autonomia, the fundamental right of all Greek poleis 
for autonomy. In according such a central role to autonomia, the proposal is a 
reflection of a political trend that dates back to the middle of the fifth century 
BC. Extensive research in recent decades has shown how the concept of 
autonomy arose in the context of struggles against Athenian power politics in 
                                                
54  Ryder 1965, 33. 
55  Andoc. 3.13, 20, 24-25, 28, 32. Jehne 1994, 34.  
56  Andoc. 3.26-28, 32, 41. Jehne 1994, 34. Welwei 2007, 278.  
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the Delian League.57 Autonomia was formulated as a right and a value, which 
allies, contrary to convention and unwritten law, had only enjoyed to a limited 
degree or been entirely robbed of during the period of the Athenian arche. The 
term, which emerged in the course of protests and resistance against the Athe-
nian policy, then acquired increasing relevance during the Peloponnesian War, 
not least because Sparta ostentatiously advocated “freedom for the Hellenes” 
and made the promotion of autonomy part of its own propaganda.  
After 404 BC, however, Sparta found itself rapidly becoming the target of 
the rallying cry for autonomy because of its hegemonic policy. The Eleans 
accused the Spartans of “enslaving the Greeks”, and Sparta’s violation of the 
right of autonomy played a prominent role in the propaganda of the Corinthian 
alliance as well.58 In this way, the concept of autonomy definitively disengaged 
itself from resistance against Athenian imperialism to find general acceptance as 
a fundamental right and a significant characteristic feature of a Greek polis. This 
did not prevent autonomia from becoming blatantly instrumentalized as a profit-
able and legitimizing slogan in interstate disputes.59 It is, however, precisely the 
omnipresence of the autonomy slogan over the entire span of the fourth cen-
tury that illustrates that the right of autonomy was now generally recognized, so 
that no powerful polis could officially oppose it any longer.60 This becomes 
already evident in the negotiations of 392/391 BC, where none of the parties 
called the autonomy principle as such into question. Instead, only specific indi-
vidual cases and questions of detail were brought into contention. Thus, at least 
in the context of a public forum, no Greek power could deny the principle of 
autonomy anymore. 
By its nature, the autonomy principle represented a conservative concept. 
The sense of its permanence and its intrinsic political value arose for the first 
time when people saw the rights and freedoms associated with it menaced or 
even lost during the Athenian arche in the middle of the fifth century.61 Hence, 
autonomia became something to be preserved, not something to be created 
anew; the struggle was to restore a former (and often idealized) condition. Yet 
the revolutionary innovation in the peace proposal of 392/391 BC was that it 
                                                
57  Cf., for instance, Bickerman 1958. Ostwald 1982. Raaflaub 1981. Raaflaub 1985. 
Baltrusch 1994.  
58  Diod. 14.17.6 (προσεγκαλούντων ὅτι τοὺς Ἕλληνας καταδουλοῦνται); cf. also Xen. 
Hell. 3.5.13; Diod. 14.82.2-4; Lys. 2.68. Raaflaub 1981, 321.  
59  See especially the discussion in Karavites 1984. Bosworth 1992. Rhodes 1999.  
60  Cf. Hansen 1995; Hansen 1998, esp. 80-82, who argues that, in fact, the general 
concept of the autonomous polis per definitionem can only be applied to the fourth 
century. 
61  Ostwald 1982, 45; Raaflaub 1985, 185-207; Baltrusch 1994, esp. 68-70; 163-167; 174.  
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formally established autonomy for the first time as an organizing principle for 
Greek interstate relations – a step that was now clearly considered necessary 
because of the experiences of the preceding decades. Under changing circum-
stances, the vindication of their own right to autonomia had thus become a cen-
tral question for all of the Greek poleis. In the understanding of interstate rela-
tions at the beginning of the fourth century, autonomia therefore constituted not 
only a general but also a generally threatened right, one that needed durable and 
contractual protection, regardless of which power in Greece held the dominant 
position or wished to claim hegemony for itself.  
And yet, for (potentially) hegemonic cities, such a codified autonomy prin-
ciple must have had some appeal that went beyond the mere restriction of their 
own ambitions as well. The principle also provided them with protection from 
rivals who might become excessively powerful, something that both the hard-
pressed power, Sparta, and Athens, with its rising fortunes, might well have 
interpreted as a security guarantee in the context of actual conditions prevailing 
in 392/391 BC.  
Even this perspective regarding the autonomy clause did not represent a 
complete novelty. The analysis of the Spartan offer to Tiribazus in Sardis al-
ready showed that in the framework of the hoped-for Spartan-Persian agree-
ment, the autonomy clause was understood as a security guarantee for the Per-
sian Empire.62 And in the Greek realm as well, such use of autonomy was not 
unknown: according to Thucydides, the treaty between Sparta and Argos in 418 
BC already required both partners to allow the cities of the Peloponnese to 
remain autonomous.63 In the context of the evolution of treaties, this was a 
critical innovation, because autonomy was not granted only to individual poleis, 
but instead, was guaranteed by both parties to the cities of an entire region. 
Thus, the goal of the agreement was not only to secure the legal status of 
weaker poleis, but in essence, to fulfill the security imperatives of both treaty 
partners.64 On the other hand – and in contrast to 392/391 BC – autonomia was 
here still regarded as a privilege granted by the powerful, not as a general right 
of all poleis in general.65  
The central codification of the autonomy principle in the peace proposal of 
392/391 BC can therefore only be understood from the perspective of the 
                                                
62  See above. 
63  Thuc. 5.77.5. 
64  Ryder 1965, 13-14. Rhodes 1999, 34; 38. Buckler 2003, 173. That the Spartan-Argive 
treaty of 418 BC served as a model for the peace proposal of 392/391 BC has espe-
cially been argued by Payrau 1961.  
65  Ostwald 1982, 4-7. Jehne 1992, 110-111. Baltrusch 1994, 182-183. Jehne 1994, 44. 
Rhodes 1999, 34. Buckler 2003, 144. Buckler – Beck 2008, 10-11.  
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
© 2012, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz 
ISBN Print: 9783938032510 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317845
 War and Peace at the Beginning of the Fourth Century     107 
 
experiences in the fifth century with the Athenian arche and the changes that 
had taken place in the first decade of the fourth century BC. Since these events 
were regarded as undesirable developments, the goal was now to take counter-
measures acceptable to all parties and thereby to develop a novel legal instru-
ment.66 It should be noted, however, that like all subsequent Common Peace 
treaties, the proposal of 392/391 BC did not contain a precise definition of 
autonomia. Whereas it explicitly sanctioned the Athenian possession of Lemnos, 
Imbros and Scyros, the constitution of the Peloponnesian League certainly was 
not up for discussion at any time. What provisions may have been made for the 
Boeotian League, whose ongoing existence was guaranteed for the Thebans, 
can no longer be determined in detail.  
 
 
The form of the peace proposal 
 
The proposal was built on the idea that peace in Greece could only be estab-
lished on the basis of autonomia, thus representing the first draft of a real peace 
treaty in Greek history. Up to this time, Greek international law had only 
known treaties that either founded an alliance (symmachia) or philia, or spondai, 
which established a truce of fixed duration. Had it been ratified, the treaty of 
392/391 BC would have defined peace as a positive legal condition between 
states for the very first time.67 Unlike the spondai of the era, this new peace was 
set up, at least implicitly, with the idea of permanence.68 Yet even this innova-
tion can be traced back to the changes that had occurred during previous dec-
ades. From the middle of the fifth century on, one begins to find more and 
more spondai with terms of 30 or 50 years, thus defying the definitional logic of 
a “truce”.69 Therefore, it was only consequent that the next step was to recog-
                                                
66  Baltrusch 1997, 36. 
67  For the usage of the term eirene in interstate agreements in the second half of the 
fifth century BC see Santi Amantini 1985. Giovannini 2007, 225-227.  
68  Baltrusch 1994, 157-158. No time limit is mentioned either by Andocides or by 
other sources. Later examples, such as the King’s Peace and the subsequent koinai ei-
renai also suggest that already in 392/391 BC the goal was a treaty that would remain 
in effect forever. 
69  Cf. the treaty between Athens and Sparta of 446/445 BC (30 years, Thuc. 1.115.1; 
Andoc. 3.6. Plut. Pericl. 24.1; Iustin. 3.7.1; Diod. 12.7.1; Paus. 5.23.4. Baltrusch 1994, 
158-169); the Peace of Nicias of 421 BC (50 years, Thuc. 5.18.3; Diod. 12.74.5; Bal-
trusch 1994, 169-185). Jehne 1994, 28.  
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nize peace as a positive legal status and to move toward the development of a 
corresponding treaty form.70  
Finally, the peace proposal of 392/391 BC was formulated with the view 
that it would be concluded between multiple partners, thus breaking with the 
traditional bipartite principle of interstate treaties. This new “multilateralism” 
was incorporated right from the outset, since invitations to Sparta were appar-
ently sent out at least to all the warring parties in Greece. Given the lack of a 
formal hierarchy in the Corinthian alliance, its individual representatives would 
each have had to conclude their own separate treaties with Sparta anyway. 
However, the general concept and the autonomy principle furthered the idea of 
a multilateral treaty; indeed, it even made such a treaty a requirement. Yet, in 
this area as well, it is possible to document earlier attempts. Thus, even though 
the Peace of Nicias of 421 BC was concluded bilaterally between Athens and 
Sparta and their current confederates, at least the members of the Peloponne-
sian League were compelled to swear to the accompanying oath kata poleis.71  
Since we do not have the verbatim text, the exploration of the individual 
substantive and formal elements of the treaty must remain incomplete, but the 
analysis has nevertheless shown that the peace proposal of 392/391 BC must 
be explained as a consequence of the experiences of the fifth century. The 
unwritten conventions in force up to that time had proved incapable of manag-
ing the stresses of Athenian power politics, thus promoting the emergence of 
the autonomy doctrine. However, after the end of the Peloponnesian War, the 
hopes previously described for a new period of peace and freedom were 
abruptly disappointed, and due to Sparta’s hegemonic policy the autonomy 
doctrine was now propagated beyond the specific context of anti-Athenian 
resistance. The experiences of a new war less than a decade after the capitula-
tion of Athens ultimately led to the need for a comprehensive, enduring, and 
above all, stable order. The proposal, which included the first-ever formulation 
of the idea of a koine eirene, can thus be traced back to changes that had oc-
curred during the previous decades, and seen as a reaction to those experiences. 
In the process, the individual elements of the proposal represented an expan-
sion and further development of the range of policy instruments available in 
                                                
70  This significant development was analyzed for the first time by Bruno Keil (1916, 
esp. 5-9, 17-22), cf. also Ryder 1965, xv. Baltrusch 1994, 157-158. At the beginning 
of the fourth century, however, the terminology had not yet been clearly differenti-
ated and was still under development. Thus, Andocides also blurs the terminology, 
although at one point, he explicitly points to the difference between “true peace” 
and earlier spondai (Andoc. 3.11). Albini (1964, 22-23; comm. ad Andoc. 3.11) as-
sumes that Andocides only differentiates between spondai and eirene if necessary for 
his argument. Cf. already Blass 1886, 327. 
71  Thuc. 5.18.9; Baltrusch 1994, 174-177, cf. 162.  
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international law, elements which were tailored to the specific content and 
intent of the agreement. As a whole, the draft thus represents a revolutionary 
innovation in Greek treaty making. 
 
 
The Athenian debate and the failure of the peace proposal 
 
At the same time, one could certainly understand the treaty from a more prag-
matic perspective as the best possible outcome that could be achieved after 
debilitating years of continuous conflict without a decisive outcome. It would 
end the war and improve the status of poleis like Sparta and Thebes or at least 
made that status more secure. Nevertheless, the debates that took place in 
Athens following the negotiations in Sparta showed that, especially for a polis 
with hegemonic ambitions, it was difficult to accept these insights and to adopt 
the principles set down in the peace proposal. 
Although it is impossible to reconstruct the precise mandate of the Athe-
nian delegation to Sparta, the treaty certainly did not deviate so extensively 
from the compromise achieved in the negotiations to compel the four ambas-
sadors to come to a swift rejection. On the other hand, there were doubtless 
some profound differences, leading the Athenian representatives to refer the 
decision back to the assembly, despite their clear authorization as presbeis auto-
kratores.72 At their request, a 40-day extension was granted, and so they pro-
ceeded to return to Athens to transmit the treaty proposal and their own rec-
ommendation to the ekklesia.73 
It is Andocides’ third speech that has survived as our primary source of the 
debate in the Athenian assembly.74 Its arrangement and contents suggest that it 
was not part of the initial remarks from the delegation that opened the debate, 
since Andocides foregoes a precise depiction of the negotiations and the pro-
posal, and also does not lucidly detail the arguments favoring his opinion that 
the treaty should be adopted. Instead, he begins with a comprehensive response 
to the opponents of the treaty, and his entire presentation is marked by a rather 
defensive style; the speech thus seems to be a rebuttal to the voices of the op-
                                                
72  Andoc. 3.33, 34; cf. Philochorus FGrH 328 F 149b. Funke 1980, 143. 
73  Andoc. 3.33, 40. 
74  Although it remains unclear by whom and with what intent the speech was pub-
lished (cf. Grethlein 2010, 128), there is no compelling reason to doubt its authentic-
ity (cf. esp. Harris 2000; the authenticity of the speech is defended i.a. by Kennedy 
1977, 104-105. Edwards 1995, 107-108. Grethlein 2010, 128-129). 
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position in the debate.75 These basic features of the oration certainly make the 
reconstruction of events, the course of the negotiations and the details of the 
proposal more difficult to discern, but it offers a glimpse into the discussion 
that took place in Athens. While a detailed analysis of the speech lies beyond 
the scope of this paper, at least its main arguments should be summarized 
briefly.  
Andocides begins his speech with a response to the opponents of the pro-
posal that addresses their strongest argument, namely that peace with Sparta 
would bring no advantages to Athens, but, quite the contrary, would actually 
endanger the democracy.76 Clearly, the audience recalled the Athenian-Spartan 
treaty of 404 BC, so Andocides presents a whole series of historical counter-
examples, in which peace with Sparta had allowed Athens to blossom and 
democracy to achieve its fullest development.77  
Despite his extensive use of arguments drawn from history, the orator was 
well aware of the innovations and the far-reaching implications contained in the 
proposal. In fact, he makes clear to his listeners that they are not only casting a 
vote with respect to Athens, but that they are deciding about peace for all of 
Greece and names the goal of a koine eirene,78 of course without yet using the 
term in its technical sense.79 Andocides consistently emphasizes the innovations 
in the proposed peace treaty in comparison to the treaty of 404 BC, and he 
specifically makes the distinction between peace (eirene) and an enforced truce 
(spondai).80  
                                                
75  Cf. Kennedy 1977, 104. Funke 1980, 144-146. Missiou 1992, 56. Hochschulz 2007, 
41. 
76  Andoc. 3.1-12. 
77  Andoc. 3.3-12. In this context, the historical errors in this account are only of sec-
ondary importance.  
78  Andoc. 3.17: “Do not overlook another thing, gentlemen; you are negotiating today 
for the common peace and independence of all Greeks alike: you are giving them all 
the opportunity of sharing in every advantage.” (σκέψασθε δέ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τόδε, 
ὅτι νυνὶ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι κοινὴν εἰρήνην καὶ ἐλευθερίαν πράττετε, καὶ μετέχειν 
ἅπασι πάντων ἐξουσίαν ποιεῖτε. Translation K.J. Maidment). 
79  Ryder 1965, xv. 
80  Andoc. 3.11: “There is a wide difference between a peace and a truce. A peace is a 
settlement of differences between equals: a truce is the dictation of terms to the 
conquered by the conquerors after victory in war.” (εἰρήνη γὰρ καὶ σπονδαὶ πολὺ 
διαφέρουσι σφῶν αὐτῶν. εἰρήνην μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ποιοῦνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους 
ὁμολογήσαντες περὶ ὧν ἂν διαφέρωνται· σπονδὰς δέ, ὅταν κρατήσωσι κατὰ τὸν 
πόλεμον, οἱ κρείττους τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐξ ἐπιταγμάτων ποιοῦνται. Translation K.J. Maid-
ment). 
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These reflections, however, did not occupy the central place in his speech, and 
apparently they were not at the center of the debates in Athens, either.81 First 
and foremost, Andocides claims not only that any hopes for a Spartan defeat 
are unrealistic,82 but also stresses that a continuation of the war would be unjus-
tified since its main reasons had been voided. Athens had become free 
(eleuthera) again, and the reconstruction of the walls and the rebuilding of the 
fleet would be guaranteed by the peace together with the possession of Lem-
nos, Imbros and Scyros.83 Andocides explicitly points out that of all the warring 
parties, Athens stands to gain the most from peace, whereas the Boeotians even 
had to accept the secession of Orchomenos, and the Spartans had to renounce 
their hegemony.84 At the end, the orator confesses that not nearly all the 
hoped-for successes had been accomplished. Yet he does not object to these 
far-fetched goals, but instead cites the current peace proposal as a much likelier 
foundation for achieving additional success for Athens in the future.85 Thus, it 
is evident from Andocides’ speech that (besides the worry about falling back 
under Sparta’s dictate) it was mainly Athens’ own war aims that defined the 
discussion.  
Hence, the determining factor for the ekklesia’s decision about the peace 
was the widespread view that Athens could achieve further victories in the 
current war, and as a result, its citizens were unwilling to be satisfied with the 
rights assured by the draft treaty. Despite the ambassadors’ support for the 
peace proposal, their opponents prevailed in the ekklesia, and as a consequence 
of Athens’ rejection, the peace of 392/391 BC failed.86 Yet, the discussions in 
Athens continued and the public mood remained tense even after this decision. 
In fact, the opponents of the treaty were not contented with their electoral 
victory, but the four ambassadors were tried on charges of parapresbeia at the 
behest of Callistratus and went into exile.87  
                                                
81  Ryder 1965, 33. 
82  Andoc. 3.15-16, 24-28. 
83  Andoc. 3.12-14, 16, 20.  
84  Andoc. 3.17-23. Schmitz 1988, 234-237.  
85  Andoc. 3.36, 40-41. 
86  Philochorus FGrH 328 F 149a. If Aristoph. Ekkl. 200-203, 354-357 alludes to this 
rejection, Thrasybulus might have been one of the main opponents.  
87  Philochorus FGrH 328 F 149a; Dem. 19.277; Plut. mor. 835A. Perlman 1968, 263-
264; Funke 1980, 63-64. 145-146; Jehne 1991, 275. Hochschulz 2007, esp. 34-40. 
The account of Philochorus FGrH 328 F 149a that the Athenians rejected the peace 
because “here had been written in it that the Greeks who were inhabiting Asia were 
all to be accounted members in the King’s household” (… διότι ἐγέγραπτο ἐν αὐτῇ 
τοὺς τὴν ᾽Ασίαν οἰκοῦντας ῞Ελληνας ἐν βασιλέως οἴκῳ πάντας εἶναι 
συννενεμημένους, Didym. in Demosth. 10, 34 col. 7,19-22), clearly refers to the 
King’s Peace of 386 BC, cf. Hamilton 1979, 237-239; 318. Schmitz 1988, 237. Jehne 
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As it has been shown the idea of a koine eirene was not invented in 386 BC with 
the King’s Peace, but formulated for the first time in the course of the negotia-
tions that took place in 392/391 BC. This process began with a Spartan peace 
offer to Persia that was aimed to bring the conflict in Asia Minor to an end and 
thereby to terminate Persian support for Sparta’s enemies in Greece. However, 
as a consequence of the unanticipated involvement of the Corinthian alliance, 
the discussions extended to a consideration of ending the war in Greece as well. 
Despite the failure of the consultations in Sardis, they provoked early glimmers 
of a Greek debate about a peace solution, and may even have led them to begin 
in earnest. As a consequence, the ensuing conference in Sparta had the sole aim 
of finding a solution for the Greek conflicts. The proposal drawn up at this 
meeting contained all the essential components of a Common Peace treaty: it 
was based upon a general guarantee of autonomy and constituted a veritable 
peace treaty that was intended to be concluded between several states and (at 
least implicitly) having a limitless term.  
These provisions can only be understood by considering the experiences of 
the fifth century and the changes that took place in the subsequent years. In the 
period following the Peloponnesian War, it became clear that, although the 
fundamental crisis in Greek interstate relations may have begun with the expan-
sion of Athenian power and the formation of its arche, it had not been resolved 
by the capitulation of Athens. Instead, the Spartan hegemonic policy had dem-
onstrated that Athens was not the only polis to pose a threat to autonomy and 
that the right to autonomia therefore needed to be protected. In order to imple-
ment such a comprehensive political order the existing legal instruments had to 
be significantly expanded, and these innovations ultimately gave birth to a new 
form of treaty.  
Although the peace proposal of 392/391 BC thereby represented a revolu-
tionary innovation in the world of Greek interstate relations, it was hardly mo-
tivated or initiated from the perspective of a superior, lofty ideology of peace. 
First and foremost, it was inspired by growing war-weariness and hopelessness, 
the wish to bring the conflicts to a rapid end for one’s own benefit, and an 
increasing political, military and economic exhaustion on every side. In Athens, 
however, the hope still persisted for additional gains, and thus ultimately led to 
the failure of the peace process. Only a few years later, Athens finally had to 
agree to quite similar conditions. This time, however, the peace was supported 
                                                                                                    
1991, 271-273. Urban 1991, 60. Keen 1995. Keen 1998. Bruce 2001. Buckler 2003, 
141-142. Harding 2006, comm. ad fr. 183a. For a comprehensive overview of the 
discussion see Keen 1995 and 1998. 
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and sanctioned by the Great King. The peace treaty of 386 BC certainly did 
bring the Corinthian War to an end, and yet it failed to bring success, peace and 
stability to Greece, not at all unlike the koine eirene treaties that followed. Hence, 
although the right to autonomia was at least in theory irreversibly established as 
the fundament of a stable interstate order throughout Greece, the words with 
which Andocides chided his fellow-citizens in 392/391 BC applied not only to 
Athens but also to the majority of the other poleis:  
 
“If it is your duty to go to war, you want peace; if peace is arranged for you, 
you count up the benefits which war has brought you.”88  
                                                
88  Andoc. 3.35. κἂν μὲν πολεμεῖν δέῃ, τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐὰν δέ τις ὑμῖν τὴν 
εἰρήνην πράττῃ, λογίζεσθε τὸν πόλεμον ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ὑμῖν κατηργάσατο. Translation 
K.J. Maidment. 
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Peace, Common Peace, and War in Mid-Fourth-Century Greece 
 
  Polly Low 
 
In 362/361 BC, a representative of the Persian satraps (who were then in rebel-
lion against the Persian King) arrived in mainland Greece, seeking Greek sup-
port for a war against Persia. The Greeks – in what might be seen as a rare 
outbreak of common sense – replied that they would rather not get involved in 
this particular suicidal scheme, preferring instead to maintain their “quiet” 
(hesychia): 
 
“They are not aware that the King has any war against them. If, therefore, 
he keeps quiet and does not embroil the Greeks, and does not attempt to 
break up the peace that has come into being for us by any craft or contriv-
ance, we too shall keep quiet in matters with regard to the King.”1 
 
This response is preserved in an epigraphically odd document,2 of indetermi-
nate status,3 and uncertain authorship. The text was found in Argos, but is 
written in Attic dialect and Attic-Ionic script; in spite of its claim to speak for 
                                                
1  RO 42, lines 8-12. β]ασιλεῖ δὲ οὐδένα πόλεμον οἴδασιν ὄντα πρ[ὸς αὑτούς. ἐὰν ο]|ὖ̣ν 
ἡσυχίαν ἔχηι καὶ μὴ συνβάλληι τοὺς Ἕ[λληνας, μηδὲ τὴν ν]|[ῦν] γεγενημένην ἡμῖν 
εἰρήνην ἐπιχειρῆ[ι διαλύειν τέχνηι μ][ηδ]εμιᾶι μηδὲ μηχανῆι, ἕ̣ξομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς 
[ἡσυχίαν τὰ πρὸς β]|[α]σ̣ιλέα.  
2  RO 42 (also published as IG iv 556, although RO’s restorations follow (for the most 
part) those suggested by Wilhelm 1901; his text also forms the basis for the editions 
in SIG3 182, Tod 145, StV 292). The inscription was seen and transcribed by Four-
mont (“Argis in horto quodam”: Boeckh ap CIG i 1118) and by de Pouqueville 
(1826-27, vol.5, 205), but is now lost. The date of 362/361 is inferred only from the 
text’s contents (above all, its allusions to a period of unrest within the Persian Em-
pire); alternative dates have been proposed ranging from the first common peace of 
386 (Boeckh ap. CIG i 1118), via 371/370 (Momigliano 1934, 494-498; Dusanic 
1979, 336), to the period around Chaeronea (Koehler 1876, 15, n.1). Absolute cer-
tainty is impossible, but 362/361 does seem, on the basis of our current knowledge 
of the period, to provide the best fit between this text and the political situation 
within and beyond Greece.  
3  The stone included (at least) two different documents: the “reply” which will be the 
focus of discussion here (lines 1-17), and a second, very fragmentary, text, which 
seems to refer to foreign judges. Charneux 1983, 251, n.3 suggests (very briefly) that 
the first document at least is best understood as a letter; RO object that lines 2-3 of 
the document imply that the man to whom the response is being given is present. 
Perhaps the text could be understood as a letter from Athens to Argos? In the ab-
sence of the opening formula, certainty is again impossible. 
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“the Greeks” (lines 3, 12, 14), it should probably be seen as an essentially Athe-
nian creation.4  
In historical terms, this response is not particularly hard to explain: if Xen-
ophon’s account of the battle of Mantinea of 362 and its consequences is 
reliable, then the Greek world at this time was in a state of utter exhaustion.5 
Becoming embroiled in another war at this point might not even have been 
logistically possible, even if it had been strategically sensible. What is more odd, 
though, is the way in which this preference for hesychia is justified and explained. 
The Greeks, it is said (at lines 4-7),  
 
“have resolved their disputes towards a common peace, so that, being freed 
from the war against themselves, they may each make their own cities as 
great as possible and happy (eudaimonas), and remain useful (chresimoi) to 
their friends and strong (ischyroi).”6 
 
My aim in what follows is twofold. First, I hope to try to explain the reasons 
for, and implications of, this epigraphically unparalleled proclamation of the 
benefits of peace. That explanation will require contextualisation, and a second 
aim of this chapter is to undertake a wider exploration of the diplomatic and 
theoretical representations and discussions of peace which are visible in our 
mid-fourth-century sources. In doing so, I hope to contribute to a long-running 
                                                
4  Buck 1913, 158f must be right to reject the suggestion of Wilhelm (1900, 159) that 
Attic script and dialect had, by this period, become simply the standard language of 
diplomatic exchange. His suggestion (ibid; accepted by Lalonde 1971, 212, and, with 
some reservations, by Jehne 1994, 102-105) that the text should be seen as an Athe-
nian creation, or at least subject to strong Athenian influence in its formulation, 
seems likely to be correct. The text would then have been disseminated by the 
Athenians to other participants in the 362/361 Common Peace (see Lalonde 1971, 
189-202 for further discussion and examples of the retention of non-local dialects in 
diplomatic texts of this sort). That this particular copy of the text was an Argive 
creation, however, is suggested by the fact that the second decree on the stone (at 
lines 18ff) appears to be Doric, although this part of the text is so fragmentary that 
an absolutely firm judgement on its dialect is not possible. 
5  Xen. Hell. 7.5.26f. 
6  διαλέλυνται τὰ̣ <δ>[ιάφορα πρὸ]|[ς κ]οινὴν εἰρήνην, ὅπως ἀπαλλαγέντες τοῦ π[ρὸς 
αὑτοὺς πολ]|[έ]μου τὰς πόλεις ἕκαστοι τὰς αὑτῶν ὡς μεγί[στας καὶ εὐδαίμον]|[α]ς 
ποιῶσιν, καὶ χρήσιμοι μένωσιν τοῖς φίλο[ις καὶ ἰσχυροί]. The supplement 
[εὐδαίμον|α]ς was suggested by Wilhelm 1901, and has generally been accepted, al-
though it is worth noting that Wilhelm’s justification for this supplement was based 
primarily on the connection between eudaimonia and eirene in literary sources of the 
period. 
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debate over the nature and role of eirene in fourth-century Greece (and particu-
larly in fourth-century Athens).  
It is generally accepted that this period sees important developments in 
both technical and more general approaches to eirene, although the precise na-
ture and significance of those developments is still disputed. A long-standing 
orthodoxy held that this development was visible above all in a shift in vocabu-
lary: in the fifth century and the first 15 years of the fourth century, it was ar-
gued, eirene was used only in the non-technical sense (to mean “an absence of 
war”); the use of eirene to mean a specific peace treaty was thought to be an 
innovation of the 380s, and one which could be directly linked to the koinai 
eirenai.7 The Common Peaces could, therefore, be seen as marking a distinctive 
shift in the diplomatic vocabulary of the Greek world. Moreover (the argument 
continues), these koinai eirenai might also represent a more deep-seated shift in 
Greek attitudes to the function of such peace treaties. It has been suggested 
that to declare an interstate agreement an eirene (rather than, for example, spondai 
or synthekai), is to make an important (and perhaps novel) assertion that one is 
not simply (and temporarily) interrupting a universal, default “state of war”; but 
rather instituting a potentially limitless state of peace.8 A consequence of this, 
and the culmination of the argument, is that it might be possible to see in the 
fourth century a shift from a model of interstate politics in which war is the 
default relationship between states and peace only an abstract ideal, to one in 
which peace becomes a serious (if still elusive) alternative to war.9 
The specifically linguistic element of this argument is no longer as strong as 
it once seemed, because subsequent (and particularly epigraphic) discoveries 
have shown that eirene was already being used in its technical diplomatic sense 
in fifth-century interstate documents.10 Nevertheless, the wider problem still 
remains. It is clear that eirenai, in the technical sense of peace treaties, start to 
take significant new forms in fourth-century diplomacy (above all in the context 
of the koinai eirenai); and it is also clear that more general attitudes to peace – as 
a social, cultural and religious concept – also undergo important developments 
in this period. What is much less clear is how (if at all) those two processes are 
                                                
7  Keil 1916 (followed by Zampaglione 1973, 26-28; Ryder 1965, 5f). 
8  Alonso 2007, 221. Ryder 1965, 6 floats a similar view, but is less whole-hearted in 
endorsing it. 
9  Tritle 2007, 181. 
10  See especially Santi-Amantini 1985, 1997; further discussion in Giovannini 2007, 
225-227. Pre-386 epigraphic references to eirene (in the sense of “treaty”) include ML 
67bis (Spartan treaty with Aetolians: see below); IG i3 56, line 30 (decree relating to 
Eleusis, 430s); IG i3 86, line 12 (treaty between Athens and Argos, 417/416); it is re-
stored in IG i3 75 (treaty between Athens and Halieis, 424/423). On eirene as peace 
treaty in fifth-century literary sources, see Santi-Amantini 1986. 
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connected, and it is in answering that question that RO 42 is a particularly 
useful starting-point, precisely because the terms in which eirene is described in 
this text seem – at least superficially – to straddle this divide between the nar-
rowly diplomatic and the more abstract senses of the word. A better under-
standing of the praise of peace in RO 42 might, then, lead to a better under-




Peace and prosperity 
 
The first and most important question which therefore needs to be asked about 
RO 42’s declaration of the merits of peace is: what sort of peace is being 
praised in this document? Is it eirene as a general concept; eirene in the specific 
sense of a peace agreement; or both at the same time? The most recent com-
mentary on this text chooses the first of those three options, observing that:  
 
“lines 5-7 are striking for their praise of peace, not just as the absence of 
war but as a foundation for prosperity and co-operation between cities.”11  
 
I will return later in this chapter to the question of whether that reading of the 
semantic scope of eirene is legitimate. For now, however, it is worth exploring 
what might follow if that reading is correct: why, and how, might peace (in the 
general sense) be praised, and is such praise as striking as Rhodes and Osborne 
suggest? 
The proposition that peace is, in general, a desirable state is, of course, nei-
ther novel nor controversial:  
 
“no-one is fool enough to choose war instead of peace”,  
 
according to Herodotus’ Croesus;12 for Aristophanes’ Trygaeus in the Peace, 
Peace (here, strictly speaking, the goddess) has  
 
“the odour of sweet fruits, of festivals, of the Dionysia, of the harmony of 
flutes, of the tragic poets, of the verses of Sophocles, of the phrases of Eu-
ripides (...) of ivy, of straining-bags for wine, of bleating ewes, of provision-
                                                
11  RO, p. 217. 
12  Hdt. 1.87. 
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laden women hastening to the kitchen, of the tipsy servant wench, of the 
upturned wine-jar, and of a whole heap of other good things”.13 
 
This generalised portrayal of peace as an uncomplicated benefit continues in 
some respects unchanged down into the fourth century. It is interestingly visi-
ble, for example, in Theopompus’ utopian vision of the Eusebeis, who live a 
blissfully happy life, free from war.14 What does seem to be new in this period, 
however, is the appearance in our sources of a more thoroughly and rigorously 
developed rationale for this general approbation. A particularly well-worked 
version of the argument is visible in Xenophon’s Poroi: Athens should (Xeno-
phon argues) avoid all war, and make a deliberate effort to cultivate and pre-
serve peace; they should even appoint eirenophylakes to make sure the job is 
done properly.15 The result will be to boost trade, enhance prosperity, cut ex-
penditure, and generally foster the wellbeing of Athens, and, by extension, of all 
the other Greeks too:  
 
“were you to show also that you are striving for peace in every land and on 
every sea, I do think that, next to the safety of their own country, all men 
would put the safety of Athens first in their prayers.”16 
 
In his On the Peace, Isocrates puts forward a similar argument. Embracing peace, 
he suggests, will not only bring about an end to the specific unpleasantness of 
war, but will also make possible, and even stimulate, a whole set of other bene-
                                                
13  Aristoph. Pax 530-538. ταύτης δ’ ὀπώρας, ὑποδοχῆς, Διονυσίων, | αὐλῶν, τραγῳδῶν, 
Σοφοκλέους μελῶν, κιχλῶν, | ἐπυλλίων Εὐριπίδου | …κιττοῦ, τρυγοίπου, προβατίων 
βληχωμένων, | †κόλπου† γυναικῶν διατρεχουσῶν εἰς ἀγρόν, | δούλης μεθυούσης, 
ἀνατετραμμένου χοῶς, | ἄλλων τε πολλῶν κἀγαθῶν. Generally on representations of 
peace in fifth-century texts, see Caldwell 1919, chs 3-4; Zampaglione 1973, 64-100; 
Slater 1981 (focussing on poetry and the symposium). 
14  FGrH 115 F 75C. On the depiction of peace and war in this fragment, see Dillery 
1995, 45-48. 
15  Xen. Poroi 5.1: the term seems to be a Xenophontic coinage, and is perhaps intended 
to be a pun on the Hellespontophylakes of the fifth-century empire (and therefore in-
tended to contribute to Xenophon’s agenda of setting up an alternative model of in-
terstate behaviour – and interstate success – to that of Athens’ imperial past). An al-
ternative reading would see this as a nod towards the common peaces: Jansen 2007, 
261 notes that the Persian King is described by Isocrates (4.175) as phylax of the 
common peaces, and suggests that Xenophon might here be envisaging a more spe-
cific diplomatic role for Athens, as defender of these peace treaties. 
16  Xen. Poroi 5.10. εἰ δὲ καὶ ὅπως ἀνὰ πᾶσαν γῆν καὶ θάλατταν εἰρήνη ἔσται φανεροὶ 
εἴητε ἐπιμελόμενοι, ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι πάντας ἂν εὔχεσθαι μετὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδας 
Ἀθήνας μάλιστα σῴζεσθαι. 
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fits: fewer expenses, particularly for the liturgical class; increased opportunities 
for trade; greater domestic, as well as panhellenic, stability.17 
The general link between eirene and wellbeing is, therefore, quite well estab-
lished in the Greek world even before 362, and the more specific idea that 
peace could be a basis for collective, and particularly panhellenic, benefit is also 
visible in texts other than RO 42 (particularly the Poroi). But Rhodes and Os-
borne are not necessarily therefore wrong to categorise its appearance in RO 42 
as “striking”. RO 42 is, of course, substantially earlier than some of the most 
extensive fourth-century praises of peace, but what might be even more impor-
tant than chronology is context. Whatever view is taken of the authorship of 
RO 42, it certainly seems to have a slightly more official, public status than the 
disgruntled pamphleteering of Xenophon and Isocrates. What this inscription 
might preserve, therefore, is a rather rare example of the praise of peace finding 
its way beyond the marginal (and often more or less oligarchic) realm of dis-
course. By extension, it could serve as a useful corrective to the view that ex-
pressions of the value of peace are typically driven more by anti-democratic 
animus (or at least oligarchic self-interest) than any fundamental conviction.18 
 
 
Peace treaties and war 
 
But does all this run the risk of missing the point? As was noted at the start of 
the previous section, an assumption which underpins that reading of RO 42 is 
that the eirene of line 5 is equivalent to the eirene extolled by Xenophon (and the 
other literary sources discussed above): that is, eirene as a general “state of 
peace” rather than a specific peace agreement. But of course l.5 does not talk 
only of eirene but of koine eirene – and that qualification should perhaps encour-
age that praise of peace to be set in a more technical, and narrowly diplomatic, 
context: would this justification of peace would make better sense if it were 
read as the justification of a specific peace treaty: that is to say, the “Common 
Peace” of 362. 
It might seem idiotic to ask whether the Greeks made peace treaties because 
they hoped such agreements would actively enhance their happiness, strength, 
and usefulness to their allies (since what other reason would they have for 
making them?). But the question is not (I would argue) quite as simple-minded 
as it might initially appear. At the heart of the problem is the issue of how an 
                                                
17  The argument pervades the speech, but is summed up at Isocr. 8.18-21. On Isocra-
tes’ attitude to war and peace, see briefly Betalli 1992, and see also below. 
18  On opposition to war as a characteristic of those opposed to radical (or any) democ-
racy, see de Romilly 1954, 344-353; Bearzot 1985; Missiou 1992, 82. 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
© 2012, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz 
ISBN Print: 9783938032510 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317845
124 Polly Low  
 
eirene – in the narrow, juridical sense of “peace treaty” – should be categorised. 
Interstate agreements in classical Greece might be divided into two (broad) 
categories: in one group, positive, prospective agreements, involving some sort 
of (usually mutual) obligation between the contracting parties (that is, symmachiai 
or philiai); in the other group, agreements which are more negative in content, 
and whose main function is to guarantee that the parties involved will refrain 
from some sort of action (this category would include truces: spondai, diallagai, 
and so on). That second category of agreement does not promise any new 
benefit to the states involved, but rather allows simply for a reversion to what-
ever the status quo ante might have been. It promises, in short, an absence of 
war, rather than the presence of anything positively new. 
Into which of those categories should the koinai eirenai be placed? The most 
recent analysis of the Common Peaces has suggested that these agreements 
should be considered under the same general heading as spondai,19 and this 
interpretation does have several points in its favour. The basic obligation of an 
eirene, like that of spondai, is negative: the participants in the agreement should 
stop fighting each other. The same is true of the core features of the koinai 
eirenai, whose obligations are admittedly more extensive, but essentially no more 
positive than those of more simple truces: participants undertake not to in-
fringe autonomy or eleutheria, not to install garrisons, and so on.20 To be sure, 
referring to an agreement as an eirene rather than (for example) spondai does 
involve a shift in emphasis away from the act of making peace to the outcome 
of that act – the state of peace which results.21 But it does not necessarily fol-
low that the outcome of an eirene is qualitatively different from, or need neces-
sarily offer any more positive tangible benefits than, the outcome of spondai.  
Such a reading would, I think, make it hard to explain why or how a peace 
might make any state chresimos (or ischyros). That is: there is still an unfilled ex-
planatory gap between RO 42’s reference to the koine eirene and its description 
of the various advantages which the peace has brought. But that reading is also, 
of course, far too simplistic, certainly in the case of the later koinai eirenai. Even 
if attention is restricted to the formal terms of those agreements, more positive 
obligations soon start to emerge. The second Common Peace of 371 includes 
                                                
19  Alonso 2007, 219-221; Giovannini 2007, 353. Cf. Jehne 1994, who is more willing to 
emphasise the positive obligations entailed in koinai eirenai. 
20  See Xen. Hell. 5.1.31 for the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas (which includes only a 
commitment to autonomy). Removal of garrisons may have been implied in the au-
tonomy clause of the Peace of Antalcidas (Diod. Sic. 15.5.1; Ryder 1967, 123), but 
explicitly appears only in the Peace of 375 (Diod. Sic. 15.38). The first Peace of 371 
requires withdrawal of governors and demobilisation of armies (Xen. Hell. 6.3.18).  
21  Giovannini 2007, 226f, 363. 
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the option (although not, apparently, the requirement) for states to use military 
action against those who violate the peace agreement.22 In 338, the League of 
Corinth more explicitly merges the negative undertakings of a Common Peace 
with the positive obligations of an alliance. If the restoration of the (very frag-
mentary) text is accepted, members undertake not only to abide by an eirene but 
also to fight wars, and, if necessary, to do both at the same time:  
 
“If anyone does commit any breach of treaty concerning the agreements, I 
shall go in support as called on by those who are wronged (?), and I shall 
make war against the one who transgresses the common peace (?) as de-
cided by the common council and called on by the hegemon”. 23 
 
RO 42 can be read as fitting into that pattern in its combination of negative 
obligations and positive commitments. Although it is not clear whether the 
Common Peace of 362 was accompanied by a formal symmachia,24 this particular 
inscription leaves no doubt that the koine eirene could be closely associated with 
the prospect of combined military action by the Greek states. The threat is 
most obvious in the latter part of the inscription: if the Persian King, or anyone 
from Persia, starts to destabilise the peace then retaliatory action will be taken:  
 
“if he makes war on any who have sworn the oath, or provides money for 
the breaking up of this peace, either himself in opposition to the Greeks 
who have made this peace or anyone else of those from his territory, we 
shall all resist in common, worthily of the peace that has now come into be-
ing and of what we have done before now.”25 
 
But it is also possible to read this potential for military action as being the real 
concern of lines 5-7. What exactly does it mean to say, as these lines do, that 
                                                
22  Xen. Hell. 6.3.18 
23  RO 76, lines 19-22. [ἂν τις ποε͂ι τι] παράσπονδον πε|[ρὶ τὰς συνθήκας, βοηθήσω] 
καθότι ἂν παραγ|[γέλλωσιν οἱ ἀδικούμενοι (?)], καὶ πολεμήσω τῶ|[ι τὴν κοινὴν 
εἰρήνην (?) παρ]αβαίνοντι καθότι | [ἂν δοκῆι τῶι κοινῶι συνεδ]ρ̣ίωι καὶ ὁ ἡγεμ̣ὼ|[ν 
παραγγέλληι. The reference to koine eirene in line 20 is a supplement proposed by 
Wilhelm 1894, 36 and generally accepted since (but cf. Buckler 1994, 113f). 
24  Diodorus (15.89.1) and Polybius (4.33.9) report that the common peace was accom-
panied by a symmachia, although it has been suggested that they have confused the 
enforcement clause (attested for the 371/370 Peace, although not for the Peace of 
362) with a formal symmachia: see Ryder 1967, 141f; cf. Taeger 1930; Jehne 1994, 97f. 
25  Lines 12-17. ἐὰν δὲ πολεμῆι πρός τινας τῶν[ὀμοσάντων τὸν ὅρκον ἢ χ]|[ρή]μ̣ατά τισι 
παρέχηι ἐπὶ διαλύσει τῆς εἰρή[νης τῆσδε. ἢ αὐ]|[τὸς] ἐναντίον τοῖς Ἕλλησιν τοῖς 
τήνδε [τὴν εἰρήνην ποήσα]|[σιν] ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐκενου χώρ[ας, ἀμυνοῦμεν 
κοινῆι]|[πάντε]ς ἀξίως τῆς τε νῦν γεγενημένης ε[ἰρήνης καὶ ὧν πρὸ τ]|[οῦ ἐπράξα]μεν. 
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the Greeks will be chresimoi to their philoi? Chresimos does not form part of the 
normal vocabulary of interstate agreements, but it is a more common feature of 
the language of honorific decrees, where it carries a strong implication of prac-
tical aid or specific services performed.26 In an interstate context, those services 
will, perhaps unsurprisingly, often involve military assistance of some sort.27 
There is therefore a strong hint (at least) in these lines that the benefit of this 
peace will not be the sort of widespread withdrawal from conflict envisaged by 
Xenophon, but rather an enhanced ability to engage in other wars (a hint which 
becomes even stronger if the restoration of ischyroi is accepted at the end of line 
7).28 This koine eirene therefore becomes something which is praiseworthy not 
because it is a straightforward opposite to war, and not because it allows for an 
absolute absence of war, but rather because it enforces a better balance be-
tween peace (or perhaps better: stability)29 and war. 
This sort of attitude to the relationship between eirene and war is not specific 
to the Common Peaces. The Spartan treaty with the Aetolians (ML 67bis) pro-
vides an earlier, and more explicit, example of this combination of peace and 
belligerence.30 The whole agreement is described as a synthekai, but under that 
general heading the Spartans commit three to more specific sorts of relation-
ship with the Aetolians: philia, eirene, and also symmachia (lines 1-3).31 The rest of 
the treaty goes on to set out the (extensive) circumstances in which the Aetoli-
ans and Spartans will take advantage of their “peace” – here, quite clearly, an 
extremely limited sort of eirene – in order to fight wars: 
 
“They shall follow wherever the Spartans lead both by land and by sea, hav-
ing the same friend and the same enemy as the Spartans. They will not put 
an end to the war without the Spartans, and shall send fighters to the same 
opponent as the Spartans. They shall not receive exiles who have partici-
pated in crimes. If anyone leads an expedition against the land of the 
Erxadieis for the purpose of making war, the Spartans shall assist them with 
                                                
26  Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 203f, 268. 
27  For example: RO 98, lines 28f (Athenian honours for Memnon of Rhodes, 
327/326): Memnon’s ancestors are praised for having been “chresimoi to the Athe-
nian demos in the wars” (χρήσιμοι ὄντες ἐν [τ]|[ο]ῖς πολέμοις τῶι δήμωι). 
28  The supplement is highly conjectural: Wilhelm (1900, 153) included it “lediglich 
beispielsweise” (and printed it with a query); the query had disappeared by the edi-
tion of Wilhelm 1901, and the supplement has been generally accepted since, but 
Wilhelm’s initial caution seems worth re-emphasising. 
29  On stability as the real goal of the Common Peaces, see Jehne 1986, esp. 7-19. 
30  ML 67bis. 
31  [συνθε͂κ]αι Αἰτολοῖς κ̣[αττάδε] | [φιλία]ν καὶ hιράναν ἐ͂μεν ποτ] | [Αἰτο]λ̣ος καὶ 
συνμα[χίαν. 
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all the strength in their power; and if anyone leads an expedition against the 
land of the Spartans for the purpose of making war, the Erxadieis shall as-
sist them with all the strength in their power”.32 
 
Another example, the Prospectus of the Second Athenian League, shows how 
such a combination might function in a multilateral alliance (and also provides 
a closer parallel for the phraseology of RO 42).33 The substantive part of this 
decree opens (like RO 42) with a purpose clause: the function of the league is 
to allow the Greeks to preserve (among other things) their hesychia (line 10), 
and to maintain “the eirene and the philia sworn by the Greeks and the King” 
(lines 12-14) – that is, the Peace of Antalcidas.34 Here too this assertion of the 
importance of maintaining eirene is apparently entirely consistent with the later 
provisions for (defensive) military action in support of the symmachia (lines 46-
50). This combination of eirene and war is even made the basis for the assertion 
of a general principle of international politics by Isocrates in the Panegyricus. 
According to Isocrates, not only is eirene not incompatible with fighting wars, 
fighting wars is in fact a requirement for a successful eirene (with the proviso 
that the fighting must directed against Persia): 
 
“For as matters now stand, it is in vain that we make our treaties of peace; 
for we do not settle our wars, but only postpone them and wait for the op-
portune moment when we shall have the power to inflict some irreparable 
disaster upon each other. We must clear from our path these treacherous 
designs and pursue that course of action which will enable us to dwell in 
our several cities with greater security and to feel greater confidence in each 
other. What I have to say on these points is simple and easy: it is not possi-
ble for us to cement an enduring peace unless we join together in a war 
against the barbarians, nor for the Hellenes to attain to concord until we 
                                                
32  Lines 4-23, tr. Dillon. hεπο]|[μ]ένος hόπυι κα Λα[κεδαιμόνι]|[ο]ι hαγίονται καὶ κα[τὰ 
γᾶν] |[κ]αὶ καθάλαθαν, τ[ὸν αὐτὸν] | φίλον καὶ τὸνν αὐτ[ὸν ἐχθρὸν] |ἔχοντες hόν περ 
[καὶ Λακε]|δαιμονίοι. μεδὲ κ̣[ατάλυhιν] |ποιε͂σθαι ἄνευ Λα[κεδαιμονίον] |μεδενί, 
ἀνhιέμ̣ε̣[ν δὲ μαχομένος] |ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν πόθ’ ὅ Λ̣[ακεδαι]|μονίος. φεύγον[τας μὲ 
δεκέθο]|hαν κεκοινανεκ[ότας ἀδικε]|μάτον. αἐ δέ τίς κα [ἐπὶ τὰν το͂ν] |Ἐρχαδιέον 
χόραν [στρατεύει] |ἐπὶ πολέμοι, ἐπικο[ρε͂ν Λακεδαιμο]|νίος παντὶ σθένε[ι κὰ τὸ 
δύνατον·] |αἰ δέ τίς κα ἐπὶ τὰ[ν Λακεδιαμο]|νίον χόραν στρ[ατεύει ἐπὶ πολέ]|μοι, 
ἐπικορε͂ν Ἐ[ρξαδιε͂ς παντὶ] |[σθένει κὰ τὸ δύνατον …….] 
33  RO 22.  
34 〚κα̣]ὶ [ὅπ]ω̣[ς κ]υ̣[ρ]ί̣α̣ ἦ̣ι κ̣[α̣]ὶ̣ δ̣ι|[αμένηι ἥ τε εἰρήνη̣ κ̣αὶ ἡ φιλία ἣν ὤμο̣σ]α̣|[ν οἱ 
Ἕλληνες] κ̣α̣ὶ̣ [β̣̣α]σ̣ι̣λ̣ε̣ὺ̣ς̣. (The reference to the Peace of Antalcidas was deliberately 
erased, probably in the 360s, but read by Accame 1941, 54; more recent studies have 
supported his restorations: see RO ad loc). 
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wrest our material advantages from one and the same source and wage our 
wars against one and the same enemy.”35 
 
Only when peace is combined with war in this way, according to Isocrates, will 
eirenai actually become qualitatively different from synthekai and entail a genuine 
solution to conflict, rather than just a means of delaying it.  
 
 
Eirene  and e i r ena i  in mid-fourth century Athens 
 
When viewed in this context, therefore, the praise of peace in RO 42 begins to 
seem both less revolutionary and less idealistic. Eirene, on this reading, is some-
thing which is useful in the context only of this specific peace agreement, and, 
moreover, useful primarily because it creates a more stable basis from which to 
undertake further wars. Moreover, that perception of usefulness is not some-
thing which is particularly novel, or specific to the koinai eirenai (or even specific 
to multilateral peace agreements). 
Such a reading is, I would argue, an important corrective to the more opti-
mistic views of a fourth-century revolution in attitudes to peace which were 
outlined above. Nevertheless, I would not want to insist on the absolute irrele-
vance of those approaches to peace and pacifism in this period. In fact, I would 
like to suggest that there might be a third way between the two readings which 
I have (misleadingly) so far presented as mutually exclusive.  
This third way is based on treating the ambiguity in the semantic scope of 
eirene as an opportunity to be exploited rather than a problem to be resolved. 
There are grounds for believing that fourth-century Greeks were no less aware 
than modern scholars of the potential double meaning of this term, and, more 
importantly, that they were alert to the potential for creative manipulation of 
that ambiguity. In the On the Peace, for example, Isocrates initially seems to be 
engaged in a specific argument, about one particular peace treaty: his opening 
gambit is to claim that  
 
                                                
35  Isocr. 4.172f. νῦν μὲν γὰρ μάτην ποιούμεθα τὰς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης συνθήκας· οὐ γὰρ 
διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους, ἀλλ’ ἀναβαλλόμεθα καὶ περιμένομεν τοὺς καιροὺς ἐν οἷς 
ἀνήκεστόν τι κακὸν ἀλλήλους ἐργάσασθαι δυνησόμεθα. δεῖ δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς 
ἐκποδὼν ποιησαμένους ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐξ ὧν τάς τε πόλεις 
ἀσφαλέστερον οἰκήσομεν καὶ πιστότερον διακεισόμεθα πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. ἔστι δ’ 
ἁπλοῦς καὶ ῥᾴδιος ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ τούτων· οὔτε γὰρ εἰρήνην οἷόν τε βεβαίαν ἀγαγεῖν 
ἢν μὴ κοινῇ τοῖς βαρβάροις πολεμήσωμεν, οὔθ’ ὁμονοῆσαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὶν ἂν καὶ 
τὰς ὠφελείας ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιησώμεθα. Trans-
lation Norlin. 
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“we should make a peace (eirene) not only with the Chians and Rhodians and 
Byzantians, but with all mankind.”.36  
 
But his focus soon shifts from the specific to the general, and before very long 
(as was noted above) he is enmeshed in an argument which echoes the Aristo-
phanic vision of peace as a universal bringer of good things: it will allow the 
Athenians  
 
“to dwell in our city secure from danger … provided more abundantly with 
the necessities of life … of one mind amongst ourselves … completely 
happy.”37  
 
And again – very soon after – the emphasis shifts very subtly once more, as it 
becomes clear that this vision of a beneficent, beneficial state of eirene is cer-
tainly not one which rules out all recourse to war: one of the most important 
consequences of embracing this sort of peace, according to Isocrates, is that 
Athens will acquire “all mankind as our military allies (symmachoi)”.38 Eirene for 
Isocrates can therefore be used to imply a specific peace treaty, a general state 
of peace, and a platform for future military action, and it is the very ambiguity 
of the term which enables him to construct such a (superficially, at least) plau-
sible argument here. 
Of course this is exactly the sort of argumentative sleight of hand which 
might be expected from Isocrates, but it is possible to find other – and perhaps 
more representative – evidence of the possibility of conflating the two varieties 
of eirene (and their connotations). The best, and most complex, evidence comes 
in Athens’ worship of the goddess Eirene. On the one hand, the image of that 
goddess, particularly as represented after about 375/374 BC, seems to corre-
spond most closely to the idealising, generalising Aristophanic or Xenophontic 
vision of peace as a source of wealth and plenty – a relationship which is fa-
mously literalised in Cephisodotus’ statue of Peace holding the infant Wealth, 
and which also recurs in other representations of the goddess.39 On the other 
                                                
36  Isocr. 8.16. χρῆναι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ μόνον πρὸς Χίους καὶ Ῥοδίους καὶ 
Βυζαντίους καὶ Κῴους ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους.  
37  Isocr. 8.19. εἰ τήν τε πόλιν ἀσφαλῶς οἰκοῖμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν βίον εὐπορώτεροι 
γιγνοίμεθα καὶ τά τε πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμονοοῖμεν … τελέως τὴν πόλιν 
εὐδαιμονήσειν. 
38  Isocr. 8.21. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, συμμάχους ἕξομεν ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους. 
39  The statue was located in the Agora (near the Bouleuterion: Pausanias 1.8.2). On the 
location and its significance, see Knell 2000, 73-80; on this depiction of Peace, see 
Smith 2003, 11; and on other representations of Peace holding an infant Wealth, 
LIMC s.v. Eirene, Section C. Earlier Athenian depictions of Eirene seem to have por-
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hand, however, the impetus for the creation of this image (and the introduction 
of formal worship of Eirene to Athens) is generally agreed to have been very 
specific – the Common Peace of 375 – and the context in which it was intro-
duced was, as Parker observes, “not that of a nascent pacifism”:40 the peace 
followed on from (and was closely connected with) Timotheus’ conquest of 
Corcyra and victories over the Spartans.41  
It is, of course, not entirely unreasonable that peace could be represented as 
a consequence (or a product) of war. What must also be significant, though, 
and what is perhaps less predictable, is that the connection between war and 
peace seems to have been regularly revived and reaffirmed as a programmatic 
rather than a purely historic feature of the cult. This is visible above all in the 
fact that it is the Athenian generals who appear to have been responsible for 
performing the annual sacrifices to Peace.42 Those sacrifices were offered on 
16th Hekatombeion, so were presumably one of the first duties which a general 
would have performed after taking up his office in the new year. This Athenian 
festival of Eirene seems, therefore, to be simultaneously a celebration of the 
benefits of peace, a commemoration of a specific victory (and a specific peace 





                                                                                                    
trayed her as one of the Horai rather than the wealth-nurturing figure into which she 
develops in the fourth century: on these fifth-century depictions, see Drougou 2000, 
Pappas-Delmonsou 2003. 
40  The evidence is summarised by Parker 1997, 229f. 
41  Isocr. 15.109f. Note also FD III.4.462, a dedication made by Timotheus at Delphi 
which has been read as claiming that he “made a new synoikismos of Victory and the 
Athenian demos” (ν[έ]|[ον συν]οι[κ]ισμὸν ποι[ῶ]ν Ν[ι]κῆ[ς]|[καὶ τοῦ δή]μ[ο]υ τὸν 
Ἀθηναίω[ν]: see Vatin 1983). The first fourth-century appearance of gold Victories 
in the inventories of the Treasurers of Athena (IG ii2 1424, lines 31ff [374/373]) has 
also been connected with these campaigns and the peace which followed (Parker 
1997, 230). 
42  Knell 2000, 74; Pappas-Delmonsou 2003, 97. The evidence for these sacrifices 
appears only in the 330s (IG ii2 1496, lines 94f [334/333], 127f [332/331]), and it is 
possible that their introduction should be seen as a later move, perhaps to be associ-
ated with the apparent re-organisation (and expansion?) of the festival in the second 
half of the fourth century (SEG 16.55, with Robert 1977; Sosin 2004). 
43  The Athenian fondness for calling their warships Eirene might be seen as a different 
manifestation of the same basic phenomenon (that is: celebration of Peace in the 
context of continuing warfare). Eirene appears four times in the naval lists: IG ii2 
1604, line 43 (377/376); 1607, line 4 (373/372); 1611, lines 66, 149 (357/356). 
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Eirene has (at least) two quite different connotations in mid fourth-century 
thought. When it is used in strictly diplomatic context, it seems usually to imply 
a very limited sort of peace agreement, which will always allow for (and some-
times require) war against those not involved in the agreement. It is this view of 
eirene, I would argue, which remains dominant in this period.  
It is tempting, indeed, to speculate that this functionalist view of eirene even 
starts to over-run the more abstract, idealising conception of the term. It is 
attractive to see in Athens’ creation of its cult of Eirene an attempt to appropri-
ate the genuinely peaceful-Peace in the service of the more functionalist (and 
belligerent) version of the concept. And – at the risk of indulging in one specu-
lation too far – it is perhaps even possible to read Xenophon’s Poroi as a reac-
tion against that appropriation, and as an attempt to reclaim peace (in its func-
tional, instrumental form) as something which really does not have to have 
anything to do with war.  
If so, it was an attempt which was clearly doomed to failure: the future of ei-
rene in fourth-century Greece lay not in Xenophon’s vision of prosperous calm, 
but rather in the much more aggressive ambitions of the League of Corinth. 
J.A.O. Larsen (writing during World War II) raised the possibility that, in the 
Greek world of the classical period, “peace is possible only when a war is actu-
ally being waged”.44 He rejected that possibility as too pessimistic, but I am 
inclined to think that the pessimistic view might, in this instance, be not too far 
from the truth. The praise of peace in RO 42 reveals more, I would argue, 
about the Greek states’ continued commitment to war than it does about their 
idealisation of the prospect of peace. 
 
 
                                                
44  Larsen 1944, 162. 
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Legalism and Peace in Classical Greece 
 
  Peter Hunt 
 
The Greek city-states of the classical period have acquired a bleak reputation 
for fighting wars all the time.1 Historians have tended to blame this state of 
affairs on two aspects of the way that Greeks thought about interstate relations. 
First, drawing their conclusions largely from Thucydides, more traditional 
scholars stress the amoral calculations that they believe determined Greek for-
eign policy. There were thus no moral curbs to prevent, for example, an impe-
rial state, like Athens, from destroying a weaker state, like Melos, in hopes that 
such brutality would demonstrate its resolve and power. Second and more 
recently, historians have criticized this approach as modernizing. We are used 
to leaders calmly and amorally calculating their state’s interests – or so this 
argument runs – and have thus overemphasized the rational and calculating 
strain in Greek thinking about war, peace, and the relations of states. These 
historians investigate and stress the emotional side of Greek foreign policy, in 
particular the touchy sense of honor and hyper-competitiveness that they see as 
the root cause of Greek warfare. An additional methodological insight typically 
informs their work: Greeks understood the relations of states, which were 
necessarily somewhat abstract, in terms deriving from the concrete and well-
known relations between individuals within the state – they thought in terms of 
what is called the “domestic analogy.”2  
So J.E. Lendon and Hans Van Wees, for example, invoke the domestic 
analogy to explain what they find otherwise inexplicable, the frequency of war 
among Greek city-states.3 I agree with these scholars that focusing on the do-
mestic analogy can help us to understand Greek thinking about the relations of 
states. But an acute sense of honor and a competitive ethos were not the en-
tirety of Greek culture and values. Nor did these individual traits provide the 
only value-laden analogy that the Greeks applied to their foreign policy. States 
could be like slaves or friends, like brothers, like a man defending his home. 
Rather than being bound by a single model to apply to the relation of states, 
that of a sulky, vengeful, and violent Homeric hero – a model that might seem 
to doom them to irrational wars – Greek society provided a broad repertoire of 
                                                
1  This chapter is based on and develops parts of my chapter on “Legalism” in Hunt 
2010.  
2  The domestic analogy has long been used in theories of international law: Vattel 
1793: liv, section 18; Dickinson 1920, 29-31.  
3  Lendon 2000, 2007; Van Wees 2004.  
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analogies that could be applied to the world of states. Some of these tended 
indeed to encourage the recourse to war – Pericles famously likened any con-
cession to Sparta with slavery4 – but others had the opposite effect: they tended 
towards the resolution of disputes without violence. I will consider here one of 
these more pacific domestic analogies: the world of states, like that of individu-
als, could be and ought to be subject to laws instead of being a realm of force 
and violence.  
To put this another way, Lendon wants us to picture the Athenians as react-
ing to an insult or injury in the interstate realm as if they were characters in the 
Iliad.5 But there were also ways in which the Athenians in their foreign relations 
more closely resembled the un-heroic, quotidian Athenians parodied in Aristo-
phanes. When an Aristophanic character is attacked or mistreated, he or she is 
more likely to call upon witnesses and threaten a lawsuit than to take personal 
revenge to repair his or her honor.6 New Comedy is, if anything, even more 
replete with legal terms, references, and analogies.7 And, of course, this way of 
thinking is not limited to comedy: copious evidence in virtually every literary 
genre confirms the importance of law to classical Athenian culture and ideals. If 
the Athenians applied the attitudes and approaches of their everyday life to the 
relation of states, they might be just as likely to think of legal redress as of vio-
lent retaliation when Athens had suffered insult or injury. They would merely 
be thinking about the relationships between states in one of the ways they 
thought about individual relationships.  
So the main arguments of this paper are two. First, the Greeks did indeed 
talk and think about the relations of states as if they were subject to law just as 
the relations of individuals were. In particular, the terms of treaties played a 
crucial role in foreign policy deliberations, a role similar to that played by writ-
ten laws and contracts in the decisions of Athenian courts. Second, I will show 
that the legal and peaceful resolution of interstate disputes was contrasted with 
the recourse to violence, which was considered to be a great accomplishment 






                                                
4  Thuc. 1.141.1; cf. Isoc. 6.51. 
5  E.g., Lendon 2000, 13; Van Wees 2004, 22-26. 
6  E.g. Ar. Nub. 1222, 1255, 1277-1278, 1297; Vesp. 1332-1334, 1406-1408, 1415-1419. 
7  The catalogue in Scafuro 1997, 424-467 on the threat of lawsuits (and legal self-help) 
in New Comedy includes many similar cases. 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
© 2012, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz 
ISBN Print: 9783938032510 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317845
 Legalism and Peace in Classical Greece     137 
 
Evidence of legalism 
 
The evidence for what I shall be calling the legal analogy – the habit of thinking 
about states as if they were individuals subject to laws – falls into two catego-
ries: references to legal processes among states; references to things like laws 
among states.  
Interstate arbitration provides an obvious example of a legalistic process among 
states.8 Within the city, arbitration was a long-established procedure by the 
classical period. In classical Athens disputants could agree to submit to binding 
arbitration to settle their differences. By the fourth century private cases involv-
ing more than ten drachmas were required to go first to arbitration – although 
in these cases either side could appeal and demand a trial.9 Starting at the latest 
in the mid-fifth century many treaties between states included the clause that 
differences between the parties should be settled by arbitration. Although the 
English translation “arbitration” is often used and best conveys the procedure 
to be used, the Greeks typically used a form of dike, best translated here as 
“legal process,” to denote arbitration between states. When treaties between 
states specify that disputes are to be resolved by arbitration rather than war, 
they often use expressions such as “by oath and justice” or “to refer to legal 
judgment”. Although in many cases we know that these implied arbitration, 
these words are indistinguishable from the words used to describe any recourse 
to law within the state.10  
Analogs among states to domestic law come in two flavors. First some gen-
eral rules of war and diplomacy are explicitly described as the “laws of the 
Greeks,” although they were usually unwritten. Several scholars point out that 
among these almost universally accepted laws belongs the rule that states need 
to abide by their treaty obligations. This meant that the terms of treaties also 
acquired a legalistic status in arguments for or against wars. They thus supple-
mented the unwritten “law of the Greeks” and constitute the second flavor of 
law-like things, the one I will be focusing on here. Treaties are written docu-
ments, but they are too specific to be considered parallel to written law within 
the state.11 Rather treaties are more like contracts. Within a Greek city state, 
private contracts served to impose more specific requirements than the laws 
                                                
8  Ager 1996, 33; Roebuck 2001, 159. 
9  Roebuck 2001, 352-358; Thür 2005, 156-157; Thür 2007.  
10  E.g., Hdt. 6.42; Thuc. 1.78.4, 80.1, 85.2, 140.2, 141.1, 144.2, 145, 4.79.1, 118.8, 
5.18.4, 41.2, 79.1; [Dem.] 7.7, 36-37, 41, 43-44. See Roebuck 2001, 156. 
11  Gagarin 1986, 81 n. 1.  
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but generally had the full force of the law behind their enforcement.12 Thus 
they supplemented domestic law. Among states treaties stood alone in the 
absence of generalized written laws of conduct.13 So while the unwritten laws 
of the Greeks, that is flavor one, typically limited the conduct of war and al-
lowed diplomacy even between enemies, it was by reference to the terms of 
treaties that Greeks could argue for or against the recourse to war in a legalistic 
way. Such arguments were ubiquitous. In particular, if one looks at the assem-
bly speeches of fourth-century Athens – our best evidence if not necessarily 
representative of the rest of Greece – one finds that virtually every speech 
either explicitly states or implicitly assumes that the terms of treaties should be 
obeyed and thus should guide Athens’ actions.14  
A pattern in these assembly speeches suggests that even such a catalogue 
may under-represent the significance of treaties in Athenian foreign-policy 
deliberations. While Demosthenes’ orations dominate this body of evidence, it 
is actually the three non-Demosthenic speeches that are the most legalistic, 
Andocides, On the Peace, and the pseudo-Demosthenic On Halonnesus – which 
Raphael Sealey calls “legalistic and tiresome”15 – and On the Treaty with Alexan-
der. It may be that most orators relied heavily on legalistic arguments, while 
Demosthenes preferred to deal with the big picture in a more emotional and 
generally moral way. That even Demosthenes referred to treaty obligations in 
his speeches reveals the large role they played in Athenian discourse about war 
and peace.  
In contrast, other speakers sometimes argued that legal procedures and 
ways of thinking were not appropriate between states. For example, on the eve 
of the Peloponnesian War, Sthenolaidas is represented as arguing against arbi-
tration:  
 
“These things should not be decided by lawsuits and speeches since we are 
not being injured in word alone.”16  
 
                                                
12 On the legal enforceability of contracts see E. Cohen 2005, 299, who cites Dem. 
47.77, 56.2; Din. 3.4; Pl. Symp. 196c; Arist. Rh. 1375n9-10.  
13  Treaties could be referred to by the same word synthekai as contracts sometimes 
were (Isoc. 17. 20). 
14  Andocides 3.34; Dem. 2.5-7, 3.16, 5.13, 6.1, 8.5-6, 39, 9.6, 9.16, 10.18, 16.9; [Dem.] 
7.24-5 and passim; [Dem.] 17.1-2, 4, 16, 20-21, 26, 30. See D. Cohen 1984 on appeals 
to law in Thucydides.  
15  Cf. Sealey 1993, 178. 
16  Thuc. 1.86.3. οὐδὲ δίκαις καὶ λόγοις διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους. 
See also Thuc. 1.73.1, 3.44.4; [Dem.] 7.7-8, 36-37, 41, 44; Dem. 8.28, 16.26-28. 
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These rejections of legalistic categories and processes reveal that the contrary 
opinion, that states should act legally, was possible and was indeed common 
enough to require refutation or pre-emption. They thus underscore the positive 




The power of treaties 
 
I have been using the soft terms, legalistic and legalism, advisedly. Speakers in 
the assembly could not invoke law in the sense of “a rule of conduct imposed 
by authority.”17 There was not then and is not now any world-state or sover-
eign authority over states to judge competing legal claims, make and enforce its 
decisions, and to reserve the use of violence to itself. Modern international law 
has been hobbled by the anarchy of the international regime. So too the ancient 
hope that states could be restrained by treaties was limited by the lack of au-
thoritative sanctions against treaty-breakers.  
The Greeks were well aware of this problem.18 They took steps to combat 
it. City states often insisted that copies of their treaties be publicly displayed at 
Panhellenic centers. This practice reveals the hope that the opinions of the 
Greek city-states, and the actions consequent on these, could provide some 
sanction against breaking treaties. It also ensured that treaty terms were widely 
known. The Greek cities, of course, formed opinions about all sorts of behav-
ior or misbehavior by states, but their judgments about the adherence to or the 
breaking of treaties may have possessed a higher degree of coherence: the spe-
cific written terms of treaties provided an agreed upon standard to judge the 
actions of its parties. Otherwise, state’s actions could be construed according to 
any number of different standards: were the Thebans just helping their friends 
in the Peloponnese (as they claimed) or were they just trying to palliate their 
imperial ambitions (as Xenophon thought)?19 When Sparta attacked Mantinea, 
was it just punishing a disloyal ally (as it claimed) or destroying a small state 
despite the general peace treaty, which had just been concluded?20 Written 
treaties have the potential to lessen, though they certainly do not destroy, the 
ability of states to justify in specious moral terms whatever actions their self-
interest dictates. Last and most important, diplomacy was crucial to Greek city-
states: it allowed them to make alliances and to end wars. A reputation for 
                                                
17  “Law” 1 in the OED2. 
18  E.g., Dem. 15.26-29 with Hunt 2010, 159-160.  
19  Xen. Hell. 7.4.40, 7.5.1-2. 
20  Xen. Hell. 5.2.2; Isoc. 4.126. 
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sticking to treaties was a prerequisite for either of these extremely advantageous 
diplomatic procedures.  
But the Greeks did not rest content with written terms and publicity to en-
courage adherence to treaties. All treaties were sanctioned by oaths that called 
on gods, not only as witnesses, but also as enforcers who were asked to take 
action against whichever party broke a treaty.21 Indeed, the Greek words for 
treaty include spondai, after the libations made to the gods at the ratification 
ceremony and horkoi, after the oaths that were sworn.22 A number of passages 
show confidence, to a greater or lesser degree, that the gods do, in fact, punish 
states for disregarding the oaths they swore. To take just one example out of 
many, the Spartans refused to go to arbitration before the Peloponnesian War. 
According to Thucydides the Spartans later felt that their culpability on this 
score had been the cause of their misfortunes in the Archidamian War.23 Even 
if the gods did not intervene, to break a treaty without excuse was to show 
impiety and contempt for the gods, qualities hardly approved or conducive to 
high standing among the Greeks.24  
Another diplomatic practice, somewhat paradoxically, provides more evi-
dence of the force of treaties and the oaths that sanctified them. Everett 
Wheeler has brought attention to a number of treaties that included an “anti-
deceit” clause. This was a phrase or just a word indicating that agreement was 
to be upheld without verbal trickery. That states – especially Athens it turns out 
– would try to come up with an excuse or verbal trick to avoid fulfilling their 
side of a treaty makes it clear that the alternative, simply to ignore their treaty 
obligations, was even less palatable. Wheeler emphasizes that fear of the gods 
might motivate a state to try to wriggle out of its obligations in whatever way it 
could rather than openly to break a sworn agreement; states also wanted to 
avoid a reputation for bad faith among the Greeks – which was apparently even 
less desirable than one for sophistry.  
If the gods were powerful and if they took their invocation in treaties seri-
ously, we might have found a rule of law among Greek states, based on their 
treaties. It might even have been more perfect than the law within a state – for 
who can fool the gods? But, it does not require the thesis of a loss of faith in 
fourth-century Athens, an implausible proposition, to explain that the gods 
were not completely trusted to enforce treaty obligations. Among other diffi-
                                                
21  Lonis 1980, 267. 
22  Adcock and Mosley 1975, 229. 
23  Thuc. 7.18.2. See Tritle 2007, 175 for a skeptical view of Thucydides’ account here. 
For other evidence of the belief or hope that the gods may punish treaty-breakers 
see Thuc. 1.78.4; Xen. Hell. 3.4.11, 5.4.1, 5.4.17, 6.4.3. 
24  See the judgment of Plutarch on Lysander (Plut. Lys. 8).  
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culties it was unclear whether state representatives can actually swear on behalf 
of anybody but themselves. 25 And which side broke a treaty and thus deserved 
divine wrath was often a disputed issue. Nevertheless, the practical difficulties 
of imposing a rule of law, in the strong sense, do not make the legal analogy 
unimportant or void of force. A parallel will clarify my claim. The application 
of the requirements of individual honor and the code of reciprocity to states – 
as per Lendon and Van Wees – did not in fact ensure either revenge on ene-
mies or gratitude and assistance to friends; indeed, failures to reciprocate were 
frequent. Like interstate reciprocity, legalism was one of several important 
systems of thinking according to which Athenians judged other states and 
which influenced but did not fully determine their own actions.  
In fact, I think we can go further than this. One body of evidence suggests 
that treaties, a crucial manifestation of legalism, did possess a special force in 
the Greek world and, in some respects, stood above the mass of other moral 
claims, emotional appeals, and cold calculations that seem to have driven Athe-
nian foreign policy. We may grant that speeches about whether to go to war 
included all sorts of arguments, honorific appeals, considerations of advantages, 
admissions of the general superiority of peace or, on the other hand, a variety 
of bellicose domestic analogies. But the question put to a vote seems often to 
have been whether a treaty had been broken and was thus void. At the outset 
of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartan assembly was told to divide and to vote 
depending on whether they thought that “the treaty has been broken and that 
the Athenians are acting unjustly”; an affirmative vote was a vote for war.26 An 
important, perhaps crucial step in the breakdown of the Peace of Nicias was 
taken when the Athenians voted that the Spartans had not kept their oaths and 
had this inscribed at the bottom of the treaty stele.27 So, too, the war of Chaer-
onea began, on the Athenian side, when they voted to destroy the stele of the 
Peace of Philocrates with Philip.28 Such physical abrogation of treaties was not 
necessarily standard practice – as Sarah Bolmarcich has shown29 – but when it 
did occur, it seems to have amounted to a declaration of war. That the declara-
tion of war, aimed to justify the war to the citizens of the declaring state and to 
the wider Greek world, was described in terms of treaty obligations or the 
failure to uphold them shows the importance of legalism among states.  
                                                
25  Lonis 1980, esp. 278.  
26  Thuc. 1.87.2. 
27  Thuc. 5.56.3; Ar. Lys. 513-414. 
28  Philochorus in Didymus col. I.67-74; Dion. Hal. Ad. Amm. 1.11; FGrHist 328 F54. 
See Harding 2006, 114-115. See also IG ii2 116 = RO 44. 
29  Bolmarcich 2007.  
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This practice had both an internal and external rationale. Within Athens, for 
example, a treaty was a decree of the assembly, a psephisma, and thus had the 
force of law.30 In this respect, it is too weak to speak of the “legal analogy”: 
treaties were legally binding. Before somebody could propose an action con-
trary to a treaty – or perhaps in conjunction with such a proposal – the Atheni-
ans had to vote to declare the treaty void; they sometimes publicized this by the 
physical destruction of the public copy of the treaty. This action also served to 
reassure those Athenians, sometimes a large number of prominent men, who 
had sworn to the treaty that the god’s wrath would not pursue them.31 The 
official abrogation of a treaty was also directed at an external audience, the 
opinions of the Greek world at large. This audience could not be expected to 
sympathize with many of the arguments made in the assembly: Athens’ self-
interest or its need for preeminence in the Greek world would have left them 
cold. That another state had broken its treaty was a justification for war with 
general rather than a partial appeal. For all these reasons, if a speaker could 
convince the Athenians that a certain course of action was required by or for-




Interstate legalism and ancient law 
 
The definition of law as “generalized commands backed by authoritative sanc-
tions” is not the only one possible. According to some modern definitions 
Greece possessed a system of international law – Sheets, for example, invokes 
the notion of “horizontal law.”32 I don’t think that we should forget entirely 
about sanctions – especially given the Greeks’ own attempt to enlist the Gods 
to punish treaty-breakers. I also do not wish to enter into a discussion of differ-
ent definitions of law, something outside of my field. But the legal analogy 
probably involved less of a stretch in its ancient context; for the legal system 
and thinking that the Athenians possessed and applied to the realm of states 
was not the same as a modern system. These differences make Athenian do-
mestic law unsatisfactory by modern standards, but they made it more easily 
                                                
30  Hansen 1991, 172 points out that even treaties of explicitly unlimited duration were 
still psephismata, decrees, rather than nomoi, laws.  
31  See Lonis 1980.  
32  Sheets 1994; cf. Low 2007, 103. Scholars have long argued for the existence of 
international law among the Greeks: e.g., Phillipson 1911; Bederman 2001; Alonso 
2007; Lanni 2008. 
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applicable to the relations between states; legalism among states is necessarily 
more like Athenian legal system than it is like that of a modern nation state.  
The Athenian legal system depended to a large extent on self-help in the ex-
ecution of court decisions or even in lieu of a jury trial.33 For example, the 
winning plaintiff in a property suit was expected to take control of the property 
awarded him on his own. It was eventually possible to have the state appropri-
ate the award, but this process might require further lawsuits. Given this con-
text, the notion, for example, that whoever wanted to could act as an enforcer 
of a Common Peace, would have seemed more legalistic to a classical Athenian 
than it does to us today; legal decisions were not as closely connected to their 
enforcement by a separate, sovereign authority.  
As I have already mentioned, binding arbitration played a large role in the 
legal resolution of disputes in Athens.34 Hence the recourse to arbitration be-
tween states would have seemed a more familiar and legal process than it does 
today. Arbitration probably preceded state control of the resolution of dis-
putes.35 Its somewhat primitive nature might have made it particularly suitable 
to the relationship of states, another realm lacking a sovereign power.  
The ideal that a trial should focus narrowly on the application of the law to the 
facts of the case was much less strong in classical Athens than it is in a modern 
court.36 Even a charitable view admits that Athenian courts took into account 
the “larger picture” and history of the case and wanted to preserve flexibility.37 
In any case, a portion, sometimes a large one, of a law court speech might treat 
the general moral character of the litigants, their past crimes or good deeds, and 
attempts to magnify the issues at stake. We saw that assembly speeches on 
foreign policy often made legalistic arguments and referred to treaties, but that 
they vary greatly in the extent to which they focus on these. That approach is 
paralleled in actual law court speeches; the application of the law is just one 
part of the case. In both cases, the general merits and status of the two parties, 
the interests of the audience, and the past history of the dispute all play as large 
a role as specific laws or treaty terms.  
A final feature of Athenian law courts is also worth considering. The Athe-
nian law courts did not have judges to direct deliberations, instruct the jury, and 
limit what might be said. Athenians were tried by their peers and nobody else. 
                                                
33  Herman 1993, 411; D. Cohen 2005, 226-229; cf. Wolff 2007, 95-96. See the sugges-
tions of Pl. Leg. 12.958a-c.  
34  Todd 1993, 123-125, 128-129. 
35  Paulus 2007; Gagarin 1986, 42-43.  
36  E. Harris 1994 has argued against this consensus, but see Yunis 2005, 197 n.13; cf. 
Lanni 2006, 41-74. 
37  E.g., Rhodes 2004.  
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Thus, in the realm of states, they felt no need for the equivalent of a modern 
judge to make decisions. A non-hierarchical conference of state representatives, 
such as the Delphic Amphictyons, would have seemed quite familiar and a 
perfectly good way to legislate, to interpret the laws, and decree sanctions, 
whose imposition could either be assumed or assigned to whichever state was 
willing to take on the task. 
 
 
Peace and law 
 
So far law; but what about peace? Thomas Krüger explains the Jewish prophe-
sies of peace established by God as a “judge of nations” in terms of the analogy 
between states and individuals:  
 
“The most important condition (…) for a vision of overcoming violence in 
the international realm through justice and peaceful settlement of conflicts, 
seems to have been the fact that analogous developments had already taken 
place successfully within individual peoples and communities – in simplified 
terms: the overcoming of revenge through law.”38  
 
Did the legal analogy have a similar irenic appeal when deployed in classical 
Greece? I think it did, but two complexities must be acknowledged from the 
start. In practice treaties of alliance could require a state to go to war: for ex-
ample, the Argives in 419/418 BC use legalistic language when they say that 
they will consider that the Athenians are doing them an injustice unless the 
Athenians take hostile action against the Spartans as per their treaty obliga-
tions.39 In addition, some Common Peace treaties authorized war against states 
breaking their terms; this process was legalistic but not peaceful.40 These cave-
ats notwithstanding, we often see dike, usually implemented by arbitration and 
often paired with horkos, oath, as an alternative to the recourse to war. This 
dichotomy appears in a number of treaties, in several speeches, and in a witti-
cism preserved in Plutarch: in this last Phocion criticized the Athenians’ desire 
to go to war with Thebes rather than to resolve legally, dikazesthai, their quarrel.  
                                                
38  Krüger 2007, 170 on Micah 4:1-5 and Isaiah 2:2-5. 
39  Thuc. 5.56.2. 
40  See Low 2007, 185 on the Common Peace of 371. 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
© 2012, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz 
ISBN Print: 9783938032510 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317845
 Legalism and Peace in Classical Greece     145 
 
He advised that they should fight the Thebans with words, in which they had 
the edge, rather than with arms in which the Thebans were superior.41 
Historically the recourse to law had replaced the blood feud as a way of resolv-
ing or, according to another account, conducting individual conflicts within the 
city; the Greeks were aware of and celebrated this advance.42 Since the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts was manifestly a desideratum among Greek states, they 
naturally thought in terms of laws operable among states as a substitute for – or 
limit upon – the violence of war. And just as in Old Testament prophesy we 
find in Greek culture religious expressions of the association of peace and legal 
justice – although not of course the notion of God as a judge of nations. For 
example, in the Theogony Hesiod has Eunomia, Dike, and Eirene as sisters, the 
Horai, who guard the works of mortal men.43 His famous description of Dike 
in the Works and Days associates her repeatedly with legal judgments (rather 
than justice in general) and insists that Dike, if practiced with foreigners, will 





                                                
41  Plut. Phoc. 9.6. For the contrast between war and arbitration, e.g., Hdt. 6.42; Thuc. 
1.78.4, 80.1, 85.2, 140.2, 141.1, 144.2, 145, 4.79.1, 118.8, 5.18.4, 41.2, 79.1; [Dem.] 
7.7, 36-37, 41, 43-44. 
42  E.g., Gagarin 1986, 46-50.  
43  Hesiod, Theogony 901-903. The association is also found in Pindar Olympian 13.7-10 
and the Hymn of the Kouretes line 37-40. Pindar makes Hesuchia –- peace but probably 
within a city - the daughter of Justice (Pythian 8.1-5).  
44  Hesiod, Works and Days 225-229, 276-280. Gagarin 1973 argues for an exclusively 
judicial sense of dike in Hesiod. Although scholars such as Dickie 1978 and Beall 
2005-2006, 176-177 have countered that it also has a more generally moral force, the 
associations with law are certainly strong enough for my argument. 
This early reference to Dike and peace suggest another way of thinking about legal-
ism among states. We have so far considered legalism as parasitical upon a prior and 
more powerful legalism within the state. This does seem to reflect the relative 
strength of law within and among states in the classical period: the recourse to law 
within the state was a potent threat; among states it was a hope. But historically le-
galistic procedures antedated written law and state curbs on violence (Gagarin 2008, 
13-36). Before these developments, similar procedures of conflict resolution may 
have been applied both within communities and between members of different 
communities – hence the practice of dike with foreigners in Hesiod. This is necessar-
ily speculative, but it may be that it was only with the advent of written law, state en-
forcement, and the elimination of the feud that the interstate realm became so dif-
ferent from the domestic world that legality there was merely analogous to justice 
within the state.  
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This paper may seem merely to have proved the obvious. After all, the exami-
nation of treaty terms has long been a staple of the diplomatic history of 
Greece. One of the possible implications of my inquiry, however, is more likely 
to provoke indignation than command bland assent. If legalism played a large 
role in Greek foreign policy thinking and if the resolution of conflict by dike 
was seen as an alternative to war, then how can the Greeks have been doomed 
by their culture, by the model of Achilles for example, to frequent and unneces-
sary wars? For example, most Greek historians are familiar with Yvon Garlan’s 
tabulation that from the beginning of the fifth century to the Lamian War, the 
Athenians were at war 2 out of 3 years and never enjoyed a decade of peace; I 
have cited it myself.45 I now wonder whether this leads to an exaggerated view 
of Athenian belligerence and consequently an over-enthusiastic embrace of 
cultural theories, specific to Greece, purporting to explain it.  
The fifth century was marked by many fierce wars, but in the fourth cen-
tury, Athens spent long periods “at war” with other states, but without doing 
anything about it. Thus, Demosthenes can query the Athenians in 351 BC, 
“Are you at war with Philip?”46 His implication was that it did not seem like 
they were and this implication was accurate. Or consider Athens and Thebes, 
neighbors who spent decades at war without ever marching out to fight a 
pitched battle? It may not be that the Athenians were egregiously bellicose, but 
rather that we are particularly sensitive to the wars of the Athenians – and the 
Greeks in general – and consequently tend to exaggerate their number and 
severity. First, they shared a language and culture and thus seem a counter-
example to any theory that puts too much stress on cultural difference and 
“othering” as a cause of war. Their sophisticated culture with its artistic, intel-
lectual, and literary accomplishments also adds to this sense of shocked disap-
pointment. Second, the Greek states in the fourth century are often seen as a 
failed Greek nation state: why couldn’t they see this, unite, and, at least, fight 
somebody other than each other. The anachronism of this view hardly needs 
stating. Greek cities were extremely happy to decide their own policies on a 
local level in what T. T. B. Ryder sees as the golden age of city-state autonomy, 
the middle fourth century.47 Third, the small size of city-states makes them 
vulnerable to the ridiculous charge of “squabbling” even when they were suc-
ceeded by Hellenistic Kingdoms and Rome, neither of whom were a whit more 
peaceful, but merely larger than the city-states that had fought wars before.  
                                                
45  Garlan 1975, 15 cited by Hunt 1998, 7.  
46  Dem. 4.25-26. 
47  Ryder 1965, 120-121.  
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If the classical Greeks did not fight an exceptional number of wars, then we 
should feel no need to seek out and to stress only the aspects of their culture 
that might explain these wars; on occasion we may feel free to linger on legal-
ism and peace.  
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A discussion on Persian diplomacy invariably focuses on Persia’s relationship 
with Greece.1 That is not surprising, as this is where the exclusively Greek 
literary and epigraphical evidence takes us. Ever since Greece came into the 
peripheral vision of the Persian king in ca. 508/507 BC, when Athens sent an 
embassy to Persia requesting aid against a possible Spartan attack after Sparta’s 
failed support for Isagoras (and accepting it with the tokens of submission, 
Earth and Water),2 Greek city-states, especially Athens and Sparta, and in the 
fourth century, Thebes, regarded Persia as a potential ally to support one Greek 
polis to her own political and military advantage against another. Following the 
events connected with the Persian Wars, and the development of Athens into 
an empire based on naval supremacy, Greek interest in the Aegean and the 
Eastern Mediterranean added to the complexities of the fight of the Greek city-
states for political dominance into which Persia was drawn as these geographi-
cal regions affected her own political sphere of influence, foremost Egypt and 
Cyprus, but also Ionia. Athens and Sparta took any opportunity to get in on 
upheavals within the empire, with plenty of opportunities presenting them-
selves especially in the fourth century, while Persia, too, for her part, enjoyed 
flexing her muscle in front of the Greeks. Ionian cities rebelling from Athenian 
or Spartan heavy-handedness found ready support from the Persian king and 
neighbouring satraps. And the Persians must have felt rather smug when, in 
393 BC, their fleet took Melos and Cythera – the first time since 480/479 BC 
that Persian ships were back in Greek waters.3  
It is probably fair to say that the relationship between the Greek states and 
the Persian Empire constantly wavered between mutual loathing and unavoid-
able co-operation borne out of political and military necessity. Against the need 
of Greek city-states to seek Persian aid against another Greek polis stood the 
Persian prerogative to regain control over Egypt, as well as Cyprus, which 
meant stopping Greek naval activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Diplo-
matic missions between Persia and the Greek city-states were numerous, reach-
ing their zenith with the Peace of Callias of 449 BC4 and the King’s Peace of 
                                                
1 For the most recent discussion see Rung 2008. 
2 Hdt. 5.73. 
3 Xen. Hell. 8.7-8. Cf. Rhodes 2006, 210; Seager 1988, 104. 
4 Renewed in 424/423 BC; ML 70 with 1998 Addenda; cf. Rhodes 2006, 113-114. 
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386 BC.5 From the first Athenian attempt to find an ally in the Persian king in 
508/507 BC to the last two, the penultimate undertaken in 341 BC to get Per-
sian support against Philip II,6 and the final one ten years later, in 331 BC, 
when an Athenian delegation was sent to Darius III in the hope to receive 
funds for their war against Alexander,7 Persia held the unchallenged position as 
the only world power whose seemingly unlimited military and financial poten-
tial was eagerly plugged into.  
Yet it is worth reminding ourselves that Persian diplomatic relationships 
with Greek city-states constitutes but one aspect of Persian diplomacy. Diplo-
matic relations must have been maintained with other peoples beyond the 
borders of the Achaemenid Empire, such as the Odrysian kingdom, the no-
madic Scythians of the Russian steppes, or the peoples beyond the Indus River. 
We possess no written sources for these, but the occasional archaeological find 
from well beyond the borders, such as the superb silver vessel from Thrace 
crafted in Achaemenid style8 or the grave finds from Pazyryk in southern Sibe-
ria9, give but a glimpse of the courtly practice of gift-giving to ruling elites out-
side the Persian Empire, which may have been part of a diplomatic exchange.10  
Likewise, if we want to understand the way in which Persia conducted her 
diplomatic relations with Greece and be able to place it within its historical 
context, we need to consider the diplomatic relations within the Persian Empire 
itself, namely those between the Persian king and the ruling elites of the satra-
pies. Rather than regarding the Persian Empire as a homogenous entity, it is 
worth emphasising the fact that it included former kingdoms and semi-
independent city-states which all had their own social structures, foremost a 
ruling elite. It was especially the latter for whom a constant effort was required 
to ensure their support and loyalty to the Persian king. Their inclusion into the 
imperial political structure was needed to ensure a smooth, peaceful running of 
the local administration, politics, law, economy and trade.11 Any resentment 
fostered by that elite could lead to rebellion, and that was to be prevented by 
assuring them of a place within the Persian system. From the reign of Cyrus II, 
the Persian kings succeeded largely in maintaining peaceful relationships with 
                                                
5 Renewed in 375 BC; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 151; Xen. Hell. 6.2.1; cf. Rhodes 
2006, 196. 
6 Dem. 10.31-34. 
7 Diod. Sic. 17.62.1-3. 
8 For a depiction see the exhibition catalogue Die alten Zivilisationen Bulgariens. Das Gold 
der Thraker, Antikenmuseum Basel und Sammlung Ludwig, Basel 2007, fig. 124a. 
9 See for example a detail of a Pazyryk tapestry in Girshman 1963, fig. 468. A com-
plete drawing is provided by Wiesner 1976, 59. 
10 On gift-giving see Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989. 
11 See Brosius 2007; Brosius 2009. 
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these lands pursuing a policy which scholars have come to define in the term 
Pax Persica, Persian Peace.12  
 
 
Persian diplomacy within the empire 
  
Persian diplomacy was conducted from the top down. We grasp its beginnings 
in the treaties concluded between the conqueror and a defeated king which 
formally handed the power – and the legitimacy to rule – over to the new king. 
They were confirmed with a marriage alliance between the victorious king and a 
daughter of the defeated king, a practice familiar from the ancient Near East.13 
The next level of diplomatic activities was aimed at the ruling elite of a con-
quered society, and were part of a set of actions determined by the concept of 
the Persian Peace. Its terms and conditions, however, were set by the king, and 
failure to accept his offer of a peaceful relationship was met with severe pun-
ishment. Persian diplomacy within the Persian Empire therefore was set be-
tween the perimeters of two extremes: Persian Peace and Zero-Tolerance. 
To give a brief description of this policy: After Cyrus’ conquest of Lydia in 
the 540s14 the Ionians and Aeolians sent messengers (Gr. aggelous) to Sardis to 
obtain from him the same terms they had when they were under the overlord-
ship of Croesus. Cyrus responded with an allegoric tale: There once was a flute 
player who saw some fish in the sea and played his flute to them in the hope 
that they would come ashore. When they refused to do so, he took a net, netted 
a large catch, and hauled them in. Seeing the fish jumping about he said to 
them: ‘You had best cease from your dancing now; you would not come out 
and dance then, when I played to you.’ The moral of the tale was to demon-
strate to the Ionians and Aeolians that they were ready to obey him only after 
Cyrus’ victory, but had refused beforehand when Cyrus had asked them to 
revolt from Croesus. Thereupon, the Ionian cities began to prepare their de-
fense against a Persian attack, except for Miletus, which had accepted the con-
queror’s terms in good time.15 
                                                
12 The concept of Persian Peace was first discussed by Root 1979; cf. Brosius 2005. 
13 It can be glimpsed in Alyattes of Lydia giving his daughter Aryenis to Astyages of 
Media (Hdt. 1.74). According to Ctesias, Cyrus II married the Median princess 
Amytis after Astyages’ defeat (Ctesias FGrH 688 F 9 (2)). Cambyses II is said to 
have married an Egyptian princess (Hdt. 3.2). For Cyrus’ arrangement with Croesus 
see Ctesias FGrH 688 F 9 (5).  
14 On the uncertainty of an accurate date for the Lydian conquest see Rollinger 2003, 
314 with n.124. Rollinger 1993, 188-197. 
15 Hdt. 1.141. 
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The story expresses rather succinctly the Persian king’s attitude towards diplo-
macy: It worked, as long as the other party played according to the king’s tune. 
If one did so, things went swimmingly. If one did not, or, as in the case of the 
Ionians and Aeolians, came round to accepting the king’s demands too late, 
military action replaced diplomatic negotiations. In 539 BC the people of Baby-
lon reaped the fruits of adhering to this kind of diplomacy when Cyrus spared 
their city and entered as a peaceful conqueror:  
 
“On the sixteenth day, (= 12 October 539 BC) Ugbaru, governor of the Guti, 
and the army of Cyrus entered Babylon without a battle … Until the end of 
the month, the shield-(bearing troops) of the Guti surrounded the gates of 
Esagil. (But) there was no interruption (of rites) in Esagil or the (other) 
temples and no date (for a performance) was missed. On the third day of 
Arahshamnu (= 29 October 539 BC) Cyrus entered Babylon. … were filled 
with … before him. There was peace in the city while Cyrus spoke (his) 
greeting to all of Babylon.”16 
 
The “peaceful” conquest of Babylon was a staged event which - in the absence 
of the Babylonian king Nabonidus himself – had involved high officials and the 
ruling elite of Babylon. It must have been preceded by negotiations between 
Cyrus and representatives of the Babylonian elite in order to ensure the smooth 
transition of power, and must have included the securing of high positions of 
that elite in the new regime. Ugbaru had already been put in charge of manag-
ing Cyrus’ ceremonial entry into Babylon, and he was to appoint the local gov-
ernors immediately after the takeover.17 Cyrus II himself emphasised the peace-
ful conquest in his inscription, the Cyrus-Cylinder, in which the political act 
gained a religious dimension, since it claimed that Bel-Marduk literally had 
invited Cyrus to take Babylon and to restore the worship for the city-god ne-
glected under Nabonidus.18  
Cyrus’ idea of political diplomacy found another outlet on this occasion. 
The return of the exiled Jews to Jerusalem and Cyrus’ assurance that the temple 
in Jerusalem was to be rebuilt under Persian protection ensured him a place in 
history as the benign ruler who seemed to be able to combine two mutually 
exclusive traits: to be a conqueror and an enlightened king at the same time. 
But, as scholars such as Amélie Kuhrt, have pointed out, we should not be 
deceived by Cyrus’ image of the humane ruler.19 Behind his actions stood un-
                                                
16  ABC 7, col. III, ll. 12-19. 
17  ABC 7, col. III, l. 20. 
18 For the text of the Cyrus-Cylinder see Brosius 2000, no. 12. 
19 Cf. Kuhrt 1983. 
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disguised pragmatism and political expediency, and, as will be argued here, it 
was both these attitudes which determined Persian diplomacy throughout 
Achaemenid rule.  
The Ionians and Aeolians had missed their chance to accept the Persian 
king’s offer when he first sent messengers to request their submission prior to 
the defeat of Croesus. Had they done so, the transition of their status from 
Lydian to Persian subjects would have gone smoothly. By rejecting his offer, 
they had expressed their resistance to Persian rule, and resistance was to be met 
with punishment. Slightly different, but following the same principle, the 
‘peaceful’ conquest of Babylon undoubtedly was to some extent the result of 
Cyrus’ brutal conquest of Opis:  
 
“In the month Tishri (= September/October), when Cyrus did battle at Opis 
on the [bank of] the Tigris against the army of Akkad, the people of Akkad 
retreated. He carried off the plunder and slaughtered the people. On the 
fourteenth day Sippar was captured without a battle. Nabonidus fled.”20 
 
Neighbouring Sippar reacted by not even offering battle but surrender immedi-
ately. Babylon learned the same lesson: Resistance to Persian rule would be 
punished severely and without mercy.  
Thus, while on the one hand the king endeavoured to convey an image of 
the peace-loving and peace-keeping ruler, on the other stood a pragmatic king 
who showed no tolerance whatsoever towards those unwilling to accept the 
king’s terms of surrender or towards rebellions within the empire, and who 
eliminated in the severest possible manner those responsible for a revolt. Only 
in exceptional cases (e.g., Evagoras, Tachos, Rheomithres) did rebels survive 
their attempts at staging an uprising. In others, negotiations between the king 
and a rebel were merely a means to an end, with no chance for the rebel to 
escape punishment (e.g., Tennes of Sidon).  
As early as Darius I his subjects received a warning against opposition to 
Persian rule as stated in the final paragraph of Darius’ inscription of Naqsh-i 
Rustam: 
 
“O man, that which is the command of Ahuramazda, let it not seem repug-
nant to you. Do not leave the right path, do not rise in rebellion!”21 
 
                                                
20  ABC 7, col. III, ll. 12-15. 
21  DNa §6 (Darius, Inscription of Naqsh-i Rustam (a), Brosius 2000, no. 48). 
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Likewise a passage in Xerxes’ Daiva-inscription leaves no doubt about the 
king’s rigorous dealing with a rebellion: 
 
“Xerxes the king says: When I became king there was one among these 
countries which are inscribed above, (one which) was in commotion. Af-
terwards Ahuramazda brought me aid. By the favour of Ahuramazda I 
struck that country and subdued it.”22 
 
These sentiments leave nothing to the imagination as to how the Persian kings 
were to handle rebellions within the empire: Instant military action replaced any 





When looking at Persian rebellions we can distinguish between palace revolu-
tions which are played out in close vicinity of the king, and rebellions in the 
empire aimed at gaining independence from Persian rule. While the former type 
leaves no room for diplomatic manoeuvre whatsoever, the latter can involve 
diplomatic solutions, sometimes achieved through the aid of a mediator.  
 
 
Palace revolts and rebellions close to the king 
 
The first palace revolt in the reign of Darius I was that of Intaphernes, one of 
the seven Persian nobles, who had entered the king’s private chambers. Ac-
cused of conspiracy Intaphernes and other male members of his family were 
put to death.23 Similarly, Xerxes’ brother Masistes paid with his life for staging a 
rebellion against the king with Bactrian and Scythian forces.24 The list of rebel-
lions against the king continues under their successors: Artaxerxes I eliminated 
those connected to the palace revolt in which Xerxes I had been killed, includ-
ing his brother Darius;25 Cyrus the Younger was killed at Kunaxa in the battle 
against his brother Artaxerxes II,26 and Darius, his designated heir to the throne 
was killed after he rebelled against his father27. Under Darius II Ochus both the 
                                                
22  XPh §4 (Inscription from Persepolis (h), Brosius 2000, no. 191). 
23 Hdt. 3.119. 
24 Hdt. 9.114. 
25 Ctesias FGrH 688 F 14 (34). 
26  Xen. An. 1.8.27-29; Ctesias FGrH 688 F 16 (64); Plut. Art. 11.4-6. 
27 Plut. Art. 29.4-7. 
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rebellion of his brother Arsites and that of Pissouthnes of 420 BC, ended with 
their deaths.28 The common denominator in these cases is that the rebellions 
arose directly from a member of the royal family or a Persian noble – figures in 
the immediate vicinity of the king who made an attempt on his life. Their direct 
threat to the person of the king meant that their link with the court had been 
severed irretrievably and that they had to be eliminated.  
 
 
Rebellions in the empire 
 
Slightly more differentiated is the king’s dealing with rebellions staged within 
the empire. Though most were handled with equally drastic action as the direct 
attacks on the person of the king, occasionally we observe efforts of resolving 
matters in a diplomatic manner. From the nine rebels opposed to Darius’ king-
ship in 522/521 BC to the sack of Miletus in 494 BC for her involvement in the 
Ionian revolt, the Babylonian revolt of Belshimanni in 482/481 BC29 which was 
met with direct military action led by Xerxes himself, Artaxerxes I’s military 
actions against Bactria and Egypt (464-454 BC), for which Inaros, leader of the 
Egyptian revolt, was subsequently killed, to the killings of Datames and 
Ariobarzanes for their rebellions in Mysia and Hellespontine Phrygia respec-
tively, do we recognise a consistent handling of rebellions, often with the king 
leading the counter-offensive himself.30 
Yet, there are also exceptions to the rule. Under Artaxerxes I his brother-in-
law, Megabyxos, staged a rebellion, probably in his satrapy Syria, after the 
Egyptian rebellion of 464-454 BC,31 but, through a mediator, Artarios, satrap of 
Babylon, he was advised to enter a treaty with the king. Megabyxos, however, 
insisted on negotiating with the king directly, though he did so from the safety 
                                                
28  Ctesias FGrH 688 F 15 (52). According to Ctesias Arsites was his full brother. 
Pissouthnes was most likely the son of Hystaspes, full brother of Xerxes I. Cf. Lewis 
1977, 55. 
29 Vorderasiatische Schriftendenkmäler der kgl. Museen zu Berlin VI 331 = Brosius 2000, no. 
66. For the possible involvement of a second rebel, Shamash-eriba, see Kuhrt 1988, 
74. 
30 Datames’ rebellion took place in the early 370s. He was killed in c. 362 BC by his 
father-in-law Mithrobarzanes (Diod. Sic. 15.91.7). Ariobarzanes rebelled in c. 366 
BC and was betrayed by his son-in-law Mithradates in c. 360 BC. Artabazus went 
into Macedonian exile, and Orontes survived his revolt after being pardoned by the 
king. For a discussion of the events of the so-called Great Satraps’ revolt see 
Weiskopf 1989. 
31 Ctesias FGrH 688 F 14 (40). 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
© 2012, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz 
ISBN Print: 9783938032510 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317845
 Persian Diplomacy Between “Pax Persica” and “Zero-Tolerance”     157 
 
of his satrapy rather than appearing at the royal court.32 He was pardoned by 
the king and allowed back at court. Even more astonishing, he survived a sec-
ond estrangement from the king, when he was sent into exile after a hunting 





The point of note here is the use of a mediator and the choice between negoti-
ating with the king directly or through an arbitrator. According to Diodorus, 
Tachos the Egyptian rebel king of 361/360 BC-359 BC, also sought to negoti-
ate directly with the king to save his life, after his own son, Nectanebo II, had 
usurped the Egyptian throne in Tachos’ absence. But his survival came at a 
price: Artaxerxes II put him in charge of the Persian force against Egypt – a 
cruel twist which must have punished Tachos doubly.34  
Indirect negotiations between a rebel and the king occurred in the cases of 
Evagoras and Tennes of Sidon, with rather different results. Evagoras not only 
survived his rebellion, but he also remained king of Salamis.35 Evagoras’ sur-
vival may be understood as part of a change of policy towards the western 
satrapies and the city-kings of Western Asia Minor and the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, where local dynasts had been able to establish their power. Such a policy 
change may have be linked to the complexities of the political situation in the 
Eastern Mediterranean involving the Ionian cities as well as Cyprus, Egypt and 
Phoenicia which had drawn in the Greek city-states as well, resulting in a diffi-
cult diplomatic obstacle course for all parties involved. Certainly Egypt can be 
identified as the key factor in determining Persian policy in the Eastern Medi-
terranean. A triangle of rebellious support was being established between Egypt 
and Cypriote and Phoenician cities, with Egypt eager to keep stirring up trouble 
elsewhere to divert the king’s attention and his army away from Egypt. But 
perhaps it was merely a local issue, and as such a contained problem: Cyprus 
had not been unanimous in the revolt; the Cypriote city-kings were opposed to 
                                                
32 Ctesias FGrH 688 F 14 (42). 
33 Ctesias FGrH 688 F 14 (43). 
34 Diod. Sic. 15.92.4-5. 
35 Evagoras (411 BC-374/373 BC) failed to take control of the whole island, and 
Persian forces were sent against him staging a siege of Salamis. Eventually Evagoras 
agreed to the peace terms delivered first by Tiribazus and then by Orontes (Diod. 
Sic. 15.2.1-2, 15.8, 15.9.2) in c. 380/379 BC. They postulated that he abandoned his 
claim to rule over Cyprus, released the cities under his control, and agreed to pay 
tribute to the Persian king. He kept his title as king of Salamis and reigned until his 
death in 374/373 BC. 
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Evagoras’ attempt of sovereignty over the island, and thus Artaxerxes II could 
be certain that Evagoras’ ambitions could never been fulfilled. Salamis was 
punished for her role in the rebellion. The case makes clear that the Persian 
king defended cities under Persian control when threatened, and thus would 
ensure their semi-autonomy. It contrasts with the absence of Persian interven-
tion when Evagoras usurped the throne of Salamis in 411 BC deposing Abde-
mon – presumably, because this was an internal political matter for the city-
state alone, and as long as a usurpation was contained and tribute continued to 
be paid, the king saw no need to interfere with local politics.  
A different fate was in stall for Tennes of Sidon who rebelled in c. 345 BC 
but when faced with the Persian army led by Artaxerxes III himself, Tennes 
abandoned his plans and through the mediator Thettalion, informed the king 
that he would betray Sidon and offer his expertise on Egypt to the king. The 
one hundred Sidonians in his company were indeed betrayed to Artaxerxes II, 
as were a further five hundred Sidonians. The city was sacked, its population 
taken prisoner and resettled.36 But despite his efforts at reconciliation with the 
king, Tennes was killed.37 Turncoats did not get far in Persia. 
 
 
Persian diplomacy with Greece in action 
 
When we now turn to Persian diplomacy with Greece we see that it is in line 
with Persia’s own internal political diplomacy. Vestiges of the policy of a 
“peaceful” conquest may be found in the Earth and Water symbolism applied 
to Macedon38 and the Greek city-states by Darius and Xerxes.39 The marriage 
alliance between Bubares, son of Megabazus and the Macedonian princess 
Gygea plays out the political acceptance of Persian overlordship at Persian 
aristocratic level.40 The sackings of Miletus in 494 BC, Eretria in 490 BC and 
Athens in 480/479 BC were the punishment for cities which had shown, di-
rectly or indirectly, support for the revolt in Ionia. Attempting to resolve mat-
ters peacefully or to do a damage-limitation by eliminating city-states from the 
Persian ‘list of cities-to-fight’, accepting the king’s offer meant that the cities 
and their population were spared and a peaceful Persian take-over could be 
claimed.  
                                                
36 ABC 9. Diodorus does not specify who the Sidonians in Tennes’ company were but 
we may surmise that they were high-ranking members of the Sidonian society. 
37 Diod. Sic. 16.45.4. 
38 Hdt. 5.17. 
39 Hdt. 6.48, 7.32. 
40 Hdt. 5.21. 
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Even the use of mediators is attested: Most famously, Alexander I of Macedon 
and Murychides acted as go-betweens for Mardonius and the Athenians in the 
Persian War.41 The treaty of Lichas of 411 BC was negotiated between the 
Spartans and her allies and the satrap Tissaphernes, while the terms of the 
King’s Peace were delivered to the Greeks via Tiribazus satrap of Sardis.42  
RO 2143 reminds us that city-kings, much like satraps, were important fig-
ures through whom to reach the king. The inscription attests to the fact the 
Strato of Sidon (c. 376-360 BC) mediated between Athens and the Persian king, 
for which he was honoured as proxenos. When precisely this is to be dated is 
difficult to determine; a plausible date could be the occasion of the renewal of 
the King’s Peace in 375 BC.  
  
“--- of the Athenians, and has taken care that the envoys to the King 
whom the people sent should travel as finely as possible. 
And reply to the man who has come from the king of Sidon that if in the 
time to come he is a good man with regard to the people of Athens there is 
no possibility that he will fail to obtain whatever he needs from the Atheni-
ans. Also Strato the king of Sidon shall be proxenos of the people of Athens, 
himself and his descendants.”44 
 
Persian diplomacy with Greece is probably best captured when it deals with the 
Ionian cities. The inscription of Erythrae of 453/452 BC,45 records regulations 
imposed by Athens on the city, including the establishment of a Council of 120, 
under the auspices of Athenian episkopoi, overseers, and a phrouarchos, a garrison 
commander. The regulations included an oath of allegiance for that council,46 
with a commitment not to revolt and not to take back those who had fled to 
                                                
41 Hdt. 8.140-144, 9.4. 
42 The treaty of Lichas (Thuc. 8.58) was the agreement between Sparta and her allies 
with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, “concerning the interest 
of the king”. For the previous versions of the treaty (Treaty of Chalcidaeus: the 
agreement between Sparta and her allies with the King and Tissaphernes; Treaty of 
Therimenes: the agreement between Sparta and her allies with King Darius, the 
King’s sons, and Tissaphernes) see Thuc. 8.18 and 8.36-37.  
43 Tod 139; Harding 40.  
44  RO 21, ll. 1-12: --- Ἀθηναί[ων, κ]αὶ ἐπεμελ[ήθη] ὅπως ὡς κάλλιστα πορευθήσονται οἱ 
πρέσβεις ὡς βασιλέα οὓς ὁ δῆμος ἔπεμψεν. καὶ ἀποκρίνασθαι τῶι ἥκοντι παρὰ το͂ 
Σιδωνίων βασιλέως ὅτι καὶ ἐς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ὢν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν 
Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἔστι ὅτι ἀτυχήσει παρὰ Ἀθηναίων ὧν ἂν δέηται. εἶναι δὲ καὶ πρόξενον 
τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων Στράτωνα τὸν Σιδῶνος βασιλέα, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκγόνος. 
45 This was the first year of tribute collection in Athens (ML 40; Fornara 71). Cf. 
Rhodes 2006, 46. 
46 Rhodes 2006, 47. 
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the ‘Medes’. It was a reaction to previous events during which a pro-Persian 
faction had revolted with Persian support, and sought refuge in Persian terri-
tory when Athens had regained control over Erythrae. The city paid for this 
attempt with an imposed democracy under the watchful eye of the Athenian 
officials there. Persia seems to have offered merely passive support for the 
rebellion, but this nevertheless shows that Persia was willing to support those 
rebelling from Athenian imperial power.  
 
“Nor shall I desert either on my own initiative nor shall I be persuaded by 
anyone else, not anyone. Nor shall I receive back any of the exiles either on 
my own initiative nor shall I be persuaded by anyone else. Of those who 
fled to the Medes without the assent of the Athenians and of the People, I 
shall not banish those who remained in Erythrae without the assent of the 
Athenians and the People.”47  
 
Erythrae had been a member of the Delian League, but, as the inscription of 
453/452 BC makes amply clear, in it was an unhappy ally. In 413/412 BC 
Erythrae was one of the first cities to rebel against Athens.48 Coming under 
pressure from the new Spartan hegemony, the city then accepted the offer of 
autonomy (from Sparta) from Pharnabazus and Conon in 394 BC.49 In this 
context Erythrae honoured Conon as benefactor and proxenos.50 By c. 390 BC 
however, Athens had gained control over the Aegean and over Erythrae once 
again:51  
 
                                                
47 ML 40, ll. 23-29: [κ]αὶ οὐκ [ἀποσ]τέσομαι Ἀθεναίον το͂ π[λ]έθος οὐδὲ [το͂ν] χσυνμάχον 
το͂ν Ἀθεναίον οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἐγὸ ο[ὔ]τ’ ἄ[λ]λοι πε[ί]σομ[αι οὐ]δ ---------- οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἐγὸ 
οὔτ’ ἄλλο[ι π]εί[σομαι ---------] τὸν φ[υγά]δον [κατ]αδέχσομαι οὐδ[ὲ] hένα οὔτ[-------- 
ἄλλο]ι πείσο[μ]α[ι το͂ν ἐς] Μέδος φε[υ]γό[ντο]ν ἄνευ τε͂[ς] βο[λε͂ς τε͂ς Ἀθε]ναίον καὶ το͂ 
[δέ]μο [ο]ὐδὲ το͂ν μενόντον ἐχσελο͂ [ἄ]ν[ευ] τε͂ς β[ολε͂ς] τε͂ς Ἀθεναίον καὶ [το͂] δέμο. A 
similar situation is found in Samos. In 441 BC a conflict between Miletus and Samos 
forced Samian exiles to seek refuge with Pissouthnes, satrap of Sardis. With 700 
troops he restored order in Samos (Thuc. 1.115.2-5). When Samos revolted from 
Athens, (c. 440/439 BC) she handed over Athenian officials from Samos to Pis-
southnes. In the end Samos was defeated by the Athenian navy, but both Erythrae 
and Samos show that there were Greeks ready to go over to Persia.  
 For a statue of Conon on Samos see RO 46; Paus. 6.3.16. 
48 Thuc. 8.5.4-6.14.2. 
49 Diod. Sic. 14.84.3-4; Xen. Hell. 4.8.1-2. 
50 RO 8. 
51 The Athenian Thrasybulus was responsible for Athens’ imperial revival in 390, 
though he was killed a year later (Rhodes 2006, 193). 
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“It shall not be permitted to any of the generals to make a reconciliation 
with those on the Acropolis without the consent of the people of Athens; 
nor shall it be permitted to any one to reinstate in Erythrae any of the exiles 
whom the Erythraeans drive out, without the consent of the people of Ery-
thrae. 
Concerning not giving up Erythrae to the barbarians, reply to the Erythrae-
ans that it has been resolved by the people of Athens ---“52  
 
Athens was setting the terms of political negotiations. Of particular interest 
here is the last section, which has been interpreted by Rhodes/Osborne to 
mean that “Athens responds to Erythraeans who did not want to be ‘given up 
to the barbarians’”.53 But in my view this is an interpretation based on a mere 
assumption that there was such a request by a faction of Erythraeans to Athens. 
Such a plea does not square with the evidence gathered so far, namely that 
Erythrae had been an unwilling member of the Delian League, resulting in the 
rebellion of a pro-Persian faction before 453 BC to which Athens reacted with 
the imposition of episkopoi and a phrouarchos. It rebelled again from Athens in 
413/412 BC and in 394 BC even honoured Conon for his part in Persia’s aid 
against Spartan control. Under these circumstances it does not seem very likely 
that Erythrae would have welcomed Athenian control when it reappeared in 
390 BC. In contrast, there is no evidence which would suggest pressure from 
Persia for which it sought protection. Resentment for Athenian/Spartan con-
trol was more explicitly expressed than for any involvement with “the barbar-
ian”. Perhaps we would be better advised to read the phrase, “not giving up 
Erythrae to the barbarians” differently: Had the Erythraeans requested from 
Athens to be allowed to go over to Persia, and had Athens responded by saying 
that they were not going to handing Erythrae over to “the barbarians”, and that 
the present text provided further arguments to that effect?54  
A case in support of the argument that there was no resentment of political 
involvement with Persia, and that collaboration with Persia was a viable option 
can be made: Persian handling of Ionian matters and respect for the status of 
                                                
52  RO 17. μὴ ἐξεῖνα[ι τ]ῶν στρατηγῶν διαλλάξαι μηθενὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει ἄνευ τοῦ 
δήμου το͂ Ἀθηναίων· μηδὲ τῶμ φυγάδων, οὓς ἂν ἐξελάσωσιν Ἐρυθραῖοι, μηδενὶ 
ἐξεῖναι κατάγειν ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς ἄνευ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἐρυθραίων. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ 
ἐκδίδοσθαι Ἐρυθραίους τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς Ἐρυθραίοις ὅτι δέδοκται 
[τῶ]ι δήμωι τῶι Ἀθηναίων ---. 
53 RO 76. 
54  Rather than translating έκδωδεμι as “to give up”, it could be read as “to give in 
charge of”, i.e., placing the Erythreaens under Persian control, a meaning which 
would make more positive reading than the defeatist “to give up”.  
 Athens, of course, ceded Erythrae (and Clazomenae) to Persia in 386 BC. 
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the Ionian city-states seems to have been guided by peaceful diplomacy. An 
inscription dated to the same period, sometime between 391 BC and 388 BC, 
records a lawsuit with the involvement of the Persian authority only at the 
point of solving an empasse. Within Greek-Persian diplomatic relations this 
inscription probably shows Persian diplomacy at its best. It records a conflict 
over borderland between Miletus and Myus, but when Myus abandoned the 
suit, the matter was relegated to the Persian satrap of Ionia, Struses.55 The 
jurors were representatives from Erythrae, Clazomenae, Lebedos and Ephesos: 
 
“When the Mysians had abandoned the suit, Struses, the satrap of Ionia 
heard the Ionians’ jurors and made the final decision that the land should 
belong to the Milesians.”56 
 
It is a rare example of diplomacy operating on a small scale and in a non-
rebelling context: While the legal set-up followed the practice of Greek law-
courts, the Ionian jurors sought the final verdict on the case by appealing to the 
legal institution at next level higher up, the Persian satrap of Ionia. The inscrip-
tion lends support to the argument made here, namely that Persia’s dealing with 
the Ionian cities, including Erythrae, seems to have been low key. This weakens 
the case for an Erythraean pleading with Athens not to hand her to the barbar-
ian, for which we need reasons for resentment – political pressure, interference 
in local politics, fear – traits we find in Erythrae’s relationship with Athens (and 
Sparta), but which we cannot discern from the literary and epigraphical records 





The reason why Persia pursued such a moderate policy in regard to the Ionian 
cities can be found in Persia’s general attitude towards her subject peoples 
guided by the principle of the Persian Peace: Persian diplomatic practice meant 
that Persia did not interfere with local matters any more than it had to. Within 
the Persian Empire it adhered to that policy by allowing the subject peoples to 
keep their own language, religion, culture, and law. This is what made the Per-
sian Peace work. It did not interfere with political upheaval at local level, as 
cases such as the toppling of Abdemon in 411 BC, or the dynastic struggles of 
the Hekatomnid dynasty show but it got involved as soon as an individual ruler 
                                                
55 RO 16.  
56  RO 16, ll. 40-44. ἐπεὶ δὲ Μυήσιοι τὴν δίκην ἔλιπον, Στρούσης ἀκούσας τῶν Ἰωνίης, 
[τέ]λος ἐποίησε τὴγ γῆν εἶναι Μιλησ[ί]ων. 
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threatened to unbalance the Persian Peace. Once other cities or lands were 
drawn into a rebellious conflict, rebels and rebelling cities were dealt with se-
verely. The same policy can be observed in Persia’s dealing with the Greek 
states and the cities of Ionia. Rebellions of Greek cities which threatened the 
Persian Peace suffered immediate punishment, but otherwise the cities were left 
to govern themselves. This is precisely what we can observe in Persia’s treat-
ment of the Ionian cities. They were left to pursue their own way of life as far 
as possible. As the case of Erythrea or the conflict between Miletus and Myus 
shows, political support or interference came only when invited to do so. An 
Ionian city forced to choose between being under the dictate of Athens or 
living under Persian rule might decide that “being given in charge of the bar-
barian” was not such a bad thing: at least you could be your political self – as 
long as you danced to the king’s tune!  
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David F. Elmer: Building Community Across the Battle-Lines. The Tru-
ce in I l iad  3 and 4  
Der Beitrag behandelt den im dritten und vierten Gesang der Ilias beschrie-
benen Zweikampf zwischen Alexander und Menelaos, mit dem der Konflikt 
und das Blutvergießen auf beiden Seiten beendet werden sollte. In diesem 
Zusammenhang fügt Homer die Hoffnungen der Soldaten beider Parteien ein, 
die den übergreifenden Wunsch auf ein baldiges Ende des Krieges durch diesen 
(vermeintlichen) Weg der Entscheidungsfindung deutlich machen. Beide Seiten 
werden in dieser Hoffnung vereint, so dass aus den Feinden eine vorüberge-
hende Gemeinschaft entsteht. Dieses verbindende Element wird vom Dichter 
bewusst aufgegriffen und der Gemeinschaft Ausdruck verliehen, indem die 
Hoffnungen von einem unbestimmten Sprecher (tis) formuliert werden. Das 
Scheitern des Zweikampfes als Entscheidungsinstrument löst diese temporäre 
Gemeinschaft jedoch wieder auf, die so erneut in zwei sich unerbittlich 
gegenüberstehende Kriegsparteien zerfällt.  
 
Natasha Bershadsky: The Border of War and Peace. Myth and Ritual in 
Argive-Spartan Dispute over Thyreatis  
Die Beziehungen zwischen Sparta und Argos sind in der archaischen Zeit als 
weitgehend friedlich anzusehen, wurden aber maßgeblich von einem 
mythischen Konflikt um die Thyreatis bestimmt. Dieser Mythos begründete 
wiederkehrende ritualisierte Kämpfe zwischen beiden Poleis, die Herodot in 
seiner Beschreibung einer Schlacht zwischen Argos und Sparta (Hdt. 1,28) 
reflektiert. Nach der spartanischen Annexion von Kynouria Mitte des 6. Jahr-
hunderts v.Chr. geriet die Tradition in Vergessenheit, jedoch wurde in den 
Friedensverhandlungen von 420 v.Chr. von argivischer Seite vorgeschlagen, 
dieses Ritual wiederzubeleben. Dabei waren es v.a. oligarchische Kräfte in 
Argos, die sich von einer so ostentativen Berufung auf archaische Traditionen 
eine Stärkung der eigenen Legitimation erhofften. Darüber hinaus sollte durch 
die Wiederaufnahme des rituellen Kampfes um die Thyreatis der antispar-
tanischen Propaganda der demokratischen Gegenfaktion der Boden entzogen 
werden.  
 
Sarah Bolmarcich: Thucydides’ Theory of Negotiation  
Diplomatische Verhandlungen zwischen den Kriegsparteien nehmen in dem 
Geschichtswerk des Thukydides eine bedeutende Rolle ein. Eine nähere Ana-
lyse der athenisch-spartanischen Verhandlungen kurz vor dem Ausbruch des 
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Krieges zeigt dabei, dass beide Parteien von Beginn sicher davon ausgehen 
konnten, dass ihre Forderungen von der Gegenseite abgelehnt werden würden 
- der Krieg war damit unvermeidbar. Ebenfalls ohne Ergebnis blieben Jahre 
später die Verhandlungen zwischen Athen und Melos, in denen Athen deutlich 
demonstrierte, dass es aufgrund seiner Selbstgewissheit und der klaren Über-
legenheit gleichfalls kein Interesse an offenen und ergebnisorientierten Ver-
handlungen hatte. Thukydides präsentiert damit ein Bild, in dem die Diplomatie 
im Vorfeld und während des Peloponnesischen Krieges nicht als lösungsorien-
tiert und offen erscheint, sondern allenfalls ein Mittel darstellt, die militärische 
Eskalation zu verzögern.  
 
Julia Wilker: War and Peace at the Beginning of the Fourth Century. The 
Emergence of the Koine  Eirene   
Die Idee einer koine eirene ist zum ersten Mal in den Verhandlungen in Sparta 
392/391 v.Chr. greifbar, enthielt der hier erarbeitete Vertragsentwurf doch alle 
wesentlichen Bestandteile eines Allgemeinen Friedensschlusses. Dabei wird 
deutlich, dass das Aufkommen der koine eirene-Idee in erster Linie mit der Er-
schöpfung aller am Korinthischen Krieg beteiligten Parteien zu erklären ist. 
Zum anderen zeigt eine Analyse der einzelnen Bestandteile, dass der Vertrags-
entwurf die Erfahrungen aus dem Peloponnesischen Krieg reflektierte und eine 
konsequente Weiterentwicklung der zwischenstaatlichen Verträge des 5. Jahr-
hunderts v.Chr. darstellte. Die Idee der koine eirene ist damit sowohl als innova-
tive Neuerung als auch als Konsequenz aus dem Scheitern früherer Friedens-
bemühungen zu begreifen. Scheiterte der Friedensplan von Sparta zunächst 
noch an der Ablehnung Athens, bildeten die hier formulierten Regelungen 
doch die Grundlage für den Königsfrieden von 386 v.Chr. 
 
Polly Low: Peace, Common Peace, and War in Mid-Fourth-Century 
Greece  
In den außenpolitischen Entwicklungen des 4. Jahrhunderts v.Chr. trat die 
Spannweite des Begriffes eirene besonders deutlich zutage. Neben einem idealis-
ierenden Ansatz, der Frieden als Wert ins Zentrum rückte, konnte eirene auch 
als Vertragsform verstanden werden, die kriegerische Unternehmungen gegen 
nicht in das Vertragsverhältnis eingebundene Gemeinwesen ermöglichte. Eine 
sorgfältige Analyse der griechischen Antwort auf ein Unterstützungsersuchen 
der aufständischen Satrapen 362/361 v.Chr. (RO 42) macht so deutlich, dass 
auch das hier enthaltene Lob des Friedens der zeitgenössischen expansiven 
Politik v.a. Athens nicht entgegensteht. Ähnlich wie der 375 v.Chr. in Athen 
eingerichtete Kult der Eirene konnte ein so verstandener eirene-Begriff damit 
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sowohl die Vorteile des Friedens als auch die Möglichkeit zu neuen mi-
litärischer Aktivitäten vereinigen.  
 
Peter Hunt: Legalism and Peace in Classical Greece  
Der Einhaltung von Abkommen und Berufung auf bestehende Vertragsver-
hältnisse kam in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen in Griechenland eine 
weitaus größere Bedeutung zu als zumeist in der Forschung angenommen. Der 
Beitrag beschäftigt sich insbesondere mit dem spätklassischen Athen und zeigt, 
dass in den außenpolitischen Diskussionen Vertragsklauseln einen zentralen 
Platz einnahmen. So konnte ein Vertrag nicht einfach gebrochen, sondern 
musste formal aufgelöst und für nichtig erklärt werden. Vertragliche Bindungen 
und Rechtsverhältnisse zu anderen Gemeinwesen bestimmten damit maßgeb-
lich sowohl die Diskussionen innerhalb der Polis als auch ihr außenpolitisches 
Handeln. Dabei wurde eine friedliche Lösung von Konflikten auf der Basis 
vertraglicher Regelungen einer militärischen Eskalation vorgezogen, so dass das 
Bild einer von kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen dominierten Außenpolitik 
revidiert werden muss.  
 
Maria Brosius: Persian Diplomacy Between “Pax Persica” and “Zero-
Tolerance”  
Der Beitrag behandelt die griechisch-persischen Beziehungen und ordnet diese 
in die Gesamtstruktur des Achaemenidenreiches und den Umgang mit rebel-
lierenden Untertanen ein. Dabei wird deutlich, dass der Großkönig mit Nach-
druck und Härte gegen Rebellionen vorging, die die Stabilität des Gesamt-
reiches und die Autorität der Zentralmacht gefährdeten, während lokale Revol-
ten an der Peripherie vorzugsweise mit diplomatischen Mitteln und Verhand-
lungen befriedet wurden. Dieses Vorgehen spiegelt sich im griechisch-
persischen Verhältnis, so dass als bedrohlich eingeschätzte Gefährdungen der 
Pax Persica umgehend militärisch beantwortet wurden, Gemeinden in den 
Randgebieten dagegen einen höheren Grad an Autonomie genossen. Der Fall 
der Stadt Erythrae macht dabei deutlich, dass unter diesen Umständen einige 
der griechischen Poleis in Ionien die persische Herrschaft einer Kontrolle 
durch Athen durchaus vorzogen.  
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Dicaiopolis 15 
Dike (goddess) 12, 145 
Diodorus 72, 73, 125, 157, 158 
Duris 94 
Echestratus 53 
Eirene (goddess) 12, 15, 16, 20, 129,  
130, 131, 145 
Ephorus 56 
Epicrates  102 
Eubulides 102 
Eunomia (goddess)  12, 145 
Euripides 14, 15, 121 
Eurypon 53 
Eusebius 65 
Evagoras 154, 157, 158 
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Gallus 54 
Georgius Choeroboscus 66 
Gorgias  102 
Gygea 158 
Hector 12, 26, 27, 34, 36, 37 
Helen 26, 29, 40 
Hera 42, 43 
Heraclitus 12, 16 
Herodotus 11, 13, 16, 19, 52-63, 
68, 121 
Hesiod  12, 145 
Hesychius  66 
Hieramenes 159 
Horai 12, 130, 145 
Isagoras 150 
Ismenias 96 
Isocrates  18, 122, 123, 127,  
128, 129  
Kronos 35, 42 
Laertes 31 
Lichas 159 
Lucian 49, 51 
Lycurgus 58 





Memnon of Rhodes 126 






Nabonidus 153, 154 
Nectanebo II 157 
Neoptolemus 12 
Nicias 107, 108, 141 
Odysseus 12, 13, 30, 34, 37   
Orontes 156, 157 
Othryades 60, 61, 62, 67 
Pandaros 35 
Patroklos 31, 37 
Pausanias (author) 53, 55, 56, 61,  
68  
Pausanias (Spartan regent) 79, 80 
82  
Pausanias (Spartan king) 94 
Peleus 45 








Pissouthnes 156, 160 
Plato 12, 16, 57, 65, 66 
Ploutos (god) 16 
Plutarch 15, 53, 58, 60, 61, 66,  
67, 95, 140, 144 
Polemos 15 
Polydorus 53, 54 
Polymnestus 67, 68 
Poseidon 82 
Priam 13, 19, 28, 31, 42 
Prytanis 53 
Rheomithres 154 
Sacadas 67, 68 
Simonides 61 
Sophocles 121 
Sosibius 54, 64 
Sthenolaidas 138 
Strato of Sidon 159 
Struses 162 
see also Struthas  
Struthas 101 
see also Struses  
Tachos 154, 157 
Tennes of Sidon 154, 157, 158 
Terpander 67 
Thaletas 64, 67 
Themistocles 79, 80 
Theopompus (Spartan king) 53 
Theopompus (comic poet) 95 
Theopompus (historian) 96, 122 
Thersites 30, 31 
Thettalion 158 
Thrasybulus 111, 160 
Thucydides 20, 33, 50, 51, 52, 53,  
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Tiribazus 98, 100, 101, 103,  







Xenophon 17, 18, 57, 59, 92, 97,  
98, 99, 100, 102, 119, 122, 123, 
126, 131, 139 
Xerxes I 13, 62, 155, 156, 158 
Zeus 11, 12, 29, 32, 34, 35,  
42, 43  
 
 
2. Peoples and Places 
  
Achaea, Achaeans 19, 25-31, 33-42,  
44, 45, 46, 89 
Achaemenid Empire,  21, 151, 155 
see also Persia, Persian Empire 
Aegina, Aeginetans  13, 69, 79, 81,  
82  
Aetolia, Aetolians 120, 126  
Akkad  154 
Anthene 50 
Arcadia, Arcadians 67 
Argos, Argives 19, 20, 26, 30, 33,   
49-69, 71, 72, 73, 83, 93, 95, 96, 
100, 102, 104, 106, 118, 119, 120, 
144 
Asine 55, 69 
Athenian Empire, 79, 85, 92 
see also Delian League 
Athens, Athenians  13, 15, 17, 18,  
20, 21, 25, 32, 33, 49, 50, 51, 69, 
72, 78-90, 92-97, 99-113, 118-122, 
126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135-144, 
146, 150, 151, 158-163 
Attica 79 
Aulis 95 
Babylon, Babylonians  153, 154,  
156  
Bactria, Bactrian 155, 156 
Boeotia, Boeotians 49, 95, 100,  
102, 104, 107, 111 
Bottiaioi 33 
Byzantium, Byzantians 71, 129 
Cephallenia 94 
Chaeronea  118, 141 
Chalcis, Chalcidians 54, 88  
Chios, Chians 129  
Clazomenae  161, 162 
Cnidus 96 
Colophon  67, 68 
Corcyra, Corcyreans 32, 33, 130 
Corinth, Corinthians 15, 33, 82, 83,  
93, 95, 96, 100, 102, 104 
Cynuria 19, 49-54, 56, 57, 
58, 60, 62, 63, 68, 71, 72 
Cyprus, Cypriotes 150, 157 
Cythera 58, 67, 150 
Deceleia 94 
Delphi  69, 94, 130 
Egypt, Egyptians 150, 152, 156,  
157, 158 
Elis, Eleans 33, 94, 95, 105 
Ephesos 162 
Epidaurus, Epidaurians 51, 73 
Eretria, Eretrians 54, 158 
Erythrae, Erythraeans 21, 159-163 
Esagil 153 
Euboea 95 
Gortyn  67 
Guti  153 
Halieis 120 
Hellespontine Phrygia 156 
Heraclea Trachinia 95 
Hysiai 53, 65 
Imbros 100, 102, 107, 111 
Ionia, Ionians 21, 98, 150, 152,  
153, 154, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 
163 
Ithaca 13 
Jerusalem  153 
Kunaxa  155 
Lacedaemon,  67, 93, 94, 95 
Lacedaemonians, see also Sparta                     
Laconia 54, 83 
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Lebedos  162 
Lelantine Plain 54 
Lemnos 100, 102, 107, 111 
Lesbos 38, 69 
Locri 67 
Locrians 96 
Lydia, Lydians 68, 152, 154 
Macedon 156, 158, 159  
Mantinea, Mantineans 33, 51, 73,  
119, 139  
Megara, Megarians 79, 81, 82, 83, 95 
Messene, Messenians 94 
Miletus, Milesians 152, 156, 158,  
160, 162, 163  
Mt Partheneion 51 
Mysia 156 
Myus 162, 163 
Nisaea 89  
Odrysian kingdom 151 
Olympus 12, 15, 35, 41, 42, 44 
Opis  154 




Pazyryk  151 
Pegae  89 
Piraeus 92 
Peloponnese 49, 58, 71, 97,  
103, 106, 139 
Persia, Persian Empire,  11, 13, 15,  
Persians            20, 21, 53, 58, 83, 
86, 90, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 
102, 103, 106, 112, 118, 122, 125, 
127, 150-163 
see also Achaemenid Empire 
Phocis, Phocians 96  
Phoenicia, Phoenicians 157 
Plataea, Plataean 62, 84, 87, 89 
Potidaea 79, 81, 82, 83 
Rhodos, Rhodians 40, 96, 126,  
129  
Salamis (Cyprus) 157, 158  
Sardis 97, 98, 100, 101,  
102, 103, 106, 112, 152, 159, 160 
Scyros 100, 102, 107, 111 
Scythia, Scythian 151, 155 
Siberia 151 
Sidon, Sidonians  154, 157, 158, 159  
Sippar 154 
Sparta, Spartans,  13, 15, 19, 20, 49- 
73, 78-87, 89, 92-112, 120, 126, 
127, 130, 136, 139, 140, 141, 144, 
150, 159, 160, 161, 162 
see also Lacedaemon 
Susa 100, 101, 103 
Syria 156 
Taenarum 78, 79, 81, 82 
Tegea, Tegeans 49, 56, 57  
Thebes, Thebans 14, 15, 84, 93,  
94, 95, 96, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 
107, 109, 139, 144, 145, 146, 150 
Thermopylae 62 
Thrace 151 
Thyrea 50, 51, 54, 60, 61,  
62, 64, 67, 70  














alliance 13, 32, 50, 67, 72,   
89, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 
107, 108, 112, 125, 127, 139, 144, 
152, 158 
see also symmachia 
ambassadors  50, 78, 100, 101,   
109, 111 
see also embassy, presbeis autokratores 
amphictyony, amphityonic 60, 66,  
67, 68, 144  
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arche 20, 83, 105, 107, 112 
Archidamian War 14, 81, 140 
autonomia, autonomy 15, 16, 20, 21,  
79, 92, 93, 94, 98-108, 112, 113, 
124, 146, 158, 160 
Boeotian League 95, 100, 102, 107 
Common Peace see koine eirene  
Corinthian alliance 98, 99, 100, 101,  
105, 108, 112 
Corinthian War 93, 102, 113  
Cyrus-Cylinder 153 
decarchy 94 
Delian League 13, 105, 160, 161 
dike 137, 144, 145, 146 
diplomacy, diplomatic 19, 20, 21,  
33, 78, 84-90, 97, 100, 119-123, 
131, 137, 138, 139, 140, 146, 150-
159, 162 
ekklesia 96, 97, 104, 109, 111 
eirene, eirenai 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18,  
20, 93, 107, 108, 110, 119, 120, 
121, 123-129, 133 
eleutheria 15, 124 
embassy 31, 79, 150 
Endymatia 67, 68, 69 
ephebes 55, 64, 65 
Gymnopaediae  54, 64-70 
harmost 94 
hegemony, hegemonic 13, 16, 20,  
21, 92-96, 99, 105, 106, 108, 109, 
111, 112, 125, 160 
Hellenic League 13 
helot 82, 83 
heychia 118, 119, 127 
hippeis 69, 70, 71, 72 
hoplite 58, 68, 70, 71 
horkia 28, 29, 45 
horkos 144 
see also oath  
Ionian Revolt 156 
King’s Peace, Peace of  15, 93, 107,  
Antalcidas     111, 112, 124, 127, 
150, 159 
koine eirene, Common Peace 15, 16,  
20, 92, 93, 98, 103, 107, 108, 110, 
112, 113, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 
125, 126, 128, 130, 143, 144 
League of Corinth 125, 131 
Lelantine War 54, 55 
libation 29, 140 
see also spondai  
Megarian Decree 79, 80, 81 
Melian Dialogue 20, 78, 84, 85, 89 
neutrality, neutral 13, 87, 88 
oath 19, 26, 28, 29, 31,  
32, 33, 34, 38, 45, 50, 88, 108, 125, 
137, 140, 141, 144, 159 
see also horkos 
Peace of Antalcidas, see King’s Peace 
Peace of Callias  15, 150 
Peace of Nicias 107, 108, 141  
Peace of Philocrates 141 
Peloponnesian League 83, 102, 107,  
108  
Peloponnesian War 13, 15, 20, 51,  
53, 78, 80, 84, 87, 89, 92, 93, 95, 
97, 105, 108, 112, 138, 140, 141 
Persian Wars 13, 80, 89, 150, 159 
philia 107, 124, 126, 127 
philotês 25, 26, 36, 37  
presbeis autokratores 101, 109 
proxenos 159, 160 
sacrifice 29, 31, 32, 34, 38, 43,  
45, 95, 130  
satrap, satrapy 20, 21, 98, 118, 150,  
151, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162 
Second Athenian League 102, 127 
spondai (libation) 29 
spondai (truce) 107, 108, 110, 120,  
124, 140 
see also truce 
symmachia 13, 32, 107, 124, 125, 
126, 127 
see also alliance 
synthekai 120, 126, 128, 138 
truce 13, 17, 25, 34, 35, 37,  
45, 49, 50, 89, 107, 110, 124 
see also spondai 
xenelasia 79, 81, 83 
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